Although the literature about amnesties is extensive, it is still extremely difficult to answer the question “Are amnesties legitimate and permissible if they cover serious crimes?”, and this book attempts to fill that gap. The book deals with the topic in a comprehensive manner and succeeds in shedding new light on the wide variety of interpretations and positions regarding this tricky question. The author is a researcher in international law currently based in Liége (Belgium), and obtained her PhD at Middlesex University in London under the supervision of Professor Schabas.

Although the current (apparently) mainstream view holds that amnesties for international crimes and/or serious human rights [HR] violations are always impermissible, and that this has perhaps become a customary rule, such an assumption is often based on a too simplistic approach. The author scrutinizes it under two different and complementary perspectives.

First, the historical review in Part I of the book shows that, both in ancient and modern times (Chapter 1), almost all states made widespread use of amnesties. Beyond the differences as to their origins, scopes, and purposes, they were conceived as a legitimate sovereign prerogative. Even after World War II (Chapter 2), when the accountability paradigm emerged in the international arena, amnesties kept their pacification role in many experiences all over the world. They no longer entailed a duty of oblivion, like ancient amnesties, but they were still widely applied in both transitional processes and postwar contexts. This overview confirms that state and UN practice up until the 1980s and 1990s was much more flexible and nuanced as to the admissibility of these measures, despite the growing concern about their compatibility with HR protection and states’ international duties (Chapter 3). The author identifies the turning point as the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999, where, for the first time, the UN issued a reservation calling for the exclusion of serious HR violations from the scope of the amnesty that was at stake. But these chapters clearly show that the ban on amnesties for serious crimes is a very recent idea, as well as one that remains disputed.

Second, the book assesses the admissibility of amnesties from a legal perspective (Part II), conducting a thorough analysis of a huge number of normative provisions (which the author does by means of literal, authentic, and teleological interpretation rules), judicial decisions, and scholarly views, and combining it with a global study of practical experiences. She puts under scrutiny the two main grounds to affirm the invalidity of these measures, namely, the existence of an international duty to prosecute and punish (Chapter 4), and the victims’ right to a remedy (Chapter 5).

I would point out two main elements stemming from this wide and careful analysis: first, the plurality of actors that have taken part in this debate, each of them offering a different view. This has created a sort of cacophony of voices, within which it is almost impossible to single out a clear and shared position. Second, the silence that has been kept, by both states and international and judicial bodies, at several opportunities where they could easily have established a prohibition of amnesties and yet have opted for a cautious position or to remain ambiguous on the point instead. These factors allow for the conclusion that the prohibition of amnesties has not yet reached the status of a customary norm. The debate, therefore, is still ongoing, and this enjoyable book assists in clarifying and criticizing the continuing discussion.