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Anecdotes, omniscience, and associative learning in examining the theory of mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Steven M. Green ,
David L. Wilson  and
Siân Evans
Steven M. Green
Affiliation:
Department of Biology, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124-0421 sgreen@umiami.ir.miami.edu fig.cox.miami.edu
David L. Wilson
Affiliation:
Department of Biology, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124-0421 sgreen@umiami.ir.miami.edu fig.cox.miami.edu
Siân Evans
Affiliation:
Department of Biology, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124-0421 sgreen@umiami.ir.miami.edu fig.cox.miami.edu
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Abstract

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We suggest that anecdotes have evidentiary value in interpreting nonhuman primate behavior. We also believe that any outcome from the experiments proposed by Heyes can be interpreted as a product of previous experience with trainers or as associative learning using the experimental cues. No potential outcome is clearcut evidence for or against the theory of mind proposition.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 122
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press