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Consciousness and mental representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Daniel Gilman
Daniel Gilman
Affiliation:
Department of Humanities, College of Medicine, Penn State University, Hershey, PA 17033 djg3@psuvm.psu.edu
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Abstract

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Block (1995t) has argued for a noncognitive and non- representational notion of phenomenal consciousness, but his putative examples of this phenomenon are conspicuous in their representational and functional properties while they do not clearly possess other phenomenal properties.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 150 - 151
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press