Hostname: page-component-6dbcb7884d-4tctr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-14T06:06:34.928Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Extensional assumptions in theories of meaning and concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Gregory L. Murphy
Gregory L. Murphy
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Beckman Institute, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 glmurphy@uiuc.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The problems that Millikan addresses in theories of concepts arise from an extensional view of concepts and word meaning. If instead one assumes that concepts are psychological entities intended to explain human behavior and thought, many of these problems dissolve.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 80 - 81
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)