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The most basic units of thought do more, and less, than point

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Frank Keil
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 fckl@cornell.edu
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Abstract

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Thinking of concepts as explicit lists of features used to pick out referents neatly is indeed mistaken; but there are other alternatives than making concepts mere pointers. These alternatives are suggested by the difference between meaning X and having the concept X, problems of conceptual change, implicit conceptual schemata, the conceptual requirements of the division of cognitive labor, and how concepts figure in perception versus language.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press