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Brute association is not identity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1999

Bram van Heuveln
Affiliation:
Program in Philosophy, Computers, and Cognitive Science, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000 bram@turing.paccs.binghamton.edudietrich@turing.paccs.binghamton.edu www.paccs.binghamton.edu
Eric Dietrich
Affiliation:
Program in Philosophy, Computers, and Cognitive Science, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000 bram@turing.paccs.binghamton.edudietrich@turing.paccs.binghamton.edu www.paccs.binghamton.edu
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Abstract

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O'Brien & Opie run into conceptual problems trying to equate stable patterns of neural activation with phenomenal experiences. They also seem to make a logical mistake in thinking that the brute association between stable neural patterns and phenomenal experiences implies that they are identical. In general, the authors do not provide us with a story as to why stable neural patterns constitute phenomenal experience.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press