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Better theories are needed to distinguish perception from cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1999

Michael R. W. Dawson
Affiliation:
Biological Computation Project, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2E9 mike@bcp.psych.ualberta.ca www.bcp.ualberta.ca/
C. Darren Piercey
Affiliation:
Biological Computation Project, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2E9 mike@bcp.psych.ualberta.ca www.bcp.ualberta.ca/
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Abstract

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Pylyshyn argues that many of the methods used to study perception are too coarse to detect the distinction between perceptual and cognitive processing. We suggest that the reason for this is that the theories used to guide research in perception are at fault. More powerful theories – for instance, computer simulations – will be required to identify where perception ends and where cognition begins.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press