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The ephemeral stories of our lives
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 May 2023
Abstract
Johnson et al. make a persuasive case that qualitative, story-like reasoning plays a crucial role in everyday thought and decision-making. This commentary questions the cohesiveness of this type of reasoning and the representations that generate it. Perhaps narratives do not underpin, but are ephemeral products of thought, created when we need to justify our actions to ourselves and others.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Author response
Narratives, probabilities, and the currency of thought