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Cognitive impenetrability, phenomenology, and nonconceptual content

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1999

José Luis Bermúdez
José Luis Bermúdez
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotlandjb10@stir.ac.uk www.stir.ac.uk/philosophy/cnw/webpage1.htm
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Abstract

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This commentary discusses Pylyshyn's model of perceptual processing in the light of the philosophical distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual content of perception. Pylyshyn's processing distinction maps onto an important distinction in the phenomenology of visual perception.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , June 1999 , pp. 367 - 368
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press