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The cognitive impenetrability of cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1999

Patrick Cavanagh
Patrick Cavanagh
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 patrick@wjh.harvard.edu visionlab.harvard.edu
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Abstract

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Cognitive impenetrability is really two assertions: (1) perception and cognition have access to different knowledge bases; and (2) perception does not use cognitive-style processes. The first leads to the unusual corollary that cognition is itself cognitively impenetrable. The second fails when it is seen to be the claim that reasoning is available only in conscious processing.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , June 1999 , pp. 370 - 371
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press