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do normative standards advance our understanding of moral judgment?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2005

david a. pizarro  and
eric luis uhlmann
david a. pizarro
Affiliation:
department of psychology and social behavior, university of california – irvine, irvine, ca 92697-7085 dpizarro@uci.edu
eric luis uhlmann
Affiliation:
department of psychology, yale university, new haven, ct 06520 eric.uhlmann@yale.edu
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Abstract

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sunstein's review of research on moral heuristics is rich and informative – even without his central claim that individuals often commit moral errors. we question the value of positing such a normative moral framework for the study of moral judgment. we also propose an alternative standard for evaluating moral judgments – that of subjective rationality.

Type
open peer commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , August 2005 , pp. 558 - 559
Copyright
2005 cambridge university press