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What We Do and Do Not Know About Standard Form Contracts? An Empirical Study of Wealth Management Product Contracts in China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2021

Qin Zhou
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
Jing Feng*
Affiliation:
School of Law, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, ChongqingChina
*
Corresponding author. E-mail: jingfeng2@swupl.edu.cn
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Abstract

Wealth management products have been popular investment vehicles in China, and they are governed by standard form contracts. Existing studies mainly focus on the risk of such products and suggest having special laws to provide more protection for customers. Little is known about the actual contents of wealth management product contracts. Based on 66 hand-collected wealth management product contracts from major Chinese commercial banks, this article tries to explore the contractual relationship between giant banks and individual customers. It also tests the exploitation theory in a Chinese context by analysing whether the wealth management product contracts are more pro-seller or pro-buyer relative to the laws and regulations in China. Our findings reinforce the argument that standard form contracts are designed in favour of the sellers. The wealth management product contracts are tilted toward the commercial banks relative to the default rules. These contracts contain massive clauses that limit banks’ liabilities and restrict customers’ choice of conflict resolution mechanisms. However, a counter-intuitive finding is that national commercial banks provide less pro-seller terms than the local ones. We argue that the explanations for such variation in contract practices among Chinese commercial banks lie in the enforcement of relevant laws and regulations and the unique nature of national commercial banks.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the National University of Singapore

Most bank-issued wealth management product contracts (WMPCs) are standard form contracts. Standard form contracts are popular in financial transactions because using them is more efficient than creating contracts on a case-by-case basis.Footnote 1 However, these contracts have been criticized from at least three perspectives: absence of freedom of contract,Footnote 2 lack of consensus between buyers and sellers,Footnote 3 and concerns about consumer protection.Footnote 4

The frequent use and vast amounts of research regarding standard form contracts in China does not mean that such contracts are well understood.Footnote 5 In the case of WMPCs in China, most studies focus on the general legal issues regarding wealth management products (WMPs), such as the regulatory enforcement toward the WMP market, the remedies for breach of WMPCs, and the protection of financial consumers.Footnote 6 A few studies have mentioned the clauses included in the WMPCs in the context of China, but their studies use descriptive rather than statistical analysis. For example, Yan compared the risk disclosure clauses in WMPCs,Footnote 7 and Huo linked the risk of WMPs with the risk disclosure clauses in WMPCs.Footnote 8 How exactly do banks draft their WMPCs to assign each party's rights and obligations? Can retail investors shop around for better terms? What motivations contribute to banks if they choose to design contracts that are more in line with the regulations? Answering these questions helps us understand the commercial banks’ standard form contracts and the impact of law and regulation on consumer banking practices more generally in China.

This study examines the bank-issued WMPCs associated with typical WMPs designed for retail investors to shed new light on the use of standard form contracts in China. Given that sales of more than 90,000 WMPs from banks exceeded 29.54 trillion RMB in 2017,Footnote 9 WMPCs deserve our attention. Moreover, a careful study of WMPCs can help focus the debates over the desirability of a specific regulation to handle the massive problems regarding WMPs.Footnote 10

The analysis in this study is based on a hand-collected sample of 66 contracts for WMPs. The WMPCs collected represent the major providers in the WMP market. These WMPCs are drawn from four types of Chinese commercial banks, including all leading state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs),Footnote 11 dozens of joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs),Footnote 12 urban commercial banks (UCBs),Footnote 13 and rural commercial banks (RCBs).Footnote 14

This article fills a gap in the literature on standard form contracts by exploring the content of WMPCs in China's banking sector. After scoring the bias of 28 common and important terms, this article concludes that all the standard form WMPCs in the sample are tilted toward the banks compared to relevant laws and regulations. This is consistent with previous findings in more economically developed countries that standard form contracts are unbalanced.Footnote 15

The results further indicate that although the structure of WMPCs is similar among banks, the terms of WMPCs are substantially different. Some commercial banks provide elaborate terms, whereas others do not. Contrary to intuition, larger national commercial banks, compared with smaller local ones, provide less pro-seller WMPCs than the default rules provided by relevant laws and regulations. Also, the association between the type of bank and the overall bias of banks’ WMPCs is statistically significant. Such a finding challenges previous conclusions that larger firms have the tendency to design more pro-seller terms.Footnote 16

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section I critically reviews the debates over the advantages and disadvantages of using standard form contracts. Section II illustrates the regulatory framework that affects the banks to draft WMPCs. Section III describes the hand-collected sample of WMPCs. Section IV elaborates the methodologies we use to score the bias of 28 common and important terms. Section V provides explanations through analysing the correlation between bank-level determinants and the overall bias results of the sampled WMPCs. The last section is the conclusion.

The theoretical debates on standard form contracts

One of the characteristics of a standard form contract is its standardized contents, which leave the parties limited space for negotiation. In most cases, such a contract is drafted by sellers. Sellers use standard form contracts to create their dominant position in markets and strengthen their empires. In addition, sellers will use their advanced position in contracting to limit their obligations toward consumers.Footnote 17 Some scholars criticize standard form contracts, calling them ‘worthless junk’Footnote 18 or ‘instruments of fraud’.Footnote 19

Empirical evidence supports the criticisms of the standard form contracts. Using 80 written reports of standard form contracts regarding warranty in various markets, Bogert and Fink find that the terms of warranty were unduly favourable to the manufacturers and dealers. The contracts themselves indicate that sellers design provisions to narrow the coverage of warranty remedies and limit their liberalities in defeated product cases. In addition, buyers endured a heavy burden of proof.Footnote 20 Kessler then supplements the evidence on exploitation through his long-term observations of the practice of standard form contracts in the insurance industry. He finds that standardized insurance contracts constrained customers to decide without bargaining or shopping for the best terms.Footnote 21 Additional affirmation comes from Whitford, who studies warranty contracts in the automobile industry. He finds that automobile manufacturers intend to design warranties to minimize their costs, and they can do that because consumers are not fully equipped with the necessary knowledge to discern product defects.Footnote 22

The relationship between standardized contract practices and firm market power, however, is ambiguous due to the lack of statistical analysis. Most previous empirical research has been conducted through qualitative methods. Marotta-Wurgler's recent study fills this gap through a content analysis over a sample of 647 software license agreements from 598 companies. She finds that most of the sampled standard form contracts were more pro-seller than the default rules prescribed in the Uniform Commercial Code.Footnote 23 She also finds that the bias of the agreements varied across companies. Her conclusion is that ‘larger and (controlling for size) younger firms tend to have more pro-seller terms than smaller and older companies’.Footnote 24

Counterarguments mainly come from economists who believe that standard form contracts are the products of the market economy. Economists argue that if a small group of consumers read and compare contract terms, sellers will have incentives to draft contract terms in response to these consumers’ preferences.Footnote 25 In certain industries, providers even compete for marginal consumers.Footnote 26 Reputation is also an incentive for businesspersons to avoid exploiting consumers. Businesspersons may be worried that the continued use of exemption clauses in their standard form contracts can tarnish their reputation, which is disadvantageous in the long run.Footnote 27 Businesspersons can avoid this disadvantage if they discover that the group of savvy consumers is tiny or if they can easily preserve their reputations.Footnote 28 If businesspersons cannot easily develop ways to identify savvy consumers, they will continue to offer these consumers competitive boilerplate terms.Footnote 29 Therefore, consumers can shop for the best terms by selecting sellers with good reputations.Footnote 30

Similar academic debates have also arisen in China. They became heated even after the Contract Law of the People's Republic of China 1999 (hereinafter ‘Contract Law’)Footnote 31 and its judicial interpretation. The concept of standard form contract was assimilated into standard terms, which were adopted in the Contract Law.Footnote 32 Classification of the standard terms according to their different content was suggested. Also suggested was that different rules should be applied to core presentation terms and incidental terms because market mechanisms could affect these two types of standard terms in distinct ways.Footnote 33 However, court decisions have been inconsistent with what scholars have argued, as they seem reluctant to interfere with the freedom of contract between the parties.Footnote 34 Although scholars devote much attention to ex-post contract practice, they are less interested in ex-ante contract design.

Standard form contracts are widely used in transactions between banks and customers in China, and banks’ wealth management services are no exception. Banks have often been reported to embed unfair standard terms in WMPCs that gave them many privileges, such as unilateral modifications of contract terms or termination of product management.Footnote 35 Although banks are required to make true statements about their products and incorporate specific warning statements in WMPCs,Footnote 36 critics are concerned about the efficacy of relevant provisions since they observe the banks’ different practices on contract design in WMP transactions. Some scholars argue that besides the specific warning statements, standardized methods of contract design barely exist. Banks design terms regarding product specification, customer rights and obligations, risk disclosure, and liability in different ways.Footnote 37 For instance, Yan compares the risk disclosure clauses in WMPCs and finds that banks adopt different manners to design these clauses to reflect the risk level of their WMPs due to the lack of standardized methods of risk disclosure. Some banks use symbols to reflect the product risk, while other banks use alphabets.Footnote 38 He argues that the different methods banks adopt to reflect product risk make the risk disclosure clauses likely to be functionally incomparable.Footnote 39 Other scholars are concerned by the efficacy of relevant disclosure rules governing the design of WMPCs because they are often ‘contingent upon whether the disclosed information is read or understood by consumers’.Footnote 40 The large quantity of information conveyed through WMPCs may overload financial consumers, and the complexity of information may be beyond their comprehension.Footnote 41 The existing literature highlights the issues regarding WMPCs but discusses them at a theoretical level. This article tries to fill the research gap by conducting a systematic empirical investigation of standard form WMPC terms.

Law and regulation on wealth management product contracts

Financial regulators have issued specific notes, administrative measures, and regulations to promote the transparency of WMPs and normalize the market. In 2005, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)Footnote 42 issued an interim measure to respond to the emerging WMP market.Footnote 43 The interim measure aims to strengthen the administration of exchanges of commercial banks’ WMPs and build a healthy market.Footnote 44 The interim measure was replaced by the Measures for the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks 2012 (hereinafter ‘2012 Measures’), which provides detailed standards and rules for commercial banks to sell their products.Footnote 45 Some guidelines and measures are more general, covering all of the commercial banks’ businesses, such as information disclosure and reputational risk control.Footnote 46

The 2012 Measures was critical for examining the quality of WMPCs because it provides guidelines and specific instructions on the design of WMPCs. A WMPC is required to consist of four parts: product-specific information, risk disclosure statement, notice on the client's rights and interest, and sales agreement.Footnote 47 When designing WMPCs, commercial banks are to be guided by the objective of making the sales process fair, equal and transparent.Footnote 48 Commercial banks shall use clear and concise language to describe material information of WMPs, and shall not use ambiguous words or complex sentences that can confuse and mislead clients.Footnote 49

The 2012 Measures also requires commercial banks to provide clients with the following information when drafting WMPCs: nature and objective of the product;Footnote 50 investment portfolio and risks of the product;Footnote 51 rates and methods for charging fees;Footnote 52 suitable clients and their risk tolerance;Footnote 53 rights and interests of clients;Footnote 54 and warning, disclaimers, and exclusions. If a commercial bank decides to include the expected return of the product, it must provide scientific and reasonable estimation formula and examples to help intended clients understand the expected return of the product and warn clients that ‘Estimations do not represent the actual return of the product, please be cautious when making your investment’.Footnote 55 Any illustration of past performance of the product shall be accurate, complete, and verified.Footnote 56

The 2012 Measures also set out detailed requirements for the form, manner, and content of mandated disclosure of terms and conditions. Commercial banks shall use visual emphasis (eg, underline, bold and italics) to help draw clients’ attention to important disclosures, such as ‘A wealth management product is not the same as deposit. Please be aware of the risks associated with the product and make prudent investment decisions.’Footnote 57 And ‘If any factor affecting your risk tolerance changes, please complete a risk tolerance assessment promptly.’Footnote 58 When quoting statistical figures, diagrams, and other materials such as third-party performance appraisal, commercial banks shall identify their sources and date of publication.Footnote 59

However, the effectiveness of these notices, administrative measures, and regulations needs further examination. The regulatory methods succeed to an extent because they set the boundaries for the WMP market and provide general principles for WMP exchanges. But these methods are far from being unconditionally successful given the many scandals that transpired in 2012 and that these scandals continued in recent years.Footnote 60 Therefore, stricter regulations have been issued to address imprudent operations and market irregularities.Footnote 61

Besides specific regulations governing the design of WMPCs, some statutes control contractual clauses (see Figure 1). The primary legislation addressing the design of contracts is the Contract Law, which provides default rules that can be contracted around by party autonomy, and mandatory rules that cannot be opted out of by contractual parties.Footnote 62 For example, any contractual clauses that exclude one party's liability for personal injury or property loss caused to the other party shall be invalid.Footnote 63 If there are any disputes concerning the construction of standard terms, the interpretation of such terms shall base on common sense. Whenever there are two or more interpretations of the standard term, such a term shall be interpreted against the party drafting it.Footnote 64 The General Provisions of the Civil Law of the PRC and the Consumer Protection Law of the PRC may be influential when commercial banks design WMPCs. The former provides general principles and rules to adjust civil relations (eg, contractual relations),Footnote 65 and the latter applies to all consumers who purchase commodities or receive services (eg, financial products).Footnote 66

Figure 1. Law and Regulation Governing WMPCs

NOTE: *The 13th NPC passed the Civil Code of the People's Republic of China on 28 May 2020, and it took effect on 1 January 2021.

**The China Banking-Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued the Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Wealth Management Product of Commercial Banks in 2018.

We use the 2012 Measures as an important reference for three reasons. First, the 2012 Measures was a landmark regulation governing the design of WMPCs. The 2012 Measures set general rules to guide banks’ design of WMPCs and instruct banks to incorporate specific warning statements.Footnote 67 Second, while the 2012 Measures expired in 2018, its main parts have been retained by the newly issued Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Wealth Management Business of Commercial Banks. For example, the new regulation also requires banks to design WMPCs that can provide accurate and complete information about the features of products (eg, investment portfolio, risks, and charges).Footnote 68 Third, the WMPCs in our sample – which will illustrate more about in Section III – were collected before 2018, when the 2012 Measures was still in effect and influenced banks’ practices on WMPC design. Hence, we believe it is appropriate to use the 2012 Measures as a benchmark to assess WMPC terms’ bias.

Sample of wealth management product contracts

This study fills the gap in the literature of standard form contract practice by adding empirical data from the Chinese banking sector. The newly emerged WMP market provides an appropriate environment to test for bias in standard form contracts. First, WMPCs contain several standard form terms that are important to understand, given that the sales of WMPs exceed 29.54 trillion RMB in 2017.Footnote 69 Second, the high structural uniformity of the WMPCs is associated with substantial variation in particular terms. Some commercial banks provide elaborate terms, whereas others do not. Third, specific regulations lead to homogeneous WMPCs from bank to bank, which allows for meaningful comparisons of their standard form terms.

The findings and conclusions are generated from a hand-collected sample of 66 bank-issued WMPCs before 2018.Footnote 70 To establish the database, we followed two steps: first, selecting the banks and, second, obtaining the WMPCs of their flagship products. We selected virtually all well-known national commercial banks, as well as some typical local ones. The leading players in the WMP market are the national-wide commercial banksFootnote 71, which had raised more than 70% of the WMP funds at the end of 2016.Footnote 72 Our sample contains almost all of the national commercial banks – all (6) SOCBs and the majority (11 out of 12) of JSCBs, and some local banks (42 UCBs and 7 RCBs).Footnote 73 The local banks included in the sample are located in the coastal cities of China, which are the most affluent regions of the country.Footnote 74 We did not include WMPCs from foreign banks in the sample for two reasons. First, the money that foreign commercial banks raised from sales of WMPs each year only constitutes a tiny portion of the total annual amount of fundraising via the sale of bank-issued WMPs.Footnote 75 Second, foreign commercial banks governed by special regulations such as Regulation on the Administration of Foreign-funded Banks Footnote 76 tend to have different corporate governance and business strategies. Therefore, we do not include foreign banks because this paper aims to explore the relationship between the nature of Chinese commercial banks and the quality of their WMPCs.

Next, we collected the WMPCs for the flagship series from each selected bank. Banks, in general, advertise all their WMPs. However, the flagship series is the one that matters most to banks and customers (ie, the predominant product that the bank seems to market).Footnote 77 We attempted to identify a bank's flagship product in consideration of its performance period and its popularity. Performance period means the time since the name of a product appeared. The longer the period over which a WMP has existed, the greater the number of WMPs sold by banks. The product thus becomes well known among customers. For example, ‘Qian Yuan’, a WMP sold by the China Construction Bank, has existed in the market for at least seven years.Footnote 78 The number of WMPs under the name of ‘Qian Yuan’ is the greatest among all the WMPs sold from this bank.Footnote 79

In general, the selection of a flagship WMP of a given bank in the sample was straightforward. The name of the flagship product either appeared the most frequently on the list of the products provided at the bank's counters or was emphasized and elaborated on the bank's website. We selected the flagship product for the remaining banks by referring to the official website on which the WMPs of all the commercial banks in China are registered (chinawealth.com.cn). We recognized a flagship product when it appears most frequently on the official website.

To sum up, the sample contains 66 WMPCs from 66 Chinese commercial banks. Readers might be concerned that the sample is subject to some types of selection bias due to the process of sample collection and the relatively small sample size. This concern is not prohibitive for several reasons. First, we do not claim that our sample represents all commercial banks in China. Instead, it represents the national commercial banks and local commercial banks in the coastal region. The sample size is acceptable given the total number of banks that sold WMPs each year. According to the search results from the chinawealth website, 6 SOCBs, 12 JSCBs, 72 UCBs, and 32 RCBs raised funds by selling WMPs in 2017.Footnote 80 Our sample contains more than half of the banks. In addition, our sample represents the commercial banks and their WMPs that clients are most likely to encounter and that matter most to both commercial banks and their clients (see Appendix 1).

Second, the WMPC of a bank's flagship product is representative given the high uniformity of WMPCs provided by the same bank. A typical WMPC consists of four sales documents: a sales agreement, a specification, a risk disclosure statement, and a note for customer rights and interests.Footnote 81 Within the same bank, the differences between WMPCs only exist in the WMP specification, in which the necessary information varies across products.

We included essential characteristics of each bank (see Table 1). The age of a bank is 2016 minus the year of founding, with the youngest at four years and the oldest at 108 years (Mean = 21.8, SD = 18.03). Specifically, the average age (74.2) of SOCBs is much higher than that of the rest (17.72), among which only two banks are over 100 years old.Footnote 82 The size was identified according to a bank's registered capital and its revenue. In the sample, the registered capital ranged from 636 to 349,321 million RMB (Mean = 27,557, SD = 72,206). In addition, the net revenue ranged from 33 to 279,106 million RMB (Mean = 22,184, SD = 54,053). Compared with other banks, the SOCBs are larger. The average registered capital of SOCBs is more than 28 times that of the rest of the banks. Moreover, on average, SOCBs generate 22 times more net revenue than the rest of the banks.

Table 1. Commercial Bank Summary Statistics

NOTE: Results based on 66 commercial banks data, including years since founding, registered capital, revenue, public listed, direct state investment, were searched in the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System.

We also collected data regarding the banks’ shareholders – whether the government has invested in the bank, and if so, to what extent. Among the 66 banks, over 90% have direct investments from the state – either from the State Council or the Ministry of Finance (MOF). However, the amount of state investment varies from bank to bank. The average percentage of state investment is 28.41% (SD = 24.26%). Furthermore, whether a bank has been publicly listed or not was also included and presented as a dummy variable. Of the 66 banks, only a small portion (36%) are publicly listed (SD = 49%).Footnote 83 Finally, we also considered whether a commercial bank was operated nationally or locally. We generated a dummy variable, coding 1 if a bank ran its business around the country, coding 0 if a bank mainly focused on local business. All the data were collected through the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System,Footnote 84 a state-established search engine that allows the public to get information about market entities.Footnote 85

Evaluating important terms of WMPCs: methodology

This section analyzes the content of WMPCs. A typical WMPC includes four sales documents containing 28 important standard terms to allocate rights, duties, and risks. These terms can be grouped into five main categories. The first category, ‘Nature of Wealth Management Product’, contains essential information for customers to make a purchase. This category includes the type, investment period, scope of investment, requirements for purchase, anticipated profit, and management fee. The second category, ‘Risk Disclosure’, contains terms describing the possible risks that will jeopardize the safety of the customers’ investments. The third category, ‘Customer Rights’, includes terms that illustrate the risk tolerance rating, channels for customers to acquire information regarding WMPs, and other rights that matter to customers’ interests. The fourth category, LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY, comprises terms that list the situations in which a bank's responsibilities are waived and the privileges they enjoy. The last category, ‘Conflict Resolution’, includes terms that affect customers’ choices regarding the methods of resolution (arbitration clauses), locations to claim the dispute (forum-selection clauses), and which sales document should be the reference in the contractual relationship.

In deciding on the measurement of bias of a given term, we rely on the laws and regulations mentioned in Section II. In particular, the terms are mainly assessed against an objective benchmark, the 2012 Measures, because it is the main regulation that the banks refer to when they design their WMPCs. The 2012 Measures mainly mandates the design of WMPCs—what must be included and what should not. For example, Article 17 of the 2012 Measures requires banks to place a warning statement in a conspicuous position in their WMPCs, which reads, ‘A wealth management product is not the same as deposit. Please be aware of the risks associated with the product and make prudent investment decisions.’ The 2012 Measures also provides many detailed rules that the banks can directly copy and paste into their WMPCs. Therefore, we chose the 2012 Measures as the benchmark to assess the bias of most terms. We assessed the remaining terms according to the general principles in the relevant laws and regulations or by referencing the questions used in previous studies.Footnote 86

Table 2 lists the terms and their references. We grouped the 28 terms into three categories according to the way they apply the provisions. The guiding provision refers to the provision that contains the sentences that can be directly copied and pasted into the contract terms. For example, all the WMPCs contain the phrase ‘I have read the above risks disclosure, and I am willing to assume the investment risks’, which is in Article 18(9) of the 2012 Measures.Footnote 87 The discretionary provision refers to the provision that specifies what information must be included in the WMPCs but leaves the banks to decide how to display such information. Using investment information as an example, Article 20(1) of the 2012 Measures requires the sales documentation to specify the scope of investment.Footnote 88 In addition, it gives banks the freedom to decide whether they would illustrate the scope of investment precisely or roughly. The rest of the WMPC terms that do not belong to the above two categories are named other/principal provision.

Table 2. List of Terms and References

a. If no special notification, the number suggests the Article number in the Measures for the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks.

It is worth emphasizing that a given WMPC term is not accessed subjectively but measured against an objective benchmark provided by the default rules in the 2012 Measures (and relevant Contract Law provisions). In the best-case scenario, the sampling banks do not merely comply with the default rules but provide terms that favour clients. Commercial banks will not get extra credits if they comply with the relevant provisions. However, in the worst-case scenario, the sampling banks will ignore the default rules and take advantage of clients through one-sided terms. Commercial banks may not always find clear default rules when drafting WMPC terms. In such scenarios, we will also consider the general principles of fair trading, industry-specific practices and standards applied in previous studies when accessing a given term.

Like the methodology that Marotta-Wurgler adopted to track the bias of end-user license agreements,Footnote 89 we identified a given term in worst-case scenarios to be more pro-seller relative to the default rules and assigned a negative one-point score for such a term. We gave a zero score if a given term matches the default rules in the 2012 Measures. We assigned a positive one score to a given term in two types of scenarios. In the first type of scenario, if a given term does not merely match the default rules but favour clients, we considered such a term is more pro-buyer than the default rules. In the second type of scenario, a given term provides additional information or entitlement to clients where the provisions of the 2012 Measures are silent about specific rules. For example, the risk level of a WMP is crucial to customers. Thus, banks shall adopt scientific and rational methods to calculate risk ratings that can reflect the risk of the WMP accurately. However, no rule in the 2012 Measures suggests how detailed the description of risk ratings should be. Customers prefer the term that not only offers the rated risk level but also elaborates the meaning of a risk rating. Such a term can enhance their understanding of the risk level. We gave a positive point to the term that explained the meaning of risk rating instead of merely showing the risk rating result. We found that the best-case scenario rarely occurred. Thus, like Marotta-Wurgler's study (assigning positive marks to 6 out of 23 terms), we assigned more negative marks than positive ones.

The score of each item will be summed up to constitute a ‘bias index’.Footnote 90 Obviously, all terms are assumed to matter equally and that customers have the same preference. Of course, this process may not be realistic. Some customers may care about the risk rating, whereas others make their purchases mainly based on the anticipated profit. Nevertheless, a portion of customers may pay more attention to the right to redeem and the exception of the banks’ liabilities.

Nature of wealth management product

This category contains information that is essential for customers to make their purchases. The general principle of designing WMPCs is that all the information regarding the nature of the product should be accurate, explicit, and truthful.Footnote 91 Such a principle is supplemented by three other articles, which offer detailed requirements regarding the estimated rate of return,Footnote 92 scope of investment,Footnote 93 and charged fees.Footnote 94 A WMPC that includes the required information is coded as zero; a negative one point is coded otherwise. For example, Article 16 of the 2012 Measures requires the promotion and sales texts of WMPs containing the descriptions involving ‘rate of return’ or ‘interval of return’ to provide the basis for scientific estimation and the approaches of the rate or interval of anticipated profit. Therefore, if a WMPC fails to include the calculation mode, it receives a negative one point. Otherwise, a zero score was assigned. In addition, Article 16 also states that customers should be reminded with eye-catching words stating that ‘estimated return is not equal to actual earnings, and investment must be considered carefully’. If a WMPC meets this requirement, then a zero score is given. Otherwise, a negative one point was given. The first five terms were coded in this way (see Table 3).Footnote 95

Table 3. WMPC Terms and Bias: Methodology

NOTE: The table describes the measures of scoring each term in the WMPC to calculate the overall bias of the contract. Zero scores mean the terms are neutral or terms that meet the demands of the laws and regulations (in particular, the Measures for the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks). Positive one captures pro-buyer terms, and negative one captures pro-seller terms.

Whether a bank sells and manages its own WMPs or sells products managed by other financial institutions matters to the contractual relationships between the bank and its customers. However, the 2012 Measures does not specifically provide for this. Sale by proxy would increase uncertainty and risks to engage in more complicated cases when disputes occur.Footnote 96 Therefore, if a WMP is sold and managed by the bank, a positive one-point score was given. Otherwise, a zero score was given.

Risk disclosure

Risk disclosure is crucial for customers. Unlike bank deposits, WMPs are not adequately secured by commercial banks. Some risks, such as natural disasters, political changes, and market fluctuations, may jeopardize the safety of customers’ investments. Such importance is also reflected in the 2012 Measures, in which the relevant provisions occupy two chapters.Footnote 97 Article 18 explicitly lists nine elements that should be disclosed to customers.Footnote 98 It begins with mandated alert statements. We measured WMPC terms to observe whether they include notice sentences stipulated in the 2012 Measures.Footnote 99 If a WMPC term conspicuously (eg, in capital, bold, italic, in bracket) expresses the required notice sentence, then a zero score is given. Otherwise, a negative one-point score was given. In addition, the WMPC should include a term that exemplifies the investment results in the worst-case scenario.Footnote 100 A negative one-point score was given if such an example is absent.

Next, we considered how the banks measure and display the risk rating of their WMPs. Article 18, Section 4, and the whole Chapter Four of the 2012 Measures request banks to rate the risk of the proposed WMPs scientifically and rationally. In addition, the risk rating result should be in the form of risk grades, that is, in the form of at least five grades in ascending order.Footnote 101 However, assigning risk grades has no uniform standard and method. Discretions are left to the banks, and the ways they display risk grades differ. In this study, a WMPC that offers risk rating results in the form of five (or more) grades receives a zero score, and risk rating results of less than five grades or risk rating never mentioned receives a negative one-point score. In addition, a single risk rating result without explanation does not mean much to customers.Footnote 102 All else being equal, customers prefer detailed information that can tell them the actual risk of the proposed product. We gave a positive one-point score for the presence of an explanation of the risk grades. Finally, a WMPC with a match between the risk grade of a product and the assessed risk tolerance of clientsFootnote 103 was scored zero; otherwise, a negative one-point score was given.

However, ‘[a] disclosure mandate can similarly backfire when the discloser who complies with the disclosure mandate is free to engage in other forms of sharp dealing’.Footnote 104 While the commercial banks all disclose risks somewhere in their WMPCs, some add a term to assign the risk exclusively to the buyer after the disclosure. Therefore, if a term casts the burden on customers to take all the potential risks after the bank discloses information, then a negative one-point score was given. Otherwise, a zero score was given.

Customer rights

The protection of customer rights is one of the fundamental principles in the 2012 Measures. Article 19 of 2012 Measures alone expresses the content that should be included in the note for customer rights.Footnote 105 Besides the mandated information, some banks spill more ink on explanations of risk tolerance. We scored a positive one-point score for the presence of additional explanation.

Second, while clients have the right to access information related to the product, the banks have discretion regarding how the information is disclosed. In practice, banks often release information in two ways: through their officers at the counters or on their websites. Some banks, however, provide additional channels such as email, phone messages, or phone lines. Everything else being equal, customers can benefit from more channels and more frequency in disclosing information. Therefore, if a bank provides more than two channelsFootnote 106 to disclose information, it receives one positive point. Otherwise, it was given a score of zero. Besides, how a bank releases information when it releases information also matters. If a term requires the commercial bank to disclose information before a new term takes effect, it receives one positive point because this allows the customers to have the freedom to choose to stay in the adjusted contractual relationship or to leave it.

The next term indicates whether the customer has the right to redeem the WMP early. As stated before, banks should inform the client of the type and the proportion of the assets invested and ensure reasonable floating according to the floating return rate stipulated in the sales documentation.Footnote 107 However, since the financial market is unpredictable, it is necessary to give banks the discretion to adjust their investments. Correspondingly, customers deserve the right to redeem the WMP in advance if they refuse to accept such adjustments.Footnote 108 A WMPC scores zero points for the presence of such a customer right; otherwise, a negative one point was given.

Finally, three additional rights, although not included in the 2012 Measures, deserve our attention. In practice, some banks impose restrictions on the transfer and pledge of WMPs to avoid being involved in a debt chain. The 2012 Measures keeps silent regarding this, and whether allowing the transfer and pledge of WMPs is legally feasible or not is under debate.Footnote 109 Customers prefer WMPs to be freely transferred or pledged, so a positive one point was given to a WMPC if the bank allows customers to make such an arrangement. In contrast, the presence of such restrictions was recorded as zero points. Moreover, since there is no legal rule requiring commercial banks to provide a statement of account for managing the WMP, even though the absence of such a statement does hurt customers’ substantial interests, a zero-point score was given if the WMPC lacks it. The last term indicates the method for calculating interests. If a bank does not count the period between the end of WMPC and the date of redemption in its calculation of interests, that portion of the interests becomes the bank's profits, thus harming its clients’ interests. We therefore assigned a negative one point if a bank calculates interests in this way.

Limitations on liability

This is the portion of the WMPCs that banks pay particular attention to carefully write the standard form terms for limiting banks’ liabilities. The first term that we recorded is whether the WMPC broadens the scope of the exemptions according to the Contract Law.Footnote 110 Although the parties are allowed to agree on terms limiting liability, there is a statutory exemption for a force majeure event.Footnote 111 A force majeure event, for the Contract Law, refers to actual situations that are unforeseeable, unavoidable, and insurmountable. Therefore, if the bank broadens the scope of the force majeure event to embrace additional situations, the clause was regarded as pro-seller and was given a negative one-point score. For example, some banks include the risk that arises from fund management in the limitations on liability, and for that, they receive a negative one-point score.

On occasion, banks also restrict their liability following the disclosure of information to customers. No matter how the banks disclose relevant information, either at the counter or through their websites or even by phone calls, messages, or emails, if they disclose the information, they will waive their liability for any consequential losses. In some WMPCs, contain a clause claiming that ‘any damage caused by customers’ reluctance to check information or any loss of possible investment opportunity due to the customers’ delay for checking information should not be liable to the bank’. If a WMPC contains such a disclaimer to waive the bank's duties after disclosing information, it receives a negative one-point score; otherwise, it was given a score of zero.

Next, we consider conditions for the termination of the contract. The basement of a contract is the parties’ consensus. Correspondingly, to terminate the contract often requires both parties’ agreement.Footnote 112 However, some banks authorize themselves to terminate the contract without the customer's consent. We identified these disclaimers as pro-seller as they limit customers’ rights to choose whether to continue the contractual relationship or not. The 2012 Measures allows customers to redeem products in advance under the sales documents when the customer rejects such adjustments.Footnote 113 We thus interpreted disclaimers emphasizing the banks’ authority to adjust or terminate the WMPCs without notifying customers of their rights to redeem in advance as pro-seller and assigned a negative one-point score to such terms.

The last limitation on liability that we examined is the right of recourse clause. A right of recourse is common in contractual relationships if they involve a third party. In the case of WMPs, the bank will represent the customers in pursuing the recovery of funds if the third party has a capital shortage and is likely to default on the fund management contract. The allocation of additional fees in the pursuit of recoveries, such as litigation fees, arbitration fees, and lawyer fees, is important to both the customers and the banks. While the 2012 Measures is silent in allocating additional fees, customers prefer not to have such fees deducted from the money recovered from the third party. Therefore, if the WMPC has no clause or the clause does not mention the relocation of additional fees, we interpreted it as neutral and assigned a zero-point score. If there was language such as ‘The fees in pursuing recovery (eg, litigation fees, arbitration fees, and lawyer fees) shall be deducted in the amount of return’, we gave a negative one-point score.

Conflict resolution

The last category involves dispute resolution. Banks may strategically use the choice of forum and mandated arbitration to increase inconvenience for customers seeking recovery of their loss from investments in WMPs, thus reducing their costs or eliminating the possibility of class actions. For example, if a customer purchased a 50,000 RMB WMP and lost 20% (10,000 RMB) in capital, the customer must choose: receive 40,000 RMB or file the case in court with the possibility of recovering less than 40,000 RMB.Footnote 114 Customers may also have to advance additional expenses such as mandated arbitration fees, attorney fees, and travel costs during the dispute resolution process. Even though choice of forum and mandated arbitration clauses are not legally forbidden in China, we interpreted WMPC terms that constrain customer's choice of methods and locations of dispute resolution as less buyer-friendly in regard to the imbalance of bargaining power between banks and their customers.Footnote 115

Finally, we recorded whether the WMPC specifies which sales documents should be the ultimate reference for the courts or arbitration tribunals to make an adjunction. Common sense indicates that the WMP agreement should be the ultimate reference because it contains terms that allocate rights and duties of the parties. However, some banks clearly state that the specification should be the ultimate reference when there are differences between the WMP specification and the agreement. Considering that the agreement has been signed by both parties, while the specification does not necessarily include their signatures, we thus interpreted WMPCs that give precedence to the specification as pro-seller and assign a negative one-point score.

Results and analysis

Overall WMPC bias results

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the overall WMPC bias index. According to our coding methodology, the attainable score of overall bias ranges from -21 to 7.Footnote 116 The x-axis in Figure 2 reflects the theoretical extremes of the bias scores. No WMPC in our sample reaches either of the extremes. A majority of the WMPCs are scored in the region between -7 to -3, with an average score of -5.68 (SD = 2.64). The distribution nearly has a bell shape.Footnote 117 The minimum score in our sample is -11, and the maximum is -1, indicating that when considered as a whole, WMPCs are always tilted toward the banks compared to the default rules in the 2012 Measures and relevant laws. This finding supports the argument that Chinese commercial banks always offer ‘hegemon clauses’, at least when selling WMPs.

Figure 2. The Overall WMPC Bias

While the WMPCs are not favourable to customers relative to the default rules provided by laws and regulations, there is a certain degree of variation among the WMPC terms from different banks. As previous studies of standard form contracts in other industries had similar results, such a finding is not unique.Footnote 118 It indicates that the banks treat the terms of WMPCs differently. Table 4 breaks the overall bias results down into five categories of terms. It shows the maximum, minimum, and mean score of each category of terms and the proportion of the banks with zero or higher scores. Some categories of terms are more pro-seller than others. For example, category four, ‘Limitations on Liability’, is the most unfair one.Footnote 119 In this category, the overall bias scores ranged from -1 to -5, indicating that all banks use pro-seller terms. Its average score is -2.77 (SD = 0.98), meaning that the terms of this category are, on net, about ‘three terms worse’ than the relevant default rules. By contrast, the average score of the terms in category three, ‘Customer Rights’, is near zero (Mean= -0.06, SD = 1.18), meaning that the terms of this category are almost fair on average. Fifty-eight per cent of the bias score in this category is zero or greater, suggesting that more than half of the sampled banks either matched the rules or were pro-buyer. This is the fairest category compared with the rest.Footnote 120 The other three categories (‘Nature of WMP', ‘Risk Disclosure' and ‘Conflict Resolution') are slightly pro-seller than the default rules: the average score of these categories are close to -1. No statistically significant difference was found among the average scores of the three.

Table 4. WMPCs Bias for the Five Categories

In addition, recall that commercial banks use different measures to design terms in different parts of the WMPCs, but we still have no clue about their strategies' rationales. Table 5 helps us to answer this question. We surmise that the terms in the Guiding Provision group are less pro-seller than those in other groups, and the terms in the Principle Provision group are the most pro-seller. The data in Table 5 verify this assumption, as the average score of the terms in the Principle Provision group (Mean=−2.970, SD = 1.265) is smaller than the score in the Discretionary Provision (Mean=−2,197, SD = 1.791) and Guiding Provision (Mean=−0.515, SD = 0.638) groups. This is not surprising if the contents of the provisions in the three groups are compared. Guiding Provisions contain specific clauses that should be included in the WMPCs, leaving no opportunity for commercial banks to modify them. It is safer for the banks to simply copy and paste those sentences into the WMPCs. This does not harm their interests because these clauses only serve a notification function. Thus, the average score of the terms in the Guiding Provision group should be closer to zero, if not necessarily equal to zero. This trend might not apply to the terms that have no clear standards for reference. The Principle Provisions, in general, are more abstract, leaving commercial banks more room to modify them according to their interests. In addition, the type of bank is still crucial for a bank's strategy in adopting the provisions. The national commercial banks are more compliant than the local banks if the rules are clear.

Table 5. WMPCs Bias—Summary on Means of Groups of Provisions

NOTE: SD is reported in the parentheses.

Subindex bias and bank characteristics

After describing the overall bias index results and the subindex bias by different categories, this section will examine the extent to which bank characteristicsFootnote 121 can explain the bias of WMPCs.

We conducted OLS regressionsFootnote 122 and found no significant association between bank age, net revenue, the percentage of State Council shares, the two dummies for whether the bank is publicly listed and whether its business is nationwide, and our dependent variables (the results are presented in Appendix 2). Therefore, none of these variables was included in the following analysis.

The regression results indicate that bank type is the key independent variable.Footnote 123 As shown in Table 6, compared to the WMPC terms designed by national commercial banks (ie, the SOCBs and JSCBs), those provided by local commercial banks (ie, the UCBs and RCBs) are more pro-seller than the relevant default rules. The terms provided by the UCBs (Mean= -7.29, SD = 2.75) are, on average, about ‘three terms worse’ than those provided by the national commercial banks (Mean= -4.47, SD = 1.63). The OLS regression analysis suggests that such a difference is statistically significant (Beta= -0.33, p = 0.02) (see Table 7). Similarly, the RCBs tend to have more pro-seller WMPC terms than the national banks (Beta= -0.26, p = 0.05) (see Table 7).

Table 6. WMPCs Bias—Summary on Means of Categories of Terms According to Types of Banks

NOTE: SD is reported in the parentheses.

Table 7. Summary of OLS Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting WMPCs Bias

NOTE: This table reports Beta and SEs (in the parentheses). * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01.

The results for individual subindexes are generally consistent with those in the overall bias index. However, the level of influence of the type of bank on WMPC bias varies across different categories of terms. As shown in Table 7, for terms in subindex (2), (4), and (5), the national commercial banks design less pro-seller terms, relative to the default rules, than the local commercial banks. Still, the differences are not statistically significant.Footnote 124 Regarding subindex (1) and (3), the type of bank exerted stronger influence. In addition, a more interesting finding is that national commercial banks, on average, design terms in favour of customers in the category of Customer Rights (Mean = 0.82, SD = 1.07) (see Table 6). Such findings are counter-intuitive due to the belief that powerful national commercial banks would take advantage of customers via one-sided standard form contracts.Footnote 125 Therefore, it is worth carefully analysing these findings in the discussion part below.

Other than the type of bank, the percentage of shares owned by the MOF plays a role. Commercial banks with a higher percentage of shares owned by the MOF, controlling the type of banks, are more likely to have less pro-seller terms (Beta = 0.23, p = 0.05). However, when we break the results down into five categories, this variable only significantly affects category 5 (Beta = 0.31, p = 0.01).Footnote 126

Why the national commercial banks offer less pro-seller WMPC terms?

The above findings reaffirm the previous conclusion that ‘consumers do have some degree of choice’ over standard form contracts, even if their boilerplates are non-negotiable.Footnote 127 This is because there are certain degrees of variation among banks’ WMPCs. Customers will have less pro-seller WMPCs if they choose to buy the products from national commercial banks, especially those that are state-owned. Why are national commercial banks’ WMPCs generally less pro-seller relative to the default rules provided by laws and regulations? We offer three possible explanations: first, national commercial banks are more concerned with their reputation, so they design good-quality WMPCs to minimize reputational risks; second, their stronger ties with the Party-State forces them to prioritize the Party-State's social and economic objectives instead of using one-sided WMPCs to maximize banks’ profits; third, national commercial banks are more aware of legal risks because they are more prone to being caught by the financial regulator.

National commercial banks are more concerned with reputation

Compared with local ones, national commercial banks put more weight on the value of their corporate reputations for the following reasons. First, national commercial banks have been perceived as semi-governmental organisations due to their strong attachments to the Chinese central government.Footnote 128 Thus, when bank-issued WMPs defaulted, retail investors not only blamed the commercial banks but also accused relevant regulators,Footnote 129 because retail investors mistakenly believe that the state would bail out the losses of investments if bank-issued WMPs defaulted.Footnote 130 Recent scandals caused by defaulted WMPs involving national commercial banks have threatened the government's and the banks’ reputations.Footnote 131 To avoid censure from the central government, national commercial banks are more cautious in designing their WMPCs to prevent reputational risks.

Second, national commercial banks value their reputations because they are more internationalized. For example, most sampled national commercial banks are simultaneously listed in the mainland and Hong Kong stock exchanges, while none of the sampled local commercial banks is.Footnote 132 Existing literature has shown the improvements in corporate governance and financial performance that national commercial banks have made after listing their shares in Hong Kong.Footnote 133 These improvements can be explained by the ‘legal bonding theory’, which emphasizes the importance of higher standards of corporate governance, investor protection and information disclosure for cross-listing firms to meet in a foreign jurisdiction;Footnote 134 or the ‘reputational bonding theory’, which focuses on the reputational benefits in accessing external finance.Footnote 135 Therefore, as an international firm, a national commercial bank would consistently ‘bond themselves by building their reputation’Footnote 136 by designing good-quality WMPCs to minimize reputational risks.Footnote 137

National commercial banks are more concerned with financial policy objectives

Compared with the local banks, national commercial banks prioritize their mission to accomplish the Party-State's financial policy objectives rather than seek profits for shareholders. Hence, national commercial banks must abide by the regulations to prevent systemic financial risks and preserve social stability.

The recent rotation of senior executives of national commercial banks reflects the Party-State's tendency to have closer ties with national commercial banks. A recent news report reveals that nearly half of the vice governors at the provincial level served as senior executives of national commercial banks before they held office in the provincial government.Footnote 138 Such postings aim at accomplishing broad financial policy objectives such as financial inclusions and the prevention of systemic financial risks.Footnote 139 To serve the interests of Party-State, national commercial banks have to consider the overall financial policies when approving the design of WMPCs. The national commercial banks would consider extremely one-sided WMPCs as an obstacle to promoting financial inclusion. Their compliance with laws and regulations would facilitate the prevention of systemic financial risks.

National commercial banks are more aware of legal risks

In the process of controlling systematic financial risks, national commercial banks, compared with local ones, are more likely to be the targets of regulatory watchdogs. For example, in 2018, the CBIRC imposed fines of US$22 million on six national commercial banks for violating regulations regarding bank-issued WMPs.Footnote 140 As one of us has found, most fines (121 out of 183) were issued by CBRC/CBIRC and their local offices to national commercial banks regarding their breach of regulations on bank-issued WMPs.Footnote 141

Thus, national commercial banks are more aware of the legal risks of severe punishments when designing their WMPCs. To achieve this goal, they adopt two strategies. First, national commercial banks often invite judges to conduct legal training programs to equip their directors, senior officers, and in-house counsels with legal knowledge regarding the purpose and practice of the latest regulations.Footnote 142 Second, national commercial banks, like many other central SOEs, have recruited former judges and prosecutors with unbeatable remuneration packages to enhance their legal compliance capabilities.Footnote 143

Conclusion

Standard form contracts are widely used in the banking industry. While many news reports cite banks’ ‘hegemon clauses’, and scholars have discussed their enforceability, there has been almost no systematic empirical study on the content of contracts provided by banks. Based on 66 hand-collected WMPCs from four major types of commercial banks in China, this article tries to provide some empirical evidence about the standard form contract practice in the Chinese banking industry.

By measuring the variation in 28 common terms, such as risk disclosure and customer rights, we calculate the scores of the WMPCs’ biases. The overall bias index indicates that all the standard form WMPCs in the sample are pro-seller relative to the objective benchmarks, the default rules provided by the 2012 Measures and other relevant laws. However, we find that national commercial banks provide less exploitative terms than local commercial banks. The explanation for such variation lies in the enforcement of relevant laws and regulations and the unique nature of national commercial banks. First, national commercial banks, which have been perceived as semi-governmental organizations and are generally more internationalized, are more concerned with their reputation. Second, national commercial banks must accomplish the Party-State's financial policy objectives to prevent systemic financial risks and preserve social stability. Third, national commercial banks are more aware of the legal risks of severe punishments when designing their WMPCs because they are more prone to being caught by the financial regulator. We find no evidence that other characteristics of the banks have a significant impact on the overall bias.

The results also indicate that the commercial banks, no matter what type they are, follow the regulations more stringently if the provisions are clear enough and leave no room for the banks to make modifications. On the contrary, if the provisions are too abstract, the banks design the WMPC terms to maximize their interests. This result is practically meaningful to the regulators. If they intend to normalize the WMP market, the best solution is to draft more explicit provisions.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the Centre for Banking & Finance Law at the National University of Singapore for the research support. We own sincere thanks to Lin Lin, and Charles Zhen Qu for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We also thank the participants of the 2018 Law and Society Annual Meeting at Toronto for insightful discussions. All errors are ours alone.

Appendix 1. Overview of the Chinese Commercial Banks in the Sample (N = 66)

Appendix 2. Regression: WMPC Bias and Bank Characteristics

Author Biographies

Qin Zhou, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Banking & Finance Law, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore.

Jing Feng, Assistant Professor at the School of Law, Southwest University of Political Science and Law; Research Fellow at the Centre for People's Tribunal Study, Southwest University of Political Science and Law.

Footnotes

1 Data collected from the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System, a state-established information disclosure system that stores the registered information of enterprises.

2 Data collected from the commercial banks’ annual reports in the year 2016.

3 According to the Law of the PRC on Commercial Banks (2015 Amendment), there are three types of commercial banks: National Commercial Bank, Urban/City Commercial Bank and Rural Commercial Bank. The concept of State-owned Bank appeared in early regulations, such as Regulation on Financial Asset Management Companies 2000, and has been inherited until now. The CBRC, in its annual report, also adopted the concept of a state-owned Bank.

  • Type of Commercial Banks Required Registered Capital

  • National Commercial Bank ≥ 1 billion RMB

  • Urban/City Commercial Bank ≥ 100 million RMB

  • Rural Commercial Bank ≥ 50 million RMB

4 National Commercial Bank means the bank operates nationally; Local Commercial Bank means the bank operates regionally.

5 Data collected from the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System. State direct investment includes the investments from State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and Ministry of Finance (central and local levels).

Note: This table reports Beta and SEs (in the parentheses). * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01.

References

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11 These SOCBs include Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Postal Savings Bank of China.

12 These JSCBs include China Bohai Bank, China CITIC Bank, China Everbright Bank, China Guangfa Bank, China Merchants Bank, China Minsheng Bank, China Zheshang Bank, Huaxia Bank, Industrial Bank, Ping An Bank, and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank.

13 These UCBs include but are not limited to Bank of Beijing, Bank of Hangzhou, Bank of Jiangsu, Bank of Ningbo, and Bank of Shanghai.

14 These RCBs include but are not limited to Xiaoshan Rural Commercial Bank, Chengdu Rural Commercial Bank, and Jiangsu Sheyang Rural Commercial Bank.

15 Hugh Collins, ‘Harmonisation by Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial Practices’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 89 (examining the impact of the European Union's Directive on Unfair Commercial Practice on the enforcement of the contract law and tort law in the United Kingdom, which aim at protecting consumers from unfair contract terms); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, ‘What's in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements’ (2007) 4 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 677 (finding that among a sample of 647 end-user license agreements (EULAs) collected from 598 software companies running business in the United States, almost all license agreements are biased to favor sellers); Daniel Schwarcz, ‘Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies’ (2011) 78 University of Chicago Law Review 1263 (reevaluating the homeowners insurance policies in the United States, and concluding that a majority of such policies decrease the amount of insurance coverage).

16 See Marotta-Wurgler, ‘What's in a Standard Form Contract?’ (n 15) 713 (concluding that in the software industry, ‘larger and (controlling for size) younger firms tend to have more pro-seller [EULA] terms than smaller and older companies’).

17 George G Bogert & Eli E Fink, ‘Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods’ (1930) 25 Illinois Law Review 400; Friedrich Kessler, ‘Contract of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia Law Review 629; William C Whitford, ‘Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty’ (1968) Wisconsin Law Review 1006.

18 William L Prosser, ‘The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality’ (1943) 27 Minnesota Law Review 117.

19 David W Slawson, ‘Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California’ (1974) 48 South California Law Review 12.

20 Bogert & Fink, ‘Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods’ (n 17) 411.

21 Friedrich Kessler, ‘Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract’ (1954) 14 University of Chicago Conference Series 9.

22 Whitford, ‘Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty’ (n 17) 1059.

23 See Marotta-Wurgler, ‘What's in a Standard Form Contract?’ (n 15) 711 (finding that ‘[l]arger firms are more likely to have more restrictive terms defining the scope of the license, limitations of liability, and conflict resolution’).

24 ibid 713.

25 Slawson, ‘Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power’ (n 3) 548–49 (arguing that small percentage declines in sales will raise producers’ attention); George L Priest, ‘A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty’ (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 1297, 1347 (arguing that ‘[i]f a small group of consumers reads warranties and selects among products according to warranty content, manufacturers may be forced to draft warranties responsive to group's preferences’).

26 Priest, ‘A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty’ (n 25) 1346–1347 (arguing that manufactures may adjust the warranties to attract a set of marginal consumers).

27 ibid 1347.

28 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract’ (1995) 47 Stanford Law Review 221; Rakoff, ‘Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction’ (n 2) 1227.

29 Alan Schwartz & Louis L Wilde, ‘Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests’ (1983) 69 Virginia Law Review 1387.

30 Robert A Hillman & Jeffrey J Rachlinski, ‘Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age’ (2002) 77 New York University Law Review 429; Stephen J Ware, ‘Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine’ (1989) 56 University of Chicago Law Review 1461.

31 Hetongfa (合同法) [Contract Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the 2nd Meeting of the 9th National People's Congress, 15 March 1999, effective 1 October 1999).

32 ibid arts 39, 40 and 41.

33 Xie Gen, ‘Specification System for Contents of Standard Terms [geshi tiaokuan neirong guizhi de guifan tixi]’ (2013) 2 Chinese Journal of Law [Faxue Yanjiu] 102.

34 Ma Yide, ‘Recognizing the Validity of Exception Clauses [mianchu huo xianzhi zeren geshi tiaokuan de xiaoli rending]’ (2014) 11 Law Science [Faxue] 146.

35 Huang Yanqing, ‘Arbitrary Terms Frequently Appear in the Sale of Bank-issued Wealth Management Product [yinhang licai chanpin pinxian bawang tiaokuan]’ (www.ce.cn, 8 Mar 2010) <http://finance.ce.cn/rolling/201008/03/t20100803_16037388.shtml> accessed 18 Aug 2020; Zhang Xin, ‘The Standard Terms of Bank-issued Wealth Management Products Are Arbitrary: One Contract Contains Ten Unilateral Privileges [yinhang licai chanpin geshi tiaokuan tai badao: yifen hetong jing baocang shixiang danfangmian tequan]’, Securities Daily [Zhengquan Ribao] (19 May 2015) <http://epaper.zqrb.cn/html/2015-05/19/content_76553.htm> accessed 18 Aug 2020.

36 For a detailed discussion about the relevant law and regulation on WMPCs, see Section II in this article.

37 See Guo Li & Wen Xin, ‘The Assignment of Bank's and Client's Obligation in Personal Wealth Management Products: An Analysis Framework Based on Differentiating Products and Contractual Relationship [geren licai yewu zhong yinhang he kehu de yiwu peizhi: jiyu chanpin he qiyue leixing chayixing de fenxi kuangjia]’ (2010) 7 Finance Forum [Jinrong Luntan] 20; Chen Xuewen, ‘Investor Protection in the Context of Commercial Banks’ Non-guaranteed Wealth Management Products [shangye yinhang feibaoben licai yewu de touzizhe falv baohu]’ (2012) 7 Political Science and Law [Zhengzhi yu Falv] 90.

38 Yan, ‘Research on the Principle of Standardization of Information Disclosure of Commercial Bank Financing Products’ (n 7) 80.

39 ibid 81–83.

40 Shen, ‘Wealth Management Products in the Context of China's Shadow Banking’ (n 6) 110; Li Lixin, ‘Disclosure in the Sale of Bank-issued Wealth Management Products and the Informed Customers [lun yinhang licai chanpin xiaoshou zhongde gaozhi yu zhixiao]’ (2013) 10 Hebei Law Science [Hebei Faxue] 141.

41 Shen, ‘Wealth Management Products in the Context of China's Shadow Banking’ (n 6) 108–110.

42 China Banking Regulatory Commission has been merged into China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) in 2018.

43 Shangye Yinhang Geren Licai Yewu Guanli Zanxing Banfa (商业银行个人理财业务管理暂行办法) [Interim Measures for the Administration of Personal Wealth Management Business of Commercial Bank] (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission, 24 Sep 2005, effective 1 Nov 2005).

44 ibid art 1.

45 Shangye Yinhang Licai Chanpin Xiaoshou Guanli Banfa (商业银行理财产品销售管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission, 28 Aug 2011, effective 1 Jan 2012).

46 Shangye Yinhang Xinxi Pilu Banfa (商业银行信息披露办法) [Measures for Information Disclosure of Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission, 3 Jul 2007, effective 3 Jul 2007); Shangye Yinhang Shengyu Fengxian Guanli Zhiyin (商业银行声誉风险管理指引) [Guidelines on Commercial Banks’ Management of Reputational Risks] (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission, 25 Aug 2009, effective 25 Aug 2009).

47 Measures for the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks (n 45) art 11(2).

48 ibid art 6.

49 ibid art 13.

50 ibid art 18(4)–(7).

51 ibid art 20.

52 ibid art 21.

53 ibid art 25.

54 ibid art 19.

55 ibid art 16.

56 ibid art 14(1).

57 ibid art 17.

58 ibid art 18(2).

59 ibid art 14 and 15.

60 See e.g, Zheng Yangpeng, ‘China's Minsheng Bank Sees Investor Trust Vanish – Along with 3b Yuan’, South China Morning Post (18 Apr 2017) <http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2088620/chinas-minsheng-bank-sees-investor-trust-vanish-along-3b> accessed 20 Jan 2019.

61 See e.g, Guanyu Guifan Jinrong Jigou Zichan Guanli Yewu de Zhidao Yijian (关于规范金融机构资产管理业务的指导意见) [Guiding Opinions on Regulating the Asset Management Business of Financial Institutions] (promulgated by the People's Bank of China, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 27 Apr 2018, effective 27 Apr 2018) (providing guiding opinions to the issues of unregulated asset management business, multi-layered nesting, rigid repayment and many others); Shangye Yinhang Licai Yewu Jiandu Guanli Banfa (商业银行理财业务监督管理办法) [Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Wealth Management Business of Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, 26 Sep 2018, effective 26 Sep 2018) (requesting banking regulators to conduct penetrated, comprehensive and dynamic supervision of the WMP business).

62 Leng Jing & Shen Wei, ‘The Evolution of Contract Law in China: Convergence in Law but Divergence in Enforcement?’, in Yun-chen Chang, Wei Shen, & Wen-yeu Wang (eds), Private Law in China and Taiwan: Legal and Economic Analyses (Cambridge University Press 2016).

63 Contract Law (n 31) art 53.

64 ibid art 41.

65 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Zongze (中华人民共和国民法总则) [General Provisions of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the 5th Meeting of the 12th National People's Congress, 15 Mar 2017, effective 1 Oct 2017).

66 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xiaofeizhe Quanyi Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国消费者权益保护法) [Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests] (promulgated by the 4th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress, 31 Oct 1993, amended on 27 Aug 2009 and 25 Oct 2013, effective 15 Mar 2014), arts 2 and 28.

67 See paragraphs 2 to 4 in this section.

68 Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Wealth Management Business of Commercial Banks (n 61) art 26. Similar rules can be found in articles 14 and 16 of the 2012 Measures.

69 Bank Wealth Management Product Registration Center, China Banking Financial Market Report 2017 [zhongguo yinhangye licai shichan baogao (2017)] (Bank Wealth Management Product Registration Center, 2 Feb 2018) <www.chinawealth.com.cn/resource/830/846/863/51198/52005/2150127/15184294380932125823274.pdf> accessed 1 Mar 2018.

70 One of us collected the 66 sampled WMPCs in late 2016 and early 2017, either through personal connections or by visiting banks in person. Not all of the banks that visited were willing to give WMPCs.

71 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国商业银行法) [Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the 13th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress, 10 May 1995, amended on 27 Dec 2003 and 28 Aug 2015, effective 1 Oct 2015), art 13 sets 1 billion RMB as the minimum amount of registered capital for establishing a national commercial bank. This standard is hardly applicable considering the fact that most of the commercial banks have more than 1 billion RMB registered capital. For the purpose of this study, we add one more condition to the capital requirement, which is put into consideration of the regional factor. A national commercial bank in this study is the one who has at least 1 billion RMB registered capital and runs business around the country.

72 National Institution for Finance & Development, ‘Tracking Bank Wealth Management Products [yinhang licai shichang yunzuo baogao]’ (2017) 1 The Chinese Banker [Yinhangjia] 129 (describing that the WMPs issued by national commercial banks had taken up more than 30% of the total number of newly issued products and consisted of more than 70% of the raised funds in the end of 2016).

73 This doesn't mean urban commercial banks and rural commercial banks don't have branches cross provinces but compared to the large scale commercial banks and joint-equity commercial banks whose branches are almost around the country, they don't have such nationalized business map.

74 Location and number of local banks included in the sample. Shandong (11), Zhejiang (7), Jiangsu (6), Fujian (4), Hebei (3), Guangdong (3), Liaoning (2), and the other provinces in the sample (1).

75 For example, the money raised from WMPs issued by foreign commercial banks only consisted of 1.25% of the total amount of fundraising via sale of bank-issued WMPs in 2017. And such ratio has declined to 0.45% in 2018.

76 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waizi Yinhang Guanli Tiaoli (中华人民共和国外资银行管理条例) [Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Foreign-funded Banks] (promulgated by the 155th Executive Meeting of the State Council, 8 Nov 2006, amended on 29 Jul 2014, 27 Nov 2014 and 30 Sept 2019, effective 30 Sept 2019).

77 The products sold under the same series share the similar WMPC.

78 Tracing the records from the website of China Construction Bank, the earliest time ‘Qian Yuan (乾元)’ was issued to the customers was April 21, 2011. For detailed information, visit <www.ccb.com/cn/finance/product.html> accessed 7 Jul 2021.

79 For example, among all the WMP sold from China Construction Bank in Beijing, 949 out of 972 are sold under ‘Qian Yuan’.

80 All commercial banks are required to disclose information of their WMPs on chinawealth website. The number is different from the annual report conducted by the Bank Wealth Management Product Registration Center because we searched the banks that issued WMPs to raise funds in 2017, while the center reported the cumulative number of banks that still had to pay off their WMPs.

81 Measures for the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks (n 45) art 11.

82 Almost all state-owned banks were founded to support industrial development in the planned economy era, so they are old-line. For example, the oldest one is Bank of Communications, which was founded in 1908. Then the Bank of China was founded in 1912. Agricultural Cooperative Bank was founded in 1951, which was the predecessor of Agricultural Bank of China. Then in 1954, China Construction Bank began its business. The youngest among the five state-owned banks is the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, who began its business in 1984.

83 The dummy variable is used to represent whether a commercial bank is public listed or not, it equals to 1 if a bank is public listed, and it equals to 0 if not.

84 Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe guihua Gangyao (2014–2020) (社会信用体系建设规划纲要(2014–2020年)) [Panning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014–2020)] (issued by the State Council, 14 Jun 2014, effective 14 Jun 2014) (explaining that establishment of the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System is an essential part of State Council's plan on constructing the social credit system).

85 Qiye Xinxi Gongshi Zanxing Tiaoli (企业信息公示暂行条例) [Interim Regulation on Enterprise Information Disclosure] (promulgated by the 57th Executive Meeting of the State Council, 23 Jul 2014, effective 1 Oct 2014) art 8 requests enterprises to submit their annual report to administration for industry and commerce through the enterprise credit information disclosure system; art 10 lists the information that shall be updated within 20 working days when such information is changed.

86 See Marotta-Wurgler, ‘What's in a Standard Form Contract?’ (n 15); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P Miller, ‘The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law Review 1475.

87 Measures for the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks (n 45) art 18(9).

88 ibid art 20(1).

89 See Marotta-Wurgler, ‘What's in a Standard Form Contract?’ (n 15) 692–693 (providing detailed description of methodology for tracking the bias of 23 end user license agreement terms).

90 ibid 691 (creating the phrase ‘bias index’ to describe the overall result of the bias of end user license agreements).

91 Measures for the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks (n 45) art 13. This article also lists the languages that shall be used cautiously.

92 ibid art 16 (requiring a bank to provide scientific and reasonable estimation methods if its WMPC contains languages meaning ‘rate of return’).

93 ibid art 20 (requiring a WMPC to specify the information regarding investment, such as the investment scope, type, proportion, and floating ratio).

94 ibid art 21 (requiring a WMPC to specify the conditions, rates, methods of sales fee, management fee, and other fees).

95 ibid arts 18(5), (6), and (7) (listing three types of bank-issued WMPs: WMPs with guaranteed income, WMPs with safeguarded principal and floating income, and WMPs with non-safeguarded principal and floating income. Each type has its own unique statement to describe the characteristics of the WMP.

96 Shen, ‘Wealth Management Products in the Context of China's Shadow Banking’ (n 6) 105 (arguing that the CBRC issued a notice to check the third-party WMPs sold through banks, because ‘without limits on the sector, defaults could risk contagion and trigger a liquidity or subprime crisis’).

97 Chapter Four of the 2012 Measures exclusively expresses the rules for the risk rating of WMPs, and Chapter Five specifies rules for the assessment of the risk tolerance of clients. There are other provisions that are relevant to risk disclosure in other parts of the 2012 Measures.

98 Measures for the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks (n 45) art 18.

99 ibid arts 17 and 18(1), and (2) (requiring WMPCs to contain specific risk warning statement).

100 ibid art 18(4).

101 ibid art 24. In practice, the banks use PR1, PR2, PR3 PR4 and PR5 to represent the risk rating of WMPs. PR1 represents the lowest level of risk, while PR5 means the highest level of risk.

102 Shen Wei, ‘Regulating Complex Structured Financial Products and Its Improvement – Taking the Lehman Brothers Mini Bond Event in Hong Kong as the Starting Point [fuza jiegou jinrong chanpin de guizhi jiqi gaijin lujing – yi xianggang leiman mini zhaiquan shijian wei qierudian]’ (2011) 23 Peking University Law Journal [Zhongwai Faxue] 1297 (arguing that the increasing complexity of financial products may limit the effectiveness of information disclosures because financial institutions may lose the incentives to disclose massive information of the financial products as such disclosures increase operational costs).

103 Measures of the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks (n 45) art 25.

104 Ben-Shahar Omri & Carl E Schneider, ‘The Failure of Mandated Disclosure’ (2011) 159 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 647, 789.

105 Measures of the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks (n 45) art 19.

106 ibid art 39 (allowing banks to sell WMPs through phone, fax, text message and email).

107 ibid art 20(1).

108 ibid art 20(3) and art 21(2).

109 Pan & Wang, ‘Legal Problems Concerning Bank-issued Wealth Management Products’ (n 6) (arguing that it is a trend to allow pledge of the WMPs, and the characteristics of WMPs meet the requirements set by the Chinese property law); Wang Xiaodong, ‘Risks of Wealth Management Products Pledge Financing and the Countermeasures [shangye yinhang licai chanpin zhiya rongzi de fengxian ji duice]’ (2013) Commercial Times [Shangye Shidai] 29 (questioning the legality of allowing pledge of the bank-issued WMPs regarding the uncertainty of WMP investments).

110 Contract Law (n 31) art 117 (defining force majeure as ‘objective situations that are unforeseeable, unavoidable and unsurmountable’).

111 ibid.

112 ibid art 93 and art 94 (there are two reasons to terminate a contract: agreement (art 93) or statutory reason (art 94); art 94 also lists five situations under which one party is permitted to terminate the contract).

113 Measures of the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks (n 45) art 20 and art 21 (allowing customers to redeem WMPs in advance if the customers refuse to accept banks’ adjustments in terms of investment portion, type of investment assets, and methods for charging fees).

114 The winning rate for customers through court is relatively low according to the current case results. The losing party also has to pay the litigation fee. Addition fees, such as the lawyer fee and travel fees, are also potential costs of a case.

115 Minshi Susongfa (民事诉讼法) [Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the 4th Meeting of the 7th National People's Congress, 9 Apr 1991, amended on 28 Oct 2007, 31 Aug 2012, and 27 Jun 2017, effective 1 Jul 2017) art 34 (allowing parties to have a choice of forum between the location of the defendant's domicile, where the contract is performed or signed, the location of the plaintiff's domicile, the location of the subject matter or other locations which have actual connections with the dispute upon written agreement.

116 The maximum score 7 refers to the extremely buyer friendly WMPC; while -21 refers to the extreme pro-seller WMPC, which requested customers to take their own responsibilities for all the risks listed. In addition, one possible reason the range of possible scores is not centered at zero is that the Measures for the Administration of the Sale of Wealth Management Products of Commercial Banks was designed to primarily protect customers.

117 The skewness statistic was -0.326 (SE = 0.295) and the kurtosis statistic was -0.696 (SE= 0.582).

118 See Schwarcz, ‘Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies’ (n 15) 1263 (finding that ‘there is substantial variation among the top home-owners carriers with respect to numerous important policy terms’); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, ‘Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in Consumer Standard-form Contracts’ (2013) 88 New York University Law Review 240 (finding that ‘[y]oung, large, and growing firms are also relatively more likely to have adopted the innovative terms by 2010’).

119 One-way repeated measures ANOVA analysis confirms the differences between these means as significant. For category 4 and 1, mean difference is -1.87, p<0.01; for category 4 and 2, mean difference is -1.95, p<0.01; for category 4 and 3, mean difference is -2.71, p<0.01; for category 4 and 5, mean difference is -1.63, p<0.01.

120 One-way repeated measures ANOVA analysis confirms the differences between these means as significant. For category 3 and 1, mean difference is 0.83, p<0.01; for category 3 and 2, mean difference is 0.75, p<0.01; for category 3 and 4, mean difference is 2.71, p<0.01; for category 3 and 5, mean difference is 1.07, p<0.01.

121 These characteristics include type of bank, age of bank, registered capital, net revenue, the percentage of State Council shares, the percentage of ministry shares, and two dummies indicating whether the commercial bank is publicly listed and whether its business is nationwide.

122 The residuals of the specifications obey the assumptions of least squares regression.

123 Type of bank is highly associated with registered capital (Eta=0.55, p>.05). In practice, registered capital depends on type of bank; national banks are required to register more capital than urban and rural banks. Thus, to avoid multi-collinearity, we identify type of bank as key independent variable and drop the registered capital from the regression analysis.

124 For analysis involving sub-index bias, we also conducted Ordinal regression analysis and got the same results.

125 Dai Zhezhe, ‘Listen to Legal Experts Say “Full Interest Calculation” [ting falv zhuanjia shuo “quane jixi”]’ People's Daily [Renmin Ribao] (26 Apr 2017) <http://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/20170426/19> accessed 10 May 2020; Qu Lingyan, ‘Bank Contracts Have Many One-Sided Clauses [yinhang hetong cun daliang bawang tiaokuan]’ Economic Information Daily [Jingji Cankao Bao] (19 Dec 2014) <http://dz.jjckb.cn/www/pages/webpage2009/html/2014-12/19/content_100308.htm?div=-1> accessed 10 May 2020.

126 For category 1, 2, and 4, the F tests indicated a bad model fit.

127 Marotta-Wurgler, ‘What's in a Standard Form Contract?’ (n 15) 703.

128 Michael N T Tan, Corporate Governance and Banking in China (Routledge 2013); Li Chen, ‘Holding “China Inc.” Together: The CCP and the Rise of China's Yangqi’ (2016) 228 The China Quarterly 927.

129 David Stanway, ‘China Investors in Rare Protest Accuse Regulators of ‘Ignoring Fraud’’ Reuters (21 Sep 2015) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-fanya-protests-idUSKCN0RL0Z420150921> accessed 10 May 2020.

130 Shen, ‘Wealth Management Products in the Context of China's Shadow Banking’ (n 6) 104.

131 ibid 66–67 (describing three scandals involving Huaxia Bank, CITIC and CCB); Engen Tham, Matthew Miller and David Lague, ‘China's Leaders Fret Over Debts Lurking in Shadow Banking System’ Reuters (28 Dec 2017) <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-risk-shadowbanking/> accessed on 10 May 2020.

132 11 out of 17 sampled national commercial banks are cross-listed, while only 9 out of the 50 local commercial banks are listed companies, among which 7 are publicly listed in mainland and 2 are publicly listed in Hong Kong.

133 Paul B McGuinness & Kevin Keasey, ‘The Listing of Chinese State-Owned Banks and Their Path to Banking and Ownership Reform’ (2010) 201 The China Quarterly 125.

134 John C Coffee, ‘The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications’ (1998) 93 Northwestern University Law Review 641.

135 Siegel, Jordan, ‘Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting US Securities Laws?’ (2005) 75 Journal of Financial Economics 319CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

136 ibid 320.

137 Liebman, Benjamin L & Milhaupt, Curtis J, ‘Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market’ (2008) 108 Columbia Law Review 929Google Scholar.

138 Frank Tang, ‘China Sends Top Financial Officials to Clean Up Debt-laden Provinces Amid Growing Signs of Economic Risk’ South China Morning Post (30 Oct 2019) <https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3035521/china-sends-top-financial-officials-clean-debt-laden> accessed 10 May 2020.

139 Tuijin Puhui Jinrong Fazhan Guihua (2016–2020) (推进普惠金融发展规划 (2016–2020)) [Plan for Advancing the Development of Inclusive Finance (2016–2020)] (promulgated by the State Council, 31 December 2015, effective 15 January 2016); Guanyu Fangfan Huajie Jinrong Fengxian Yanshou Fengxian Dixian Gongzuo de Yijian (关于防范化解金融风险严守风险底线工作的意见) [Opinions on Preventing and Resolving Financial Risks and Rigorously Holding the Bottom Line Against Risk] (promulgated by the CBRC, 22 February 2016, effective 22 February 2016).

140 Liu Yujing, ‘China's Banking Regulator Slaps US$ 22 Million Fines on Six Banks’ South China Morning Post (7 Dec 2018) <https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2176991/chinas-banking-regulator-slaps-us22-million-fines-six-banks> accessed 10 May 2020.

141 Zhou Qin, ‘The Evolving Regulations on Bank-issued Wealth Management Products: from Market to State’ (2020) (Unpublished manuscript).

142 Wang Haisheng, ‘Lunching “Sending Law to the State-owned Enterprises” Campaigns [qidong “songfa jin guoqi” huodong]’ Procuratorate Daily [Jiancha Ribao] (2 Aug 2014) <http://newspaper.jcrb.com/html/2014-08/02/content_165132.htm> accessed 20 May 2020.

143 Stanley Lubman, ‘China's Exodus of Judges’ The Wall Street Journal (4 May 2015) <https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/05/04/what-a-stubborn-exodus-of-judges-means-for-legal-reform-in-china/> accessed 20 May 2020.

Figure 0

Figure 1. Law and Regulation Governing WMPCsNOTE: *The 13th NPC passed the Civil Code of the People's Republic of China on 28 May 2020, and it took effect on 1 January 2021.**The China Banking-Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued the Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Wealth Management Product of Commercial Banks in 2018.

Figure 1

Table 1. Commercial Bank Summary Statistics

Figure 2

Table 2. List of Terms and References

Figure 3

Table 3. WMPC Terms and Bias: Methodology

Figure 4

Figure 2. The Overall WMPC Bias

Figure 5

Table 4. WMPCs Bias for the Five Categories

Figure 6

Table 5. WMPCs Bias—Summary on Means of Groups of Provisions

Figure 7

Table 6. WMPCs Bias—Summary on Means of Categories of Terms According to Types of Banks

Figure 8

Table 7. Summary of OLS Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting WMPCs Bias

Figure 9

1