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Levels of description and conflated doctrines

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

John A. Bullinaria
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Reading, Reading RG6 6AL, United Kingdomj.bullinaria@reading.ac.uk www.reading.ac.uk/AcaDepts/sx/Psych/PEOPLE/bullinaria.html
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Abstract

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It seems that I often say things that might mistakenly be thought to identify me as an adherent of the radical neuron doctrine. I take the opportunity to explain my position more clearly and argue that many apparent conflations of the radical and trivial neuron doctrines are merely the result of misunderstanding what is meant when neuroscientists talk about the relations between different levels of description. It follows that there may be considerably fewer followers of the radical doctrine than Gold & Stoljar suggest.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press