The Distancing-Embracing model outlined by Menninghaus et al. is an impressive and comprehensive account of how negative emotions can intensify engagement and enjoyment in the context of the arts. Although we applaud the broad, integrative approach adopted by the authors, and recognize the theoretical and practical value of their model, we comment here upon certain limitations and potential inconsistencies that, in our opinion, may hinder the formulation of theory-derived predictions and hypotheses for empirical testing.
Although we agree that personal safety, control, and intentionality (i.e., the notion that emotions experienced in art contexts are typically self-sought) are indeed crucial preconditions for the enjoyment of negative emotions in the context of the arts, we find the overarching concept of “psychological distance” internally contradictory. Although the lack of direct personal goal relevance typically associated with art-elicited emotions could indeed be construed as “psychological distance,” the other preconditions – control and intentionality – are less compatible with “distancing”; in fact, they imply voluntary proximity and engagement and facilitate greater immersion, identification, and transportation. Empirical evidence has shown that greater immersion (and intensity of negative emotion) is positively associated with the enjoyment of narratives and music (e.g., Eerola et al. Reference Eerola, Vuoskoski and Kautiainen2016; Green et al. Reference Green, Brock and Kaufman2004; Sparks Reference Sparks1991; Tal-Or & Cohen Reference Tal-Or and Cohen2010), and it could even be argued (as hinted at by the authors themselves) that transportation and the temporary suspension of disbelief may be conducive – or even a prerequisite – to enjoyable engagement with narrative fiction and other arts (cf. Green et al. Reference Green, Brock and Kaufman2004). Because of these positive associations between immersion, intensity of negative emotions, and enjoyment, we argue that the labelling of the Distancing factor is potentially misleading.
In our view, the most crucial limitation in the multicomponent model proposed by Menninghaus et al. is the omission of psychological mechanisms involved in the induction of emotion in the context of the arts. We argue that any model aiming to explain the enjoyment of negative emotions in the context of the arts should consider how works of art are able to induce emotional responses in the first place. Although the authors discuss empathy briefly in terms of a “meta-emotion,” where sadness gets transformed into pleasure through a self-gratifying prosocial response, we argue that empathy and empathy-related processes (embodiment, theory of mind, emotional contagion, and simulation) are actually fundamental to our engagement with (and production of) various forms of art, enabling emotion induction, transportation/immersion, and sense making. In the context of music, for example, empathic processes are thought to take place on multiple levels, ranging from preconscious, internal mimicry of emotionally expressive acoustic and gestural cues (e.g., Molnar-Szakacs & Overy Reference Molnar-Szakacs and Overy2006) to imaginative perspective taking and mentalizing evoked by the process of music listening (e.g., Clarke et al. Reference Clarke, DeNora and Vuoskoski2015; Levinson Reference Levinson and Kieran2006) and extra-musical information (Vuoskoski & Eerola Reference Vuoskoski and Eerola2015). These processes may be fundamental in understanding why we find engaging with arts and fiction enjoyable – including engagement with negative emotions, as empirical studies have associated trait empathy and deliberate perspective taking with greater intensity (even at the level of psychophysiology) and greater enjoyment of negative emotion in the context of music, opera, and film (e.g., Eerola et al. Reference Eerola, Vuoskoski and Kautiainen2016; Miu & Baltes Reference Miu and Balteş2012; Vuoskoski et al., Reference Vuoskoski, Thompson, McIlwain and Eerola2012; Zickfeld et al. Reference Zickfeld, Schubert, Seibt and Fiske2017). However, althoughempathy and related processes may play an important role in facilitating feelings of being moved and the enjoyment of sadness-evoking works of art (e.g., Eerola et al. Reference Eerola, Vuoskoski and Kautiainen2016; Vuoskoski & Eerola Reference Vuoskoski and Eerola2017; Wassiliwizky et al. Reference Wassiliwizky, Wagner, Jacobsen and Menninghaus2015; Zickfeld et al. Reference Zickfeld, Schubert, Seibt and Fiske2017), this is probably not the case for horror films and suspension, for example. In fact, empirical evidence reveals a negative relationship between empathy and the enjoyment of horror films (Tamborini et al. Reference Tamborini, Stiff and Heidel1990). These divergent relationships between empathy and the enjoyment of sadness and fear/horror in the context of arts highlight the need to consider the psychological mechanisms of emotion induction in association with the enjoyment of those emotions. For instance, although feelings of being moved and suspension may indeed both be mixed emotions that mediate the enjoyment of sadness and horror (respectively), the psychological processes through which this mediation takes place may be fundamentally different in the two cases.
Finally, we address the somewhat confusing use of the term transformation. Menninghaus et al. firmly reject the notion of “a full-blown transformation of negative into positive affect” (sect. 4.6), while simultaneously characterizing their model as a “two-factor transformation model.” Despite this characterization, it is not explicated what kind of (partial?) transformation takes place and where, and thus, it is unclear whether the notion of “transformation” is an accurate (or necessary) characterisation of the processes involved. However, if the model actually rejects transformation, it would be constructive to label the building blocks differently.
Despite the aforementioned limitations and points of potential confusion, the Distancing-Embracing model undeniably moves the field closer to understanding the wide appeal of negative topics in the arts. Future work should strive to investigate the psychological processes underlying the different components outlined in the broad model and to put forward a more detailed account of how different mechanisms of emotion induction contribute to – and interact with – the model components. To put this plea more broadly, it would be important to specify the ontological bases of the different model components, as the assumptions concerning the interpretation of mixed emotions and cultural scripts (for instance) depend largely on the framework in which they are construed.
The Distancing-Embracing model outlined by Menninghaus et al. is an impressive and comprehensive account of how negative emotions can intensify engagement and enjoyment in the context of the arts. Although we applaud the broad, integrative approach adopted by the authors, and recognize the theoretical and practical value of their model, we comment here upon certain limitations and potential inconsistencies that, in our opinion, may hinder the formulation of theory-derived predictions and hypotheses for empirical testing.
Although we agree that personal safety, control, and intentionality (i.e., the notion that emotions experienced in art contexts are typically self-sought) are indeed crucial preconditions for the enjoyment of negative emotions in the context of the arts, we find the overarching concept of “psychological distance” internally contradictory. Although the lack of direct personal goal relevance typically associated with art-elicited emotions could indeed be construed as “psychological distance,” the other preconditions – control and intentionality – are less compatible with “distancing”; in fact, they imply voluntary proximity and engagement and facilitate greater immersion, identification, and transportation. Empirical evidence has shown that greater immersion (and intensity of negative emotion) is positively associated with the enjoyment of narratives and music (e.g., Eerola et al. Reference Eerola, Vuoskoski and Kautiainen2016; Green et al. Reference Green, Brock and Kaufman2004; Sparks Reference Sparks1991; Tal-Or & Cohen Reference Tal-Or and Cohen2010), and it could even be argued (as hinted at by the authors themselves) that transportation and the temporary suspension of disbelief may be conducive – or even a prerequisite – to enjoyable engagement with narrative fiction and other arts (cf. Green et al. Reference Green, Brock and Kaufman2004). Because of these positive associations between immersion, intensity of negative emotions, and enjoyment, we argue that the labelling of the Distancing factor is potentially misleading.
In our view, the most crucial limitation in the multicomponent model proposed by Menninghaus et al. is the omission of psychological mechanisms involved in the induction of emotion in the context of the arts. We argue that any model aiming to explain the enjoyment of negative emotions in the context of the arts should consider how works of art are able to induce emotional responses in the first place. Although the authors discuss empathy briefly in terms of a “meta-emotion,” where sadness gets transformed into pleasure through a self-gratifying prosocial response, we argue that empathy and empathy-related processes (embodiment, theory of mind, emotional contagion, and simulation) are actually fundamental to our engagement with (and production of) various forms of art, enabling emotion induction, transportation/immersion, and sense making. In the context of music, for example, empathic processes are thought to take place on multiple levels, ranging from preconscious, internal mimicry of emotionally expressive acoustic and gestural cues (e.g., Molnar-Szakacs & Overy Reference Molnar-Szakacs and Overy2006) to imaginative perspective taking and mentalizing evoked by the process of music listening (e.g., Clarke et al. Reference Clarke, DeNora and Vuoskoski2015; Levinson Reference Levinson and Kieran2006) and extra-musical information (Vuoskoski & Eerola Reference Vuoskoski and Eerola2015). These processes may be fundamental in understanding why we find engaging with arts and fiction enjoyable – including engagement with negative emotions, as empirical studies have associated trait empathy and deliberate perspective taking with greater intensity (even at the level of psychophysiology) and greater enjoyment of negative emotion in the context of music, opera, and film (e.g., Eerola et al. Reference Eerola, Vuoskoski and Kautiainen2016; Miu & Baltes Reference Miu and Balteş2012; Vuoskoski et al., Reference Vuoskoski, Thompson, McIlwain and Eerola2012; Zickfeld et al. Reference Zickfeld, Schubert, Seibt and Fiske2017). However, althoughempathy and related processes may play an important role in facilitating feelings of being moved and the enjoyment of sadness-evoking works of art (e.g., Eerola et al. Reference Eerola, Vuoskoski and Kautiainen2016; Vuoskoski & Eerola Reference Vuoskoski and Eerola2017; Wassiliwizky et al. Reference Wassiliwizky, Wagner, Jacobsen and Menninghaus2015; Zickfeld et al. Reference Zickfeld, Schubert, Seibt and Fiske2017), this is probably not the case for horror films and suspension, for example. In fact, empirical evidence reveals a negative relationship between empathy and the enjoyment of horror films (Tamborini et al. Reference Tamborini, Stiff and Heidel1990). These divergent relationships between empathy and the enjoyment of sadness and fear/horror in the context of arts highlight the need to consider the psychological mechanisms of emotion induction in association with the enjoyment of those emotions. For instance, although feelings of being moved and suspension may indeed both be mixed emotions that mediate the enjoyment of sadness and horror (respectively), the psychological processes through which this mediation takes place may be fundamentally different in the two cases.
Finally, we address the somewhat confusing use of the term transformation. Menninghaus et al. firmly reject the notion of “a full-blown transformation of negative into positive affect” (sect. 4.6), while simultaneously characterizing their model as a “two-factor transformation model.” Despite this characterization, it is not explicated what kind of (partial?) transformation takes place and where, and thus, it is unclear whether the notion of “transformation” is an accurate (or necessary) characterisation of the processes involved. However, if the model actually rejects transformation, it would be constructive to label the building blocks differently.
Despite the aforementioned limitations and points of potential confusion, the Distancing-Embracing model undeniably moves the field closer to understanding the wide appeal of negative topics in the arts. Future work should strive to investigate the psychological processes underlying the different components outlined in the broad model and to put forward a more detailed account of how different mechanisms of emotion induction contribute to – and interact with – the model components. To put this plea more broadly, it would be important to specify the ontological bases of the different model components, as the assumptions concerning the interpretation of mixed emotions and cultural scripts (for instance) depend largely on the framework in which they are construed.