In their target article “Homing in on Consciousness in the Nervous System: An Action-Based Synthesis,” Morsella et al. propose the passive frame theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, assumes that the primary function of consciousness consists in serving as a frame that reflects a form of integration associated with action selection, which directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. A behavioral domain which strongly corresponds to this model is the domain of emotions. Emotions are, indeed, considered as adaptive behaviors, capable of interrupting with an urgency procedure the ongoing action, to rapidly select a new operative scheme (Oatley & Johnson-Laird Reference Oatley and Johnson-Laird1987). The action schemata, unconsciously activated by the process of spontaneous emotional computation, can be viewed as action dispositions, automatically selected from a small number of innate operative patterns, corresponding to the basic emotions and preparatory for (or supporting) specific behavioral responses (Frijda Reference Frijda1986). These behavioral patterns help solve important adaptive problems of the human species, and include expressive-communicative components, postural changes, locomotion, bodily movements, and a sizeable recruitment of the autonomic nervous system. On the other hand, behavioral responses selected by the cognitive component of the emotional system consist of controlled strategic plans, which do not include a communicative-expressive component and a concomitant strong activation of the autonomic nervous system, but an integration of actions aiming to find the most appropriate solution to the adaptive problem.
This difference between spontaneous and cognitive levels of emotions is due to the fact that, according to most authors, emotions have a complex hierarchical structure, in which some sensorimotor aspects are unconscious, but other aspects, such as the subjective feelings and the selection of the skeletal muscle output, are conscious. In particular, Leventhal (Reference Leventhal and Berkowitz1987) proposes that human emotions may be based on three functional levels: (a) the sensori-motor, (b) the schematic, and (c) the conceptual level. The sensori-motor level consists of a set of innate, universal expressive-motor programs, which are triggered automatically by a certain number of stimuli and include components of motor and vegetative activation, as well as the corresponding subjective emotional feelings. During individual development, these basic programs are linked, by mechanisms of conditioned learning, to situations of the individual experience, building the “emotional schemata,” which correspond to partly unconscious spontaneous emotions, are automatically elicited, and are accompanied by subjective feelings which constitute the hallmarks of a true emotion. The last stage of this model is the conceptual level, which is based on mechanisms of conscious declarative memory and does not store instances of concrete emotional experiences, but abstract notions about emotions and the social rules that allow their expression, leading to the conscious and controlled selection of the most appropriate action schemata.
A further difference between the above-mentioned levels of emotional processing is that (according to the clinical and experimental data reviewed in Gainotti [Reference Gainotti2012]) unconscious aspects of emotions are mainly subsumed by subcortical structures, whereas the more conscious aspects are supported by cortical structures. Furthermore, a right hemisphere network mainly subsumes spontaneous emotions, whereas a left hemisphere neural system, related to language and to the control of intentional movements, supports the cognitive aspects of emotions. Therefore, contrary to what happens in spontaneous, automatic forms of emotional behavior (in which vegetative, expressive, and postural components of the response are unconsciously produced), in controlled and intentional forms of emotional expression conscious experience is accompanied by a selective and deliberate action selection, which directs skeletal muscle output towards goal-directed patterns of response.
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In their target article “Homing in on Consciousness in the Nervous System: An Action-Based Synthesis,” Morsella et al. propose the passive frame theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, assumes that the primary function of consciousness consists in serving as a frame that reflects a form of integration associated with action selection, which directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. A behavioral domain which strongly corresponds to this model is the domain of emotions. Emotions are, indeed, considered as adaptive behaviors, capable of interrupting with an urgency procedure the ongoing action, to rapidly select a new operative scheme (Oatley & Johnson-Laird Reference Oatley and Johnson-Laird1987). The action schemata, unconsciously activated by the process of spontaneous emotional computation, can be viewed as action dispositions, automatically selected from a small number of innate operative patterns, corresponding to the basic emotions and preparatory for (or supporting) specific behavioral responses (Frijda Reference Frijda1986). These behavioral patterns help solve important adaptive problems of the human species, and include expressive-communicative components, postural changes, locomotion, bodily movements, and a sizeable recruitment of the autonomic nervous system. On the other hand, behavioral responses selected by the cognitive component of the emotional system consist of controlled strategic plans, which do not include a communicative-expressive component and a concomitant strong activation of the autonomic nervous system, but an integration of actions aiming to find the most appropriate solution to the adaptive problem.
This difference between spontaneous and cognitive levels of emotions is due to the fact that, according to most authors, emotions have a complex hierarchical structure, in which some sensorimotor aspects are unconscious, but other aspects, such as the subjective feelings and the selection of the skeletal muscle output, are conscious. In particular, Leventhal (Reference Leventhal and Berkowitz1987) proposes that human emotions may be based on three functional levels: (a) the sensori-motor, (b) the schematic, and (c) the conceptual level. The sensori-motor level consists of a set of innate, universal expressive-motor programs, which are triggered automatically by a certain number of stimuli and include components of motor and vegetative activation, as well as the corresponding subjective emotional feelings. During individual development, these basic programs are linked, by mechanisms of conditioned learning, to situations of the individual experience, building the “emotional schemata,” which correspond to partly unconscious spontaneous emotions, are automatically elicited, and are accompanied by subjective feelings which constitute the hallmarks of a true emotion. The last stage of this model is the conceptual level, which is based on mechanisms of conscious declarative memory and does not store instances of concrete emotional experiences, but abstract notions about emotions and the social rules that allow their expression, leading to the conscious and controlled selection of the most appropriate action schemata.
A further difference between the above-mentioned levels of emotional processing is that (according to the clinical and experimental data reviewed in Gainotti [Reference Gainotti2012]) unconscious aspects of emotions are mainly subsumed by subcortical structures, whereas the more conscious aspects are supported by cortical structures. Furthermore, a right hemisphere network mainly subsumes spontaneous emotions, whereas a left hemisphere neural system, related to language and to the control of intentional movements, supports the cognitive aspects of emotions. Therefore, contrary to what happens in spontaneous, automatic forms of emotional behavior (in which vegetative, expressive, and postural components of the response are unconsciously produced), in controlled and intentional forms of emotional expression conscious experience is accompanied by a selective and deliberate action selection, which directs skeletal muscle output towards goal-directed patterns of response.