We applaud May's (Reference May2018) criticism of recent attempts to reduce morality to being primarily based on evolved emotional reactions, a view often inspired by Hume. We agree with May's skepticism regarding the emotions/reasoning dichotomy, and we support his move toward a more complex view of emotions and reasoning to avoid reifying emotions and reasoning as separate processes. May makes an important contribution by providing a careful review of a great deal of literature, but we encourage him to go further by taking a developmental approach, and we begin by examining possible contradictions embedded in his work. We argue that May's goal of increasing moral knowledge requires considering the source of moral norms. We then offer an alternative approach to the typical nativist and relativist accounts of moral norms, based on the approaches of Jean Piaget and G.H. Mead.
Although May convincingly argues against sentimentalist approaches to moral psychology, his own approach is not clear. He takes for granted positions we consider problematic such as the computational theory of mind, and he also states that it is possible that humans might have evolved an innate moral faculty. On the other hand, he assumes that moral norms are relative to a culture (p. 17), and so are not objectively true. Thus, he seems to implicitly accept moral relativism because objectivism and relativism are generally considered the only two options, and he has not argued for a third alternative. However, he also seems to accept the possibility of some universal aspects of moral intuitions being “in some sense innate” (p. 102). This is too vague; in what sense innate? It has been pointed out that the multiple uses of the term “innate” are all problematic (Mameli & Bateson Reference Mameli and Bateson2006). What is usually implied is that information is encoded in a genetic program, a highly problematic position because genes do not simply carry fixed information because they are always part of a process involving other factors and can have different effects depending on what other factors are present (e.g., Fisher Reference Fisher2006; Gottlieb Reference Gottlieb2007; Meaney Reference Meaney2010; Stiles et al. Reference Stiles, Brown, Haist, Jernigan, Lerner, Liben and Müller2015). If what May is concerned with is regularity in outcome in typical human ways of life, then, from a developmental systems perspective, this can arise as an outcome from the whole human developmental system (e.g., Lickliter & Honeycutt Reference Lickliter, Honeycutt, Lerner, Overton and Molenaar2015). From this perspective, it is essential to study this whole interactive and bi-directional matrix, and it is not possible to clearly separate social from biological factors because they mutually create each other (e.g., Carpendale et al. Reference Carpendale, Hammond, Atwood, Lerner and Benson2013). It is one thing to claim that something is common in human development, but using the word innate is not an explanation; instead it is what must be explained (Lickliter & Honeycutt Reference Lickliter, Honeycutt, Blumberg, Freeman and Robinson2009; Reference Lickliter, Honeycutt, Lerner, Overton and Molenaar2015).
One way of framing debates within moral psychology is by considering what aspect of morality the various authors, all claiming to be studying morality, are trying to explain. For example, Haidt (Reference Haidt2001), as a social psychologist, is concerned with explaining typical everyday behavior, such as the way people tend to justify their choices. Although this is an aspect of human social life (e.g., Carpendale & Krebs Reference Carpendale and Krebs1995), in doing so he focuses on a small part of the overall picture of morality. Haidt's theory, along with the other approaches that May reviews, tend to overlook moral norms as a problem to be dealt with because they are just explained away as either imposed by others through socialization or they are considered evolved innate ways of thinking. However, we have argued that explaining moral norms as arising solely from biology is problematic, and, although socialization has a role in moral development, it is not a complete explanation because it fails to account for the origin and change of moral ideas and it entails moral relativism (e.g., Carpendale et al. Reference Carpendale, Hammond, Atwood, Lerner and Benson2013).
Because May has not argued for another position, it would seem that he is left with moral relativism, but this seems to clash with his wish to enhance moral knowledge and virtue because his goal seems to assume progressivity in the sense of some positions being better than others. Thus, there is something missing in May's work, although presupposed implicitly. What is missing is a discussion of moral norms and their sources. Here we argue for a third option based on the view that moral norms do not pre-exist in either the individual or the previous generation but instead emerge through a social process in the context of interaction in particular types of relationships (Carpendale et al. Reference Carpendale, Hammond, Atwood, Lerner and Benson2013). To be clear, we are not arguing for objective moral truths, nor moral relativism. Our position, based on Mead and Piaget, is different and not on the usual dichotomous choice of possibilities. It involves stepping off the pendulum, and it is based on a constructivist view of knowledge.
We encourage May to take a developmental approach to emotions and to the source of moral norms and reasoning in particular forms of interpersonal interaction. As biological and cultural approaches to moral norms fail to fully capture what needs to be explained in the case of human morality, that is, the normative dimension of right and wrong (Carpendale et al. Reference Carpendale, Hammond, Atwood, Lerner and Benson2013), we argue for a third approach – that moral norms emerge within particular forms of interpersonal interaction that create the potential for mutual understanding and agreement. We suggest that to do so requires extending thinking about the role of emotions in morality to considering how they structure the relationships within which interpersonal understanding is achieved and moral norms can potentially emerge. We have drawn inspiration for this way of thinking from G. H. Mead (Reference Mead1934) and also Piaget (Reference Piaget and Gabain1932/1965) and Habermas (Reference Habermas1983/Reference Habermas1990) in rooting the emergence of moral norms in interpersonal agreement and communication (Carpendale Reference Carpendale, Müller, Carpendale and Smith2009; Reference Carpendale, Dick and Müller2018; Carpendale et al. Reference Carpendale, Sokol, Müller, Zelazo, Chandler and Crone2010; Reference Carpendale, Hammond, Atwood, Lerner and Benson2013).
Setting this debate in a historical context is helpful in bringing out our points. At least part of the current pendulum swing away from reasoning and toward emotions was a reaction to Kohlberg's focus on moral reasoning, but, in fact, it fails to fully address the very problems he was concerned with to do with resolving conflicts between moral rules. It is true that one well-known aspect of Kohlberg's work was his focus on the development and use of forms of moral reasoning. This was based on Kohlberg's problematic interpretation of Piaget's idea of stages (Carpendale Reference Carpendale2000). But a less well-known, and perhaps at least partially incompatible, aspect of Kohlberg's complex theory and research was his view of moral development as movement toward ideal role taking, a view converging with G. H. Mead (Reference Mead1934) and Habermas (Reference Habermas1983/Reference Habermas1990). This perspective is also consistent with Piaget's pioneering work, which has generally been overlooked, perhaps because it was considered merely the inspiration for Kohlberg and therefore grouped with Kohlberg's focus on reasoning. In fact, Piaget's work is different, and they could be said to approach the same point but from opposite directions (Carpendale Reference Carpendale, Müller, Carpendale and Smith2009; Wright Reference Wright, Modgil and Modgil1982).
Whereas Kohlberg (Reference Kohlberg1981) began from reasoning, Piaget (Reference Piaget and Gabain1932/1965) started from activity. Piaget's work brings us back to a developmental approach to the link between emotions and reasoning. For Piaget, mutual affection between individuals structures the social relationships in which morality develops. Therefore, emotions are of central importance for Piaget, but this is a radically different role than that assumed by Haidt and others. Within cooperative relationships among equals children work out practical ways of getting along with each other and treating each other properly and with respect – that is, morally. Children like playing with their friends and to do so they must develop a lived morality, a way of treating each other with respect as embodied in their interactivity. They may only become able to articulate such values later as they come to be able to verbalize what is first implicit in their activity. Relationships of equality are best suited for reaching mutual understanding and arriving at a moral solution, through a moral process, what Mead (Reference Mead1934) referred to as a “moral method.” This is because individuals are obliged to listen to each other and explain their own positions. Such cooperative relationships contrast with relationships of constraint based on one sided respect and inequality. Piaget introduced these two contrasting types of relationships in terms of peer relationships versus parent-child relationships, but he also acknowledged that any relationship is some mixture of the two types and that certainly not all peer relations are cooperative nor are all parent-child relationships completely constraining. From this perspective, moral norms do not pre-exist but can emerge given certain developmental conditions in the human developmental system. This approach is only recently being recognized as a source of moral norms within social interaction (Göckeritz et al. Reference Göckeritz, Schmidt and Tomasello2014).
It might seem that we are arguing for an overly optimistic view that clashes with the extent of injustice and equality clearly evident in our world. But Piaget's (Reference Piaget and Gabain1932/1965) point with this third option is that although there are many factors at play in subverting equality, such as cultural belief systems and power imbalances, oppression is inherently unstable, leading to a constant struggle toward more equality. There is a kernel or potential to move in the direction of more equality bound up in the conception of a person as embodied in interaction and communication (e.g., Carpendale Reference Carpendale, Dick and Müller2018). There are many factors involved in explaining injustice and why people do not always do the right thing or do it for the wrong reasons. But what seems at least as important and more difficult is to explain how it is that such injustice can be recognized. It is also telling that the inhumane treatment of people and groups is typically accompanied by, and justified through, a dehumanization process. That is, the respect, and thus moral consideration, that comes from being treated as a person is denied to them.
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We applaud May's (Reference May2018) criticism of recent attempts to reduce morality to being primarily based on evolved emotional reactions, a view often inspired by Hume. We agree with May's skepticism regarding the emotions/reasoning dichotomy, and we support his move toward a more complex view of emotions and reasoning to avoid reifying emotions and reasoning as separate processes. May makes an important contribution by providing a careful review of a great deal of literature, but we encourage him to go further by taking a developmental approach, and we begin by examining possible contradictions embedded in his work. We argue that May's goal of increasing moral knowledge requires considering the source of moral norms. We then offer an alternative approach to the typical nativist and relativist accounts of moral norms, based on the approaches of Jean Piaget and G.H. Mead.
Although May convincingly argues against sentimentalist approaches to moral psychology, his own approach is not clear. He takes for granted positions we consider problematic such as the computational theory of mind, and he also states that it is possible that humans might have evolved an innate moral faculty. On the other hand, he assumes that moral norms are relative to a culture (p. 17), and so are not objectively true. Thus, he seems to implicitly accept moral relativism because objectivism and relativism are generally considered the only two options, and he has not argued for a third alternative. However, he also seems to accept the possibility of some universal aspects of moral intuitions being “in some sense innate” (p. 102). This is too vague; in what sense innate? It has been pointed out that the multiple uses of the term “innate” are all problematic (Mameli & Bateson Reference Mameli and Bateson2006). What is usually implied is that information is encoded in a genetic program, a highly problematic position because genes do not simply carry fixed information because they are always part of a process involving other factors and can have different effects depending on what other factors are present (e.g., Fisher Reference Fisher2006; Gottlieb Reference Gottlieb2007; Meaney Reference Meaney2010; Stiles et al. Reference Stiles, Brown, Haist, Jernigan, Lerner, Liben and Müller2015). If what May is concerned with is regularity in outcome in typical human ways of life, then, from a developmental systems perspective, this can arise as an outcome from the whole human developmental system (e.g., Lickliter & Honeycutt Reference Lickliter, Honeycutt, Lerner, Overton and Molenaar2015). From this perspective, it is essential to study this whole interactive and bi-directional matrix, and it is not possible to clearly separate social from biological factors because they mutually create each other (e.g., Carpendale et al. Reference Carpendale, Hammond, Atwood, Lerner and Benson2013). It is one thing to claim that something is common in human development, but using the word innate is not an explanation; instead it is what must be explained (Lickliter & Honeycutt Reference Lickliter, Honeycutt, Blumberg, Freeman and Robinson2009; Reference Lickliter, Honeycutt, Lerner, Overton and Molenaar2015).
One way of framing debates within moral psychology is by considering what aspect of morality the various authors, all claiming to be studying morality, are trying to explain. For example, Haidt (Reference Haidt2001), as a social psychologist, is concerned with explaining typical everyday behavior, such as the way people tend to justify their choices. Although this is an aspect of human social life (e.g., Carpendale & Krebs Reference Carpendale and Krebs1995), in doing so he focuses on a small part of the overall picture of morality. Haidt's theory, along with the other approaches that May reviews, tend to overlook moral norms as a problem to be dealt with because they are just explained away as either imposed by others through socialization or they are considered evolved innate ways of thinking. However, we have argued that explaining moral norms as arising solely from biology is problematic, and, although socialization has a role in moral development, it is not a complete explanation because it fails to account for the origin and change of moral ideas and it entails moral relativism (e.g., Carpendale et al. Reference Carpendale, Hammond, Atwood, Lerner and Benson2013).
Because May has not argued for another position, it would seem that he is left with moral relativism, but this seems to clash with his wish to enhance moral knowledge and virtue because his goal seems to assume progressivity in the sense of some positions being better than others. Thus, there is something missing in May's work, although presupposed implicitly. What is missing is a discussion of moral norms and their sources. Here we argue for a third option based on the view that moral norms do not pre-exist in either the individual or the previous generation but instead emerge through a social process in the context of interaction in particular types of relationships (Carpendale et al. Reference Carpendale, Hammond, Atwood, Lerner and Benson2013). To be clear, we are not arguing for objective moral truths, nor moral relativism. Our position, based on Mead and Piaget, is different and not on the usual dichotomous choice of possibilities. It involves stepping off the pendulum, and it is based on a constructivist view of knowledge.
We encourage May to take a developmental approach to emotions and to the source of moral norms and reasoning in particular forms of interpersonal interaction. As biological and cultural approaches to moral norms fail to fully capture what needs to be explained in the case of human morality, that is, the normative dimension of right and wrong (Carpendale et al. Reference Carpendale, Hammond, Atwood, Lerner and Benson2013), we argue for a third approach – that moral norms emerge within particular forms of interpersonal interaction that create the potential for mutual understanding and agreement. We suggest that to do so requires extending thinking about the role of emotions in morality to considering how they structure the relationships within which interpersonal understanding is achieved and moral norms can potentially emerge. We have drawn inspiration for this way of thinking from G. H. Mead (Reference Mead1934) and also Piaget (Reference Piaget and Gabain1932/1965) and Habermas (Reference Habermas1983/Reference Habermas1990) in rooting the emergence of moral norms in interpersonal agreement and communication (Carpendale Reference Carpendale, Müller, Carpendale and Smith2009; Reference Carpendale, Dick and Müller2018; Carpendale et al. Reference Carpendale, Sokol, Müller, Zelazo, Chandler and Crone2010; Reference Carpendale, Hammond, Atwood, Lerner and Benson2013).
Setting this debate in a historical context is helpful in bringing out our points. At least part of the current pendulum swing away from reasoning and toward emotions was a reaction to Kohlberg's focus on moral reasoning, but, in fact, it fails to fully address the very problems he was concerned with to do with resolving conflicts between moral rules. It is true that one well-known aspect of Kohlberg's work was his focus on the development and use of forms of moral reasoning. This was based on Kohlberg's problematic interpretation of Piaget's idea of stages (Carpendale Reference Carpendale2000). But a less well-known, and perhaps at least partially incompatible, aspect of Kohlberg's complex theory and research was his view of moral development as movement toward ideal role taking, a view converging with G. H. Mead (Reference Mead1934) and Habermas (Reference Habermas1983/Reference Habermas1990). This perspective is also consistent with Piaget's pioneering work, which has generally been overlooked, perhaps because it was considered merely the inspiration for Kohlberg and therefore grouped with Kohlberg's focus on reasoning. In fact, Piaget's work is different, and they could be said to approach the same point but from opposite directions (Carpendale Reference Carpendale, Müller, Carpendale and Smith2009; Wright Reference Wright, Modgil and Modgil1982).
Whereas Kohlberg (Reference Kohlberg1981) began from reasoning, Piaget (Reference Piaget and Gabain1932/1965) started from activity. Piaget's work brings us back to a developmental approach to the link between emotions and reasoning. For Piaget, mutual affection between individuals structures the social relationships in which morality develops. Therefore, emotions are of central importance for Piaget, but this is a radically different role than that assumed by Haidt and others. Within cooperative relationships among equals children work out practical ways of getting along with each other and treating each other properly and with respect – that is, morally. Children like playing with their friends and to do so they must develop a lived morality, a way of treating each other with respect as embodied in their interactivity. They may only become able to articulate such values later as they come to be able to verbalize what is first implicit in their activity. Relationships of equality are best suited for reaching mutual understanding and arriving at a moral solution, through a moral process, what Mead (Reference Mead1934) referred to as a “moral method.” This is because individuals are obliged to listen to each other and explain their own positions. Such cooperative relationships contrast with relationships of constraint based on one sided respect and inequality. Piaget introduced these two contrasting types of relationships in terms of peer relationships versus parent-child relationships, but he also acknowledged that any relationship is some mixture of the two types and that certainly not all peer relations are cooperative nor are all parent-child relationships completely constraining. From this perspective, moral norms do not pre-exist but can emerge given certain developmental conditions in the human developmental system. This approach is only recently being recognized as a source of moral norms within social interaction (Göckeritz et al. Reference Göckeritz, Schmidt and Tomasello2014).
It might seem that we are arguing for an overly optimistic view that clashes with the extent of injustice and equality clearly evident in our world. But Piaget's (Reference Piaget and Gabain1932/1965) point with this third option is that although there are many factors at play in subverting equality, such as cultural belief systems and power imbalances, oppression is inherently unstable, leading to a constant struggle toward more equality. There is a kernel or potential to move in the direction of more equality bound up in the conception of a person as embodied in interaction and communication (e.g., Carpendale Reference Carpendale, Dick and Müller2018). There are many factors involved in explaining injustice and why people do not always do the right thing or do it for the wrong reasons. But what seems at least as important and more difficult is to explain how it is that such injustice can be recognized. It is also telling that the inhumane treatment of people and groups is typically accompanied by, and justified through, a dehumanization process. That is, the respect, and thus moral consideration, that comes from being treated as a person is denied to them.