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Having a concept “see” does not imply attribution of knowledge: Some general considerations in measuring “theories of mind”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

David A. Leavens
David A. Leavens
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602; and Division of Psychobiology, Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322 dleavens@uga.cc.uga.edu
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Abstract

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That organisms have a concept “see” does not necessarily entail that they attribute knowledge to others or predict others' behaviors on the basis of inferred mental states. An alternative experimental protocol is proposed in which accurate prediction of the location of an experimenters' impending appearance is contingent upon subjects' attribution of knowledge to the experimenter.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 123 - 124
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press