The recent intra-state humanitarian crises in Libya and Syria have drawn attention to China's evolving stance on the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) concept, and also provided important insights into Beijing's broader attitudes towards international law and global governance. While China officially endorsed R2P in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD), its traditional emphasis on a strict interpretation of state sovereignty and non-intervention meant that Beijing remained cautious about international efforts to implement the concept. Given this ongoing resistance to R2P's operationalization, China's acquiescence to the passage of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 authorizing military action in Libya in March 2011 suggested the possibility of a shift towards greater Chinese acceptance of R2P and UNSC-authorized military intervention for civilian protection purposes.Footnote 1 However, the way in which NATO interpreted its mandate for the use of force in Libya—coupled with the removal of the Gaddafi government—appeared to re-ignite Beijing's long-standing concerns that R2P may be misused in order to pursue other strategic objectives such as regime change.Footnote 2 China, along with Russia, subsequently vetoed four UNSC draft resolutions which sought to impose non-forcible measures on the Syrian government. While brief moments of consensus within the UNSC have allowed the passage of several relatively weak (and largely ineffective) resolutions on Syria, deep divisions between the P3 (the US, UK, and France), on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other, have prevented the Council from agreeing on more robust measures to address the humanitarian situation.Footnote 3
In response to Western criticism of the Russian and Chinese stances on Syria, Beijing has gone to significant lengths to explain and justify its position.Footnote 4 China's aim has been to demonstrate that its behaviour during the Syrian crisis has been constructive and responsible, rather than obstructionist.Footnote 5 Beijing has defended its opposition to proposed international measures against Syria by reference to both international legal principles and pragmatic considerations. China has consistently stressed its preference for dialogue and other peaceful means of resolving the Syrian conflict.Footnote 6
In addition to defending its stance on Syria, China has played an active role in broader normative discussions over the future development of the R2P concept in the post-Libya period. Controversy over the Libyan intervention has led to renewed debate among states and scholars over R2P's third pillar—the international community's role in responding to situations in which a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations against mass atrocity crimes.Footnote 7 In late 2011, Brazil formally proposed the notion of “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP) as a means of complementing and tightening this dimension of R2P.Footnote 8 This was followed more recently by the creation of a semi-official Chinese version of R2P known as “Responsible Protection” (RP).Footnote 9
The RP concept originally appeared in a March 2012 newspaper opinion piece by Ruan Zongze, the vice-president of the China Institute for International Studies (CIIS), which is the official think tank of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Footnote 10 An expanded account of the idea—explicitly framed as an example of China contributing “its public goods to the international community”—was published in June 2012.Footnote 11 RP is concerned primarily, but not exclusively, with the most controversial dimension of R2P, namely non-consensual military intervention for civilian protection purposes. Drawing on both Brazil's RwP proposal and the original 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) conception of R2P,Footnote 12 RP puts forward six elements which offer a re-interpretation of R2P's third pillar. The Chinese initiative is intended to, first, provide criteria or guidelines for UNSC decision-making on the appropriateness of military intervention, and second, ensure that any such authorized action is monitored and supervised adequately so as to reduce the risk of R2P being used as a smokescreen for other strategic objectives such as regime change.
After initially receiving little attention, RP has recently attained greater prominence. Although it has not yet been formally adopted by the Chinese government, RP was the subject of a CIIS-hosted international conference in Beijing in October 2013 which involved delegates from a number of states. Since that event, RP has been discussed in opinion pieces by two leading R2P figures, former ICISS members Gareth EvansFootnote 13 and Ramesh Thakur.Footnote 14 Evans, in particular, sees the Chinese concept as a positive normative contribution, suggesting that “it should not be viewed as a rearguard action designed to undermine the R2P norm, but rather an effort to assume co-ownership of it”.Footnote 15 Apart from these brief commentaries, however, there has been no detailed academic analysis of the RP concept.
This paper examines the Chinese RP initiative and assesses the extent to which it offers a valuable contribution to the normative debate over R2P's third pillar following the controversy over the Libyan intervention. It also briefly considers RP's broader significance as an illustration of China's growing willingness to assert its own normative preferences in defining and shaping international law and global governance. The paper is structured in three parts. Section I outlines the current concept of R2P and traces the main phases in China's evolving relationship with it. Given that the central focus of this paper is the recent RP idea, this section provides only a relatively short summary of Beijing's earlier interactions with R2P since its emergence in 2001. Section II then analyzes the six elements of RP, comparing it to Brazil's RwP and the original ICISS version of R2P. Finally, Section III assesses RP's overall significance, both as a normative contribution to the ongoing debate over R2P's third pillar, and in the broader context of China's position as an emerging great power that increasingly sees itself as a norm-shaper and norm-maker within the international system.
This paper argues that although each of the elements of RP has its origins in previous R2P proposals, by amalgamating and repackaging these earlier ideas in a stricter form the concept as a whole represents a new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. While some aspects of RP are potentially problematic or in need of refinement, overall the proposal should be viewed as an important normative initiative aimed at facilitating further discussion of R2P's third pillar following the controversies over Libya and Syria. RP is also significant because it offers deeper insights into China's current attitude towards R2P and global governance than can be gleaned from Beijing's formal legal discourse within UN organs. First, RP indicates that China does recognize the need for non-consensual military intervention under R2P's third pillar, albeit under a more restrictive set of conditions than Western powers tend to follow. Second, several RP elements resemble UNSC decision-making guidelines on military intervention, suggesting that Beijing's position may have shifted from opposing R2P criteria towards recognizing their utility. In this respect, RP continues RwP's push towards “fleshing out” the normative content of what is currently a largely indeterminate third pillar. Third, in positioning itself as an “endeavour made by China … in building a just and reasonable new international political order”, RP represents a notable non-Western contribution to the evolving normative architecture on sovereignty and intervention.Footnote 16
I. R2P AND CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONCEPT
A. R2P and Its Evolution Since 2001
The concept of R2P developed in the aftermath of mass atrocity crimes in Rwanda, Kosovo, and elsewhere in the 1990s. R2P represents a reconceptualization of the relationship between state sovereignty and human rights, in which sovereignty is viewed “not as an absolute term of authority but as a kind of responsibility”.Footnote 17 The original 2001 ICISS Report sought to shift the emphasis in debates over international responses to humanitarian crises from the controversial notion of a “right to intervene” to the more palatable idea of a “responsibility to protect”.Footnote 18 It developed a concept of R2P consisting of three elements: the responsibility to prevent a population from suffering serious harm, the responsibility to react if such harm occurs, and the responsibility to rebuild after an intervention.Footnote 19 While the primary responsibility to protect lay with the host state, if that state perpetrated “serious harm” to a population, or was “unwilling or unable” to stop such violence, the international community assumed a responsibility to protect.Footnote 20 “Serious harm” was defined as actual or imminent “large scale loss of life” or “large scale ethnic cleansing”.Footnote 21 Military intervention for humanitarian purposes was envisaged as an exceptional measure within the framework of the responsibility to react. Importantly, the ICISS Report drew on the just war tradition in outlining a list of six criteria for assessing the appropriateness of military action: just cause, right intention, last resort, right authority, proportional means, and reasonable prospects of success.Footnote 22 On the crucial criterion of right authority, although the ICISS Report designated the UNSC as the most appropriate body for authorizing military action for civilian protection purposes, it suggested that the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and regional or subregional organizations might provide alternative mechanisms for authorizing force if the UNSC was deadlocked.Footnote 23
Unsurprisingly, it was the military force dimension of the ICISS concept of R2P that generated the most controversy. From the outset, it was viewed with suspicion by China, Russia, and a number of other non-Western states that have traditionally emphasized a strict interpretation of state sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs. These states were concerned that R2P's military component might be used by powerful Western states as a cloak for the pursuit of other strategic objectives.Footnote 24 Conscious of the need to assuage such fears and to build support for R2P, UN officials adopted a diplomatic strategy of emphasizing the less controversial elements of the concept, namely prevention and state assistance. This approach, coupled with ongoing resistance from R2P-sceptic states, led to several significant modifications to the original ICISS conception of R2P. First, the military force dimension was placed exclusively under UNSC control within the existing collective security framework, closing off the ICISS's suggestion that alternative authorization mechanisms might be utilized if the UNSC was deadlocked. Second, the ICISS's criteria for determining the appropriateness of military intervention for humanitarian purposes were removed. Third, the types of violence covered by R2P were limited to four mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing), rather than the previous less precise category of “large scale loss of life”.Footnote 25 Finally, the threshold triggering the international community's responsibility was changed from a host state being “unwilling or unable” to halt violence, to the standard of “manifestly failing” to protect.Footnote 26
The combined effect of these changes was that the conception of R2P unanimously adopted by UN Member States at the 2005 World Summit was a softer, weaker version of the idea initially formulated by the ICISS.Footnote 27 This modified form of R2P—derived from paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 WSOD, and subsequently outlined in the UN Secretary-General's 2009 Report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect—consists of three mutually reinforcing pillars.Footnote 28 The first is that each state has a responsibility to protect its populations from mass atrocity crimes. The second pillar stipulates that the international community should assist states in fulfilling their pillar one obligations. The third pillar provides that if “national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations” the international community is “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis”.Footnote 29 International action can encompass non-coercive means such as diplomacy and humanitarian assistance, as well as coercive measures, including the use of force, if authorized in accordance with the UNSC's collective security mechanism.
It is important to note that R2P does not constitute a new legal principle according to the sources of international law.Footnote 30 It is not part of any international treaty and has not attained the status of customary international law. The WSOD provisions on R2P were only included in a UNGA resolution, and therefore, are not a formal source of law. Instead, R2P is best viewed as a multifaceted political concept that is based on existing principles of international law.Footnote 31 As Welsh explains, “it is crucial to recognise that many states agreed to endorse the [R2P] principle precisely because it was not seen as transformational”.Footnote 32 In this respect, it is worth emphasizing that R2P's third pillar does not alter the international legal framework governing the use of force, which permits military action only in self-defence or when authorized by the UNSC. Furthermore, R2P does not create any additional legal duties for states or international bodies. In situations where a state is manifestly failing to protect, there is no legal obligation on either the UNSC, or on the international community more broadly, to take any action—forcible or non-forcible—to protect populations from mass atrocity violence. At most, the international dimension can be seen as a political commitment to consider possible courses of action that are available through existing institutional mechanisms.Footnote 33
The version of R2P endorsed by states in the WSOD was a disappointment for some R2P supporters. Thomas Weiss famously called it “R2P-lite”.Footnote 34 Simon Chesterman concluded that R2P's “normative content had been emasculated to the point where it essentially provided that the Security Council could authorize, on a case-by-case basis, things that it had been authorizing for more than a decade.”Footnote 35 While the emergence of R2P succeeded in shifting the language of the debate from a “right to intervene” to a “responsibility to protect”, the concept endorsed in 2005 failed to address crucial questions relating to when and how the UNSC should decide on the appropriateness of military action for humanitarian purposes.
From 2005 onwards, discussion of R2P within the UN system continued to centre on the less controversial aspects of preventive action and state capacity-building. Despite lingering resistance to R2P from some states, including Russia and China, this cautious approach eventually led to consensus within the UNSC on Resolution 1674, which “reaffirmed” the World Summit's commitments on R2P.Footnote 36 The first mention of R2P in relation to a specific crisis occurred subsequently in 2006 with UNSC Resolution 1706 on the situation in Darfur.Footnote 37 In 2008, the preventive component of the concept played a significant role in framing the international community's response to post-election violence in Kenya.Footnote 38 A further UNSC resolution in 2009 provided additional endorsement of R2P in general terms.Footnote 39 However, throughout this period, the ongoing resistance of some states to implementing R2P meant that specific references to the principle were not included in further UNSC resolutions on other crises. Instead, attention shifted from the UNSC to the UNGA, where broader discussion of R2P could be undertaken by all UN Member States. This culminated in the 2009 UNGA debate, in which states overwhelmingly supported Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's report outlining the three pillars of R2P.Footnote 40 Although this outcome appeared to vindicate the Secretary-General's diplomatic approach, his strategy of emphasizing the preventive aspects of R2P meant that contentious issues surrounding the use of military force remained unresolved.Footnote 41 This indeterminacy in pillar three enabled virtually all states, including China, to continue to express support for R2P at a rhetorical level, but it also papered over significant differences between Western and non-Western states’ interpretations of when and how R2P's third pillar should be operationalized.Footnote 42
The extent of those differences over R2P's third pillar became apparent during the Libyan and Syrian crises which began in early 2011.Footnote 43 While the passage of Resolution 1973 authorizing military force against the Gaddafi regime was initially seen as a triumph for R2P, under the surface there were deep divisions within the UNSC. NATO's support for the Libyan rebels and the eventual removal of Gaddafi prompted renewed concerns among the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and other non-Western states over the potential for R2P to be used as a pretext for regime change. This led to extensive “blow-back” against R2P, which was evident in the UNSC's inability to agree on any effective civilian protection measures on Syria. While India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) gradually adopted more flexible stances towards Western-supported proposals on Syria, Moscow and Beijing remained steadfast in their opposition to any international attempts to pressure the Assad regime.Footnote 44
Controversy over Libya and Syria has led to renewed debate over R2P's third pillar, with Brazil proposing its own complementary principle of RwP in late 2011.Footnote 45 Despite an initially hostile response from Western powers and a lukewarm reaction from the other BRICS, RwP's ideas for additional guidelines and accountability mechanisms to tighten the military force dimension of R2P appeared to offer a possible way of bridging the gap between Western powers and some non-Western states. However, Brazil's early enthusiasm for RwP waned and it now seems unwilling to push the concept any further.Footnote 46 This has created an opportunity for other states to take on the role of leading further discussion on R2P's third pillar. In the September 2013 UNGA informal interactive dialogue on R2P, China indicated that it “supports discussions at the United Nations to discuss RwP by Brazil”.Footnote 47 The formulation of China's own RP idea, plus its promotion through the international conference in Beijing in October 2013, points to China exploring opportunities to assume a more prominent role in the next stage of R2P's normative development.
B. China's Evolving Stance on R2P
The complexity of China's policy-making apparatus means that it is not always easy to discern a consistent or unambiguous Chinese position on R2P. Shogo Suzuki has observed that a lack of transparency makes it “extremely difficult to know which faction [within the Chinese political elite] is ‘winning’ at a particular point in time, and how this reflects in policy output” on R2P.Footnote 48 This opaqueness has led to various classifications of Beijing's overall attitude towards the concept. For example, Jonas Claes labels China a “rejectionist” state, although he notes that Beijing “generally refrains from openly rejecting R2P”.Footnote 49 Patrick Quinton-Brown, on the other hand, adopts a more nuanced categorization, dividing R2P “dissenter states” into “cautious supporters” and “rejectionists”.Footnote 50 In his view, China falls within the “cautious supporter” subgroup because Beijing has “agreed with the concept in principle, but will remain sceptical of its implementation in practice until it is modified to some extent”.Footnote 51 As the rest of this section will illustrate, by the time RP was conceived in 2012, China's stance on R2P was best described as dichotomous: it accepted and was generally comfortable with R2P's first and second pillars but remained deeply concerned by the potential implications of non-consensual pillar three action.
China's relationship with R2P from the concept's inception in 2001 leading through to the Libyan and Syrian crises can be divided into three main phases.Footnote 52 These stages are briefly discussed here to provide background and context to Beijing's formulation of its own RP idea in 2012. The first phase—from 2001 until 2005—featured strong Chinese resistance to the original ICISS conception of R2P. The new idea represented a serious challenge to China's traditional foreign policy emphasis on a strict interpretation of the twin principles of non-intervention and non-use of force as outlined in its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.Footnote 53 Beijing was concerned about R2P's potential for abuse by Western powers, and was vehemently opposed to the ICISS's suggestion that military intervention for humanitarian purposes could be authorized by bodies other than the UNSC.Footnote 54 As discussed above, significant modifications to the original ICISS concept were made, thereby enabling China to formally endorse the softer version of R2P that formed part of the 2005 WSOD. However, Beijing retained misgivings over the possibility of non-consensual coercive measures, including the use of force.
The second phase of China's relationship with R2P—from 2005 till 2011—featured cautious endorsement of a conservative interpretation of the concept, tempered by resistance to implementing the new doctrine in specific cases. This apparent softening of China's traditional strict interpretation of state sovereignty and non-intervention should not, however, be overstated. Beijing was careful to emphasize the primacy of prevention and state assistance under pillars one and two, while downplaying the potential for non-consensual third pillar intervention involving sanctions or military force. Cautious rhetorical backing for R2P as a general concept did not always translate into Chinese support for international action in specific cases of mass atrocity crimes. First, China abstained on UNSC Resolution 1706 (2006) on Darfur, in which R2P was mentioned for the first time in a country-specific resolution.Footnote 55 Second, China (and Russia) vetoed draft resolutions imposing international sanctions on Myanmar (2007) and Zimbabwe (2008).Footnote 56 Beijing's overall position during this second phase was described by Sarah Teitt as “preserv[ing] the vestiges of its once firm stance on non-interference—the requirement for host state consent for collective military deployment—without appearing to completely turn a blind eye to mass atrocities”.Footnote 57
The third main phase in China's relationship with R2P covers the Libyan and Syrian crises during 2011 and 2012. At first glance, Beijing's role in supporting Resolution 1970 and acquiescing to the passage of Resolution 1973 authorizing military action in Libya appeared to signal a shift towards greater Chinese acceptance of R2P's third pillar. However, a closer examination of Chinese statements within the UNSC reveals that Beijing was deeply uncomfortable with the content of Resolution 1973. China stated that it “is always against the use of force”, and had “serious difficulty with parts of the resolution”.Footnote 58 Beijing's decision to abstain from voting was shaped by an unusual set of circumstances, including the presence of regional support for international military intervention, the urgent need for international action in the face of Gaddafi's explicit threats against civilians in Benghazi, and the rapid fragmentation of the Libyan government.Footnote 59 Acquiescing to the passage of Resolution 1973 did not represent a sudden normative shift in favour of R2P's third pillar. In fact, the way in which NATO subsequently conducted its military campaign in Libya appeared to confirm Beijing's long-standing suspicions that R2P's military dimension could be used as a pretext for pursuing other strategic objectives. In the UNSC's May 2011 thematic debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, China warned that “[t]here must be no attempt at regime change … under the guise of protecting civilians”.Footnote 60
The Libyan experience with R2P seemed to trigger renewed Chinese determination to resist efforts to impose non-consensual civilian protection measures under R2P's third pillar. To date, Beijing has exercised its veto on four occasions, backing Moscow in blocking UNSC draft resolutions that proposed a range of non-forcible measures against the Syrian regime, including possible sanctions and referral to the International Criminal Court.Footnote 61 It has also voted against UNGA resolutions on Syria.Footnote 62 China has defended its behaviour on Syria by reference to both international law and pragmatic considerations. In respect of the former, Beijing has employed its traditional legal discourse on state sovereignty and non-intervention, consistently arguing that any international action on Syria must conform to “the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States”.Footnote 63 Pragmatic justifications for opposing tougher international action include China's assertion that “sanctions or the threat thereof does [sic] not help to resolve the question of Syria and instead, may further complicate the situation”.Footnote 64
At the same time, it should be noted that Beijing has been willing to support several UNSC resolutions on Syria, including those mandating the UN Observer Mission, the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons, and most recently a humanitarian aid access plan.Footnote 65 However, aside from the two relatively weak aid access resolutions, each of the UNSC resolutions that China supported involved proposals to which the Syrian government had agreed. These instances of UNSC action based on host-state consent are, therefore, fundamentally different from the imposition of coercive, non-consensual measures under R2P's third pillar. While Beijing was often prepared to support the former, it remained uncomfortable with the latter. Prior to RP's formulation in 2012, China's position on non-consensual pillar three action was summarized as follows:
the prevention of such so-called abuses of power by other major countries that could threaten Chinese interests, along with the overall defense of the sovereignty principle, are regarded as far more important than efforts to end civilian killings in domestic conflicts, except, perhaps, in those rare cases when such actions clearly threaten international order or the international system. For Beijing, if there is any moral justification for external, coercive intervention against sovereign governments, it is primarily to prevent the disruption of international society through widespread (i.e., inter-state) violence and secondarily to prevent state-inflicted mass atrocities through strictly delimited and narrowly defined efforts.Footnote 66
II. CHINA'S “RESPONSIBLE PROTECTION” (RP) CONCEPT
A. Background and Context
As noted earlier, the RP concept was developed in 2012 by Ruan Zongze, a Chinese scholar. Although it has not yet been formally adopted as official Chinese policy, there are several reasons to believe that RP represents Beijing's current thinking on R2P, or at least a very close approximation of its position. First, Ruan is the current Vice-President of the CIIS, which is the official think tank of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The CIIS employs a number of retired diplomats, and in recent years has played an increasingly important role in the development of Chinese foreign policy.Footnote 67 Second, RP was promoted by the CIIS at a recent conference in Beijing in which representatives from other, predominantly BRICS states were invited to discuss the concept. This reflects the CIIS's growing role in conducting “public diplomacy” on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Footnote 68 Third, the term “responsible protection” has been used, albeit briefly, in speeches made by Chinese officials, suggesting that the RP concept has received a degree of official endorsement.Footnote 69
Ruan's paper has three distinct sections. The first is a lengthy and, at times, sharp critique of the West's position towards Libya and Syria. The second part offers several “reflections” on what are perceived to be “serious flaws” within the current concept of R2P.Footnote 70 With a view to addressing those flaws and “contributing its ideas to the world”, the third part outlines China's own notion of “Responsible Protection” (RP).Footnote 71 Overall, the paper can be seen as serving dual purposes: first, it is an attempt to demonstrate that Beijing's position on Syria is “fair and responsible”, and second, it seeks to offer a distinctive Chinese contribution to the normative debate over R2P.Footnote 72
Before examining the elements of RP it is useful to briefly highlight the key themes which appear in the first two parts of Ruan's paper. These offer important insights into Beijing's perspective on Western responses to Libya and Syria, and also reveal China's concerns over R2P's conceptual weaknesses. Together, these insights help to frame the context within which the Chinese idea of RP is proposed. The first major theme that emerges is deep concern over R2P's potential to be misused. Ruan accuses the West of having exceeded its civilian protection mandate in a “strategic attempt at realizing ‘regime change’ in Libya”.Footnote 73 In its current form R2P is “liable to be abused”, and offers a “pretext” for the West's “new interventionism”.Footnote 74 The selective use of R2P—exemplified by Western silence over the violent suppression of demonstrations in Bahrain—is also mentioned as a factor which undermines the concept's legitimacy.Footnote 75 A second, closely related, theme is R2P's status and relationship with international law. Ruan stresses that although R2P “remains so far a concept without being made a rule in international law”, it “could be abusively employed to change the state power of a country, which contradicts the purposes of the UN Charter and the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in other's internal affairs”.Footnote 76 The fact that R2P military intervention is only permitted with UNSC authorization does not assuage Ruan's concerns. With the Libyan experience clearly in mind, he argues that “[e]ven if the UN Security Council passed a resolution, the Western powers could still make one-sided explanations and seek self-interests by abusing the resolution under the cover of ‘protecting the civilians’”.Footnote 77 A third major criticism of the West's perspective on military intervention for humanitarian purposes draws on consequentialist reasoning. Ruan argues that NATO's military campaign in Libya has done more harm than good, and that “R2P has brought unnecessary chaos to international relations”.Footnote 78 He criticizes what he sees as the West's eagerness to use military force, questioning the assumption that “as long as the goal [of protecting civilians] is noble, it may be achieved with whatever means regardless [of] the consequences”.Footnote 79 Overall, these three themes in Ruan's paper convey similar concerns over R2P to those expressed by Chinese officials within UN organs. They provide the background and context to China's decision to propose its own RP idea.
B. The Elements of RP
The six elements of China's RP concept are reproduced in full and analyzed individually in this section. They are primarily concerned with tightening R2P's third pillar framework on non-consensual international measures so as to reduce the potential for this dimension to be abused. Although not explicitly framed in such terms, four of the six elements resemble decision-making criteria to guide the UNSC in determining the appropriateness of military action for civilian protection purposes. Element six concerns mechanisms to monitor and supervise any military intervention, while element five relates to post-intervention responsibilities to reconstruct the affected state.
As Table 1 illustrates, each of the six elements has its origins in earlier ideas found in Brazil's RwP and/or the 2001 ICISS Report, which in turn draw on aspects of the just war tradition. There are, however, several subtle but significant differences in how these notions are framed and interpreted in RP. In comparison with RwP and the ICISS Report, on the whole RP offers a stricter, narrower interpretation of the permissibility of employing non-consensual coercive measures under R2P's third pillar.
Table 1 A comparison of RP, RwP, and the ICISS Report.
Element 1 of RP provides that:
First, the object of RP must be made clear. Of course, it is the people of the target country and peace and stability of the relevant region. The objects of protection must be the innocent people, not specific political parties or armed forces. Only such kind of protection is rightful and well-intentioned and is protection in its true sense.Footnote 80
This first element primarily draws on the just war tradition idea of “right intention”, while also touching on the “reasonable prospects” criterion. It reflects China's long-standing concern that external intervention in intra-state humanitarian crises may be geared towards broader strategic objectives such as regime change, rather than being for genuine civilian protection purposes. Three aspects in particular stand out. The first concerns the motives and purposes of intervention. The original ICISS Report drew a distinction between these two concepts by framing the criterion of right intention as follows: the “primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering.”Footnote 81 This formulation acknowledged the political reality that it is rare for states to intervene in an intra-state crisis on the basis of altruistic or humanitarian motives alone. By focusing on the civilian protection purpose of intervention action, the ICISS crafted a notion of right intention that was not overly restrictive. The version of right intention found in element one of RP is less nuanced, leaving open the possibility that “pure” humanitarian motives might be required before an intervention is deemed appropriate.Footnote 82 If this interpretation were correct, this would impose an unduly restrictive condition on international action.
A second notable aspect of element one of RP is its emphasis on the impartiality of those intervening. The warning against supporting “specific political parties or armed forces” implicitly conveys Beijing's disquiet over NATO's direct support for rebel forces in Libya. An insistence on impartiality has also been a long-standing theme in China's discourse on UN peacekeeping operations, with Beijing stressing that the UN must avoid becoming a party to a conflict. This raises the important question of whether civilian protection can be carried out effectively without the intervening states “taking sides”.Footnote 83 One commentator has argued that “[t]he demise of a regime responsible for the mass atrocities that trigger an R2P intervention is logically inevitable”.Footnote 84 Although further consideration of this fundamental issue is beyond the scope of this paper, the key point is that China's concerns over the motivations for, and ultimate outcomes of, intervention are reflected in what appears to be a stricter notion of “right intention” than that proposed by the original ICISS Report in 2001.
A third significant aspect of RP's first element is its reference to regional peace and stability. The importance of regional stability has been a consistent feature of Chinese discourse on R2P and reflects Beijing's emphasis on maintaining balance and order within the international system. Its inclusion in the first element of RP is one of several mentions of this issue which relate to the “reasonable prospects” principle of the just war tradition. Explicit reference to regional peace and stability underlines Beijing's preference for applying a holistic assessment of the feasibility of any international intervention. Under this interpretation, considerations of potential success must be based not only on the immediate prospects of effectively protecting civilians within a targeted state, but also on the broader issue of the impact of international action on regional peace and security. Although the express inclusion of regional stability in RP distinguishes the Chinese concept from Brazil's RwP, it should be noted that the original ICISS Report also briefly mentioned the possibility of “larger regional conflagration” within its discussion of the “reasonable prospects” criterion.Footnote 85 On the whole, however, considerations of regional peace and stability receive greater emphasis and occupy a more central position within China's RP than they do in previous interpretations of R2P, reflecting the importance that Beijing places on this issue.
The second element of RP reads:
Second, the legitimacy of the “protection” executors must be established. The government of a given state bears the primary responsibility of protecting its citizens. Besides that, the UN Security Council is the only legitimate actor to perform this duty while no countries have such a right, let alone the legal status to do so.Footnote 86
This element represents RP's version of the “right authority” criterion. It reaffirms China's long-standing position that only the UNSC has the legal authority to mandate non-consensual civilian protection measures, including military action. This is consistent with the 2005 WSOD provision on R2P, but narrower than the ICISS version and RwP, both of which recognized the possibility of alternative mechanisms of authorization—the UNGA or regional organizations—if the UNSC was deadlocked.Footnote 87 Beijing's rejection of the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention is reiterated in its warning that “no countries have such a right, let alone the legal status to do so”. Overall, this element of RP reflects China's desire to maintain control over the implementation of R2P by ensuring that the UNSC retains exclusive authority, and therefore that Beijing has the option of vetoing any proposed international action.
Element three of RP is outlined as follows:
Third, the means of “protection” must be strictly limited. The prerequisite for invoking protection should be exhaustion of diplomatic and political means of solution. Non-military means like diplomatic efforts, though time-consuming, produce long-lasting results with lesser side effects. On the contrary, using military force at every turn would not only cause huge civilian casualties but also bring severe damage to infrastructure and downturn of national economy in the country or region to be “protected”, eventually aggravating humanitarian disasters and plunging the object of “protection” into protracted and distressful post-crisis reconstruction.Footnote 88
As illustrated in Table 1, element three contains themes which relate to several aspects of the just war tradition. The principal focus is the notion of military intervention as a “last resort”. While the preference for utilizing “non-military means” of civilian protection is consistent with China's broader policy on the non-use of military force, the language used here is potentially problematic. If the reference to “exhaustion” of diplomatic and non-forcible means of civilian protection were interpreted literally, then this element would require a strict chronological sequencing of responses to a civilian protection situation. As James Pattison notes: “the obvious and frequently noted problems with such an account are that, first, mass atrocities can continue to rage whilst all other options are pursued regardless of their feasibility and potential effectiveness and, second, the other options, such as economic sanctions, can cause more harm than [military] intervention.”Footnote 89
These difficulties with a requirement to “exhaust” all non-forcible measures arose in relation to Brazil's RwP concept note, which also implied a strict sequencing approach. Criticism from a number of Western states, UN officials, and R2P scholars over this requirement prompted Brazil to shift towards a less restrictive notion of prudential sequencing that “should not be perceived as a means to prevent or unduly delay authorization of military action in situations established in the 2005 Outcome Document”.Footnote 90 A similar clarification or refinement of RP's interpretation of the last resort criterion is needed. In this respect, the original ICISS Report offers a sensible, sufficiently flexible interpretation: military force “can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded”.Footnote 91
In addition to its focus on military force as a “last resort”, element three also contains themes relating to “proportional means” and “reasonable prospects”. With respect to the former, insistence that “the means of ‘protection’ must be strictly limited” implies that such measures must not go beyond the minimum necessary to achieve the civilian protection objective.Footnote 92 On the latter, the warning about military force “aggravating humanitarian disasters” reflects China's scepticism over the effectiveness of military intervention as a civilian protection strategy.
The fourth element of RP provides that:
Fourth, the purpose of “protection” must be defined. Just as doctors should not kill patients by means of treatment, the purpose of protection must be to mitigate humanitarian catastrophe. It is absolutely forbidden to create greater humanitarian disasters because of protection, let alone to use protection as a means to overthrow the government of a given state.Footnote 93
The major theme of this element is “right intention”. In this respect, there is some similarity between elements one and four. Both reflect deeply held Chinese concerns over R2P being used as pretext for the pursuit of other strategic objectives such as regime change. However, whereas element one addresses the “object” of protection (civilian populations versus specific political parties/armed forces), element four focuses on the “purpose” of external intervention. By applying a purpose-based assessment of right intention, element four adopts a similar approach to the ICISS Report. At the same time, however, the RP interpretation of this requirement is framed in stricter terms. The ICISS reference to “primary purpose” provided a degree of flexibility by recognizing the political reality that there may be more than one purpose when intervening militarily.Footnote 94 RP, in contrast, uses more absolute language in demanding that “the purpose … must be to mitigate humanitarian catastrophe”.Footnote 95 This provides another example of RP's very strict, narrow interpretation of the requirements of just war theory.
A secondary aspect of element four is its assertion that it is “absolutely forbidden to create greater humanitarian disasters because of protection”. This appears to be a further reference to the “reasonable prospects” criterion, which is also emphasized in elements one and three discussed above. In circumstances where external military intervention would be likely to exacerbate a humanitarian crisis it would not be considered an appropriate course of action.
The fifth element of RP reads:
Fifth, the “protectors” should be responsible for the post-”intervention” and post-”protection” reconstruction of the state concerned. They should absolutely not smash and go, leaving a terrible mess to the country and people subject to “protection”.Footnote 96
This is an interesting element which extends the scope of the RP concept beyond its primary focus on R2P's third pillar and the permissibility of military intervention. As Table 1 indicates, post-intervention reconstruction responsibilities did not form part of Brazil's RwP initiative, but the idea did feature prominently in the ICISS Report as part of the “Responsibility to Rebuild” dimension of the original 2001 R2P concept. However, the notion of a “Responsibility to Rebuild” did not find its way into the WSOD in 2005 and therefore, strictly speaking, is not part of the current concept of R2P.Footnote 97 Given Beijing's repeated insistence that further discussion of R2P within the UN system must be based upon the WSOD version of R2P, it is surprising to see this earlier ICISS idea appear in China's RP concept. One interpretation of its inclusion is that China is seeking to resurrect or resuscitate the “Responsibility to Rebuild” dimension of the original ICISS R2P idea. This type of norm entrepreneurship would represent a significant, even radical, shift in Beijing's approach towards R2P's normative development, and therefore seems unlikely.Footnote 98 An alternative interpretation is that RP's reference to post-intervention reconstruction is intended primarily as an implicit criticism of the destabilizing effects of previous Western-led military campaigns, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. This latter reading recognizes that reconstruction and development themes form a central part of China's broader perspective on peacebuilding, but it does not assert that Beijing is specifically seeking to reintroduce the “Responsibility to Rebuild” dimension of R2P. The key point is that there is a need for clarification of precisely what is intended by element five.
The sixth and final element of RP is expressed as follows:
Sixth, the United Nations should establish mechanisms of supervision, outcome evaluation and post factum accountability to ensure the means, process, scope and results of “protection”.Footnote 99
Element six calls for greater accountability and supervision of those carrying out UNSC civilian protection mandates. This aspect of RP is not a new idea. Stricter oversight of international civilian protection measures has been a central theme in post-Libya debates on R2P, as a result of concerns among many non-Western states over the way that NATO interpreted and implemented UNSC Resolution 1973.Footnote 100 RP's brief proposal makes a similar demand to Brazil's RwP, which suggested that “[e]nhanced Security Council procedures are needed to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented to ensure responsibility while protecting”.Footnote 101 One point of difference—whether intentional or not—is that RP does not specify where any future supervision mechanisms should be located, referring simply to need for the “United Nations” to establish such mechanisms. Brazil's proposal, on the other hand, is more precise, explicitly calling for the creation of “Security Council procedures”.Footnote 102
The idea of establishing better monitoring procedures raises a number of complex issues which, for reasons of space, can only be discussed briefly here.Footnote 103 First of all, as alluded to above, there is the question of what form such mechanisms would take. Both the Chinese and Brazilian initiatives appear to suggest that additional procedures, or perhaps even new supervisory bodies, should be created to provide greater scrutiny of UNSC-authorized military action. However, there is no detail about how such mechanisms should be set up or what impact they would have on the wide discretion currently granted to the UNSC on matters of international peace and security. Second, it is unclear whether any new accountability mechanisms would apply to all types of UNSC-authorized Chapter VII military action, or only to third pillar R2P military intervention. As the former Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect Edward Luck has argued, it would be undesirable to impose “more restrictive ones [standards] for using force in Responsibility to Protect situations than in other situations”.Footnote 104 A third major issue relates to the impact that enhanced monitoring and supervision might have on the effectiveness of UNSC-authorized military action. The concern here is that stricter accountability mechanisms could lead to the UNSC—or a new independent body—micro-managing military operations to such a degree that the implementing states are deprived of the flexibility needed to achieve the civilian protection objectives mandated by the UNSC.Footnote 105
Given the potential difficulties associated with establishing new monitoring procedures or supervisory bodies, Alex Bellamy argues that it is preferable to concentrate instead on inserting more detailed safeguards and accountability provisions into individual UNSC resolutions.Footnote 106 He points to a range of existing measures including “sunset clauses”, “specific reporting requirements”, and “specific limitations”, which can be used to ensure that intervening states are not given carte blanche over the interpretation and implementation of civilian protection mandates.Footnote 107 While there is considerable merit in Bellamy's suggestion, the potential downside of this alternative approach to strengthening accountability is that it may lead to more complicated negotiations between UNSC members over the content of R2P resolutions. The greater the degree of detail and specificity in a proposed UNSC resolution, the longer it is likely to take and the harder it may be to reach consensus on the precise wording.Footnote 108 The risk is that prolonged negotiations over the language of UNSC mandates could undermine the ability of the Council to mount timely and decisive responses to grave humanitarian crises.
As this short discussion indicates, there are no easy solutions to the issue of how to achieve an appropriate balance between the dual desires of facilitating effective, appropriately flexible UNSC-authorized civilian protection action, on the one hand, and of ensuring sufficient accountability mechanisms, on the other. RP's proposal for better monitoring procedures clearly conveys Beijing's deep concern over R2P's potential for abuse, but in its current, very brief, form, it does little to advance the discussion of exactly how new supervision mechanisms should be established.
After outlining the six elements, the overall merits of the RP concept are summarized as follows:
In short, the idea of RP better embodies the purposes and principles of the UN Charter as well as the basic norms governing international relations, better conforms to the trends of peace and development of the present-day world, and is more conducive to building a just and reasonable new international order. Moreover, this idea is broadly based internationally.Footnote 109
At first glance, this language might suggest that RP is being offered as a direct alternative to the current WSOD version of R2P. However, as illustrated in this section, RP is a narrower initiative which focuses on R2P's third pillar, and in particular, the controversial question of non-consensual military intervention. It does not engage with, or seek to discard, pillars one and two of the existing R2P concept. Therefore, like Brazil's RwP, the Chinese idea of RP is best viewed as a contribution which reinterprets and tightens the normative content of R2P's third pillar, rather than as an attempt to replace the current version of R2P.
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA'S “RESPONSIBLE PROTECTION” CONCEPT
China's RP initiative remains something of an enigma. As noted, it is yet to be formally adopted as an official Chinese position on R2P. In addition, the lack of detail in its six elements, coupled with the fact that several of them appear to overlap, leads to RP raising almost as many questions as it provides answers. A major unresolved issue is how those RP elements that resemble decision-making criteria are intended to operate in practice. There are a number of questions here. First of all, are the RP elements proposed as criteria that would be formally adopted and codified in a new UNSC or UNGA resolution on R2P? Or are they viewed instead as providing informal guidelines to be used in UNSC debates? Given the limited prospects of reaching agreement on criteria in a UNSC or UNGA resolution, the latter option seems more likely, although further clarification is needed. A second important question is whether each and every RP criterion needs to be satisfied before military force can be considered appropriate, or whether action can proceed if there are strong indicators in favour of most of the criteria, but not all can be strictly satisfied. Third, there is the broader question of the practical benefits and political utility of having criteria in the first place. By resurrecting the idea of decision-making guidelines—which featured prominently in the 2001 ICISS Report, the 2004 UN Report “A More Secure World”,Footnote 110 and the 2005 UN Report “In Larger Freedom”Footnote 111—China's RP and Brazil's RwP concepts have prompted a renewed debate within R2P circles over this issue.
It is not possible here to engage in a detailed discussion of all the arguments for and against decision-making criteria. However, a brief outline of the basic positions in the academic debate can be sketched. On one side, Alex Bellamy maintains his long-standing sceptical view, arguing that:
there is little evidence that, in practice, criteria would serve the goals of accountability by ensuring a shared understanding of situations and mandates and that the implementation of mandates would be consistent with those understandings. In the hands of skilled diplomats, criteria would likely merely become the language used to justify pre-determined positions.Footnote 112
On the other side, James Pattison has recently offered a detailed defence of the use of informal criteria.Footnote 113 Contrary to the claims of some critics, he contends that appropriately flexible guidelines would lead neither to too much military intervention, nor to too little. Instead, according to Pattison, the use of informal criteria could help to improve the transparency of decision-making on the use of military force, and also encourage interveners to “live up to the requirements of the guidelines, which is likely to lead to intervention that is more morally justifiable”.Footnote 114 In a similar vein, Nicholas Wheeler argues that criteria would be of considerable value to R2P decision-making because they provide a “common reference within which argumentation can take place”.Footnote 115
On balance, the case in favour of informal decision-making criteria seems to be stronger. While using guidelines will not be a panacea, it does offer some hope of promoting greater openness in debate over the use of force, and will also help to provide greater precision to R2P's third pillar. Given that both Brazil's RwP and China's RP have made guidelines a central part of their proposals for developing R2P's third pillar, the issue of criteria must be taken seriously by Western powers. It is likely to continue to feature heavily in future discussions over the content and implementation of pillar three.
This brings us to the question of whether or not RP's guidelines and the concept's overall interpretation of the permissibility of military intervention for civilian protection purposes are ethically appropriate. The risk in seeking to develop safeguards against R2P's abuse is that it results in an excessively strict set of guidelines which ultimately pose an obstacle to timely and decisive international responses to humanitarian crises. RP certainly outlines a narrower interpretation of military intervention for civilian protection purposes than those found in Brazil's RwP and the ICISS concept of R2P. As discussed in Section II.B, some aspects of RP do appear to be framed too restrictively. One might ask whether there are any conceivable R2P situations in which military intervention would be permissible under RP's strict requirements. In this respect, it may be tempting to characterize RP as a “mere spoiling operation with a more sophisticated face”, rather than as a genuine Chinese effort to engage constructively with R2P.Footnote 116 According to this interpretation, RP is part of a subtle strategy of contesting and containing R2P's development and implementation while avoiding the impression that China is outwardly rejectionist or obstructionist.
Determining exactly where RP lies in terms of contestation versus engagement with R2P is difficult. Like China's overall relationship with R2P, the RP initiative contains ambiguity and inconsistency. However, despite RP's current shortcomings it would be premature to dismiss or reject the concept outright at this stage. There are at least three important reasons to remain open-minded about the Chinese initiative. First of all, the formulation of RP is a notable development in itself because it demonstrates the extent to which China is enmeshed in the ongoing debate over R2P.Footnote 117 Simply rejecting R2P or remaining silent in the wake of the Libyan controversy appear not to have been viable options for a major power like China. Second, some of the apparently problematic aspects of RP may simply be due to translation difficulties or imperfect use of language. Beijing's actual interpretation of the conditions under which military intervention is permissible may, in fact, be more flexible than RP's wording suggests. A third reason for remaining positive about RP is that there is likely to be refinement and modification of the initial concept. Brazil's experience with RwP is instructive here. The original Brazilian concept note attracted significant criticism from both states and UN officials, most notably in relation to the apparent call for a rigid, chronological sequencing of responses.Footnote 118 However, once Brazil had clarified its position and moved towards a more flexible interpretation of sequencing, other states began to engage more constructively with RwP. This eventually resulted in RwP gaining a prominent position in the UN Secretary-General's 2012 Report on R2P's third pillar.Footnote 119 A similar process of conceptual clarification, refinement, and further discussion may occur with the Chinese initiative. The recent RP conference in Beijing is a positive first step in this direction, which suggests that China is genuinely interested in engaging constructively in the debate over R2P's third pillar.
In spite of the potential concerns and unresolved issues surrounding RP at present, it is possible to draw several preliminary conclusions about the significance of the initiative. The first is that RP is important because it offers deeper insights into current Chinese thinking on R2P than those provided by the often generic official statements made within UN organs. One crucial message from RP is that Beijing does recognize the permissibility of non-consensual military intervention under R2P's third pillar. Although China has never explicitly rejected such a possibility, it has consistently emphasized that the international community's response to major humanitarian crises should be based on assisting states, thereby implying that host state consent to external action is a prerequisite.Footnote 120 Beijing's preference for obtaining the consent of a functioning host state remains, but RP now acknowledges that in some circumstances—albeit very narrow ones—international military intervention for humanitarian purposes may be permissible even without such consent. This represents a notable shift in China's position on R2P's most contentious dimension. Another important message from RP is that Beijing has reassessed its stance on decision-making guidelines or criteria. Prior to the 2005 World Summit, China (and Russia) opposed R2P guidelines on the basis that their inclusion could increase the potential for unilateral international intervention outside the UNSC framework on the use of force.Footnote 121 The concern was that criteria could operate as a check list which might be used to legitimize military intervention without UNSC authorization.Footnote 122 However, once the WSOD firmly anchored R2P military intervention within the UNSC's exclusive control, closing off the possibility of alternative authorization mechanisms or unilateral action, Chinese and Russian concerns were largely assuaged. Now, with the RP proposal, Beijing appears to have embraced decision-making guidelines as an additional means of reducing the potential for abuse of R2P.
As well as providing specific insights into Beijing's current interpretation of R2P, RP is also significant because it offers a window into how China views itself and its role as an emerging power.Footnote 123 Shogo Suzuki describes China having “dual identities” as “both an aspirational ‘great power’ which plays a key role alongside the West in global governance, and a member of the post-colonial state which views Western hegemony with a critical eye and sees the need to champion the causes of the developing world”.Footnote 124 Both of these identities are evident in the language of RP. On the one hand, the concept is framed as a responsible, constructive contribution to R2P's normative development from a “leading actor on the international stage”.Footnote 125 On the other hand, RP conveys China's deep scepticism of Western motives for intervention, and positions itself as a perspective which reflects the “general stand and concern of the vast developing countries”.Footnote 126 While China's growing involvement in international peacekeeping and non-traditional security arrangements such as the Somali anti-piracy framework points to a broader shift towards greater acceptance of its responsibilities as a global power, some of the language in RP illustrates Beijing's continuing identification with the developing world. How these often contradictory dual identities are balanced by China in the future, and how this is reflected in its relationship with R2P, will be fascinating to observe.
A third significant aspect of RP is that it represents a distinctive, non-Western contribution to the evolution of international norms and global governance. This development raises a number of important issues relating to the processes of normative change and the impact of shifts in global power, which can only be briefly addressed here.Footnote 127 Traditionally, normative development within the international system has been seen as the West's domain. On the whole, within the academic literature, non-Western states have been viewed either as passive receivers of Western ideas who are gradually socialized into accepting such norms, or as recalcitrant states who remain resistant to their adoption.Footnote 128 This perception of normative development as a Western-dominated endeavour has been mostly true for much of R2P's short life. This is not to say that contestation over the concept can be divided neatly along North-South lines, nor is it to ignore the important contributions to R2P's conceptual design made by non-Western figures such as Francis Deng, Kofi Annan, and Ramesh Thakur. However, as Oliver Stuenkel correctly notes, R2P has remained “largely dominated by established powers at both the policy and the academic level”.Footnote 129 Now though, as global power shifts away from the West, the BRICS and other non-Western states are beginning to assert their own normative preferences more decisively across a range of issues, including R2P.Footnote 130 Both China's RP and Brazil's RwP proposals are recent illustrations of the increasing willingness of emerging powers to play a role as norm entrepreneurs in crafting and floating their own perspectives on sovereignty and intervention. RP is explicitly framed as an example of China having “the courage to speak out and contribute its ideas to the world”.Footnote 131 Rather than rejecting R2P's third pillar after its experience with the Libyan intervention, Beijing has attempted to redefine it by advancing a new, restrictive interpretation of the circumstances in which non-consensual civilian protection measures, including military force, can be operationalized. In this respect the creation of RP may represent an important milestone in China's relationship with R2P, in which it transitions from playing a subtle norm-shaping role towards a more proactive stance as a norm-maker and norm entrepreneur. Although much will depend on the extent to which Beijing seeks to promote RP in the future, the formulation of a distinct Chinese interpretation is, in itself, a notable development.
There are at least two important implications of this shift towards a more influential role for non-Western powers in the development of international norms. The first is that Western states will need to adapt to a new international environment in which the redistribution of power means that they no longer hold a monopoly on global norm-making. Thorsten Benner observes that the West has largely been “unprepared for the non-linear, open-ended politics of norm contestation and evolution in which non-Western powers also play important roles”.Footnote 132 This was illustrated by the initially hostile Western reaction to Brazil's RwP concept, which appeared at least partly attributable to its source as a non-Western proposal.Footnote 133 With respect to China's RP idea, Western powers should engage constructively with Beijing's initiative, rather than dismiss it as an attempt to derail R2P.Footnote 134 In an increasingly complex normative environment in which certain tenets of the Western liberal order, such as R2P, are subjected to challenge or reinterpretation, the continuing legitimacy of such norms will depend on the West's willingness to accommodate non-Western perspectives.Footnote 135 The sooner Western powers recognize this, the better the prospects of bridging the current divisions over the content and implementation of R2P's third pillar.
A second, broader implication of the redistribution of global power and the growing articulation of non-Western normative preferences is a possible move towards a more diverse, pluralistic international order. William Burke-White recently outlined the emergence of what he calls “a multi-hub structure for international law, distinct from past structures such as bipolarity and multipolarity”.Footnote 136 Within this new configuration “a growing number of states play issue-specific leadership roles in a flexible and fluid system”, thereby operating as separate “hubs” of power.Footnote 137 When these “hubs within the system seek to gain followers, they have opportunity and incentives to articulate distinct preferences for the evolution of the substance of international law that reflect their own interests and may be attractive to potential followers”.Footnote 138 Burke-White identifies Beijing's preference for a more absolutist version of sovereignty as an example of rising powers offering an alternative vision to the West's more conditional interpretation of sovereignty.Footnote 139 By promoting a more state-centric conception of international law, China (and Russia) may become hubs that attract followers among the BRICS and other non-Western states.
Recent developments surrounding China's RP initiative support this perspective. First, the language of RP—framed as a concept that “expresses the hope that the voices of the developing countries are duly respected”—suggests that China is indeed positioning itself as a hub for non-Western states to attach to on the issue of R2P.Footnote 140 Second, the decision to host an international conference on RP in Beijing in October 2013, involving predominantly BRICS representatives, can also be interpreted as an attempt to promote further discussion of the Chinese concept.Footnote 141 These are signs that China may be seeking to build broader support for its own, more restrictive vision of R2P's third pillar.
At present, it is unclear what this increasingly complex and contested normative environment will mean for the future of R2P's third pillar. Three possible scenarios can be briefly sketched here. One is that pressure from China and other non-Western states could lead to the emergence of a more tightly constrained global interpretation of pillar three.Footnote 142 This could result from Western powers recognizing the need to accommodate the types of decision-making guidelines and monitoring mechanisms proposed in RP and RwP. Incorporating such proposals into R2P—either formally or informally—would provide a greater level of specificity about when and how pillar three should be operationalized. However, the adoption of RP and RwP ideas would not go as far as creating a positive duty on the UNSC to take action in response to a manifest failure to protect, nor would it formally alter the legal framework on the use of force. Instead, the need for UNSC discretion to be exercised on a case-by-case basis within the existing collective security system would remain central to R2P's third pillar. Under this first scenario, by evolving but ultimately remaining a global concept, R2P's coherence and integrity as a universal norm would be preserved.
A second possibility is that failure to evolve at a global level could lead to R2P fragmenting through the formation of distinct or regional subsets of the concept. These separate versions might be based around distinct hubs, which would then apply R2P in their own area based on a regional or local interpretation.Footnote 143 A third conceivable option is that neither of the first two scenarios eventuates. A redefined, stricter global interpretation of R2P's third pillar could fail to materialize, while initial signs of the emergence of alternative regional subsets might also run out of momentum. Under this scenario, we could be left with multiple, conflicting interpretations of R2P's third pillar, none of which would have a sufficiently broad following to generate consensus—even within a regional or local framework—on international action for civilian protection purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
China's RP proposal represents an attempt to reinterpret R2P's third pillar at a time of renewed contestation over the content and implementation of the concept. It reflects Beijing's deeply held concerns over R2P's potential for abuse. Although many of the elements of RP are drawn from previous initiatives such as Brazil's RwP and the 2001 ICISS Report, the repackaging of these ideas in a more restrictive form gives the overall concept a distinctive Chinese flavour. In its current shape, some aspects of RP appear to be framed too strictly or narrowly to offer workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of military intervention for civilian protection purposes. Clarification and refinement is needed in certain areas.
RP does, however, provide several important insights into the current Chinese stance on R2P. First of all, it indicates that Beijing does recognize that non-consensual military intervention for humanitarian purposes can be an appropriate course of action for the international community to pursue, albeit within a very narrow range of circumstances. Second, by including elements which resemble decision-making guidelines, RP suggests a shift in China's attitude towards such criteria. Having previously opposed the inclusion of guidelines in earlier versions of R2P, Beijing now appears to view them as useful tools for safeguarding the concept against the risk of abuse. Finally, the creation of the RP proposal, plus its discussion at the recent Beijing conference, points to China exploring the possibility of assuming a more prominent role in the future normative development of R2P. Following on from Brazil's RwP initiative, RP provides a further illustration that rising, non-Western powers are becoming increasingly willing to contribute to the evolving normative architecture on sovereignty and intervention. This has potential implications both for R2P and for the international system more broadly. One possibility, briefly considered in this paper, is a move towards a more diverse, pluralistic normative order.
RP's impact on the future development of R2P will depend on how China proceeds with the concept, and how other states respond to it. If Beijing decides to formally adopt the idea and promote it internationally, it could play an important role in future discussions on R2P's third pillar. With Brazil appearing unwilling to push its own RwP concept any further, there is an opportunity for China to take up the reins. Two things could help to position RP as a useful normative initiative. The first would be to detach the RP idea from the rest of Ruan's paper, which contains highly critical language that could undermine Western receptivity towards the concept. A separate, revised account of RP that clarifies and refines the original ideas in more neutral language would be less likely to arouse suspicions over the motives behind the Chinese initiative. Second, Beijing could consider putting RP on the agenda for consideration at the next BRICS summit, with a view to achieving broader endorsement of the proposal.Footnote 144 This could then enable it to be introduced for discussion at a global level within the UN system, in a similar way to RwP's initial promotion by Brazil. If China does decide to formally adopt and promote RP in the future, Western powers should engage constructively with the proposal. Its ideas may ultimately contribute to bolstering the normative content and legitimacy of R2P's third pillar, which in turn could lead to better prospects for operationalizing this dimension of the concept.
