¹ English language translations of Amendments may be found at Voices of Overseas Youth for Civic Engagement, here; Colin P.A. Jones, “The LDP constitution, article by article: a preview of things to come?,” Japan Times, 7/2/13; Lawrence Repeta, “Japan's Democracy at Risk – The LDP's Ten Most Dangerous Proposals for Constitutional Change,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 28, No. 3, 7/15/13; Keigo Komamura, “Constitution and Narrative in the Age of Crisis in Japanese Politics,” 26 Washington International Law Journal 75, Appendix 1, 2017.

² The Mainichi, 5/1/17, Japan guards U.S. military vessel for 1st time under security legislation.

³ Under Kokutai and enshrined in the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor was deemed to possess Japanese sovereignty and was deemed the essence of the Japanese State through his mythical relationship with the Sun Goddess, a principal Shinto Deity. Other Japanese held a relationship with each other and the Emperor through their relationship with lesser Shinto Deities.

⁴ H.S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics (University of Minnesota, 1932); Gregory J. Kasza, The State and the Mass Media in Japan, 1918-1945 (Univ. of Calif. Press, 1988) (Kasza notes that the Emergency Power was exercised on four occasions to restrict press freedom.}

⁵ Constitution “Article 43. Both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people.”

⁶ Constitution “Article 67. The Prime Minister shall be designated from among the members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet. This designation shall precede all other business.

If the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors disagree and if no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or the House of Councilors fails to make designation within ten (10) days, exclusive of the period of recess, after the House of Representatives has made designation, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.“

⁷ For English language translations of amendments under consideration see note 1 supra.

⁸ The Mainichi, 1/1/16. Abe gov't looks to add emergency clause for major disasters to Constitution; Mainichi, 5/8/15, LDP proposes prioritizing debate on contingencies in revising Constitution.

⁹ Constitution Article 53. The Cabinet may determine to convoke extraordinary sessions of the Diet. When a quarter or more of the total members of either House makes the demand, the Cabinet must determine on such convocation. Article 54. … When the House of Representatives is dissolved, the House of Councillors is closed at the same time. However, the Cabinet may in time of national emergency convoke the House of Councillors in emergency session. Measures taken at such session as mentioned in the proviso of the preceding paragraph shall be provisional and shall become null and void unless agreed to by the House of Representatives within a period of ten (10) days after the opening of the next session of the Diet.

¹⁰ Constitution Article 68. The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However, a majority of their number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet. The Prime Minister may remove the Ministers of State as he chooses.

¹¹ See, Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹² 6 Marc de Wilde (2015)) Just trust us: a short history of emergency powers and constitutional change, Comparative Legal History 3:1, 110-130, DOI:10.1080/2049677X.2015.1041728. John E. Finn Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 1991) (Constitutional Dissolution in the Weimar Republic).

¹³ Diet panel resumes Constitution debate, eyeing 1st-ever amendment, Mainichi 3/16/17.

¹⁴ Justice Stephen Breyer, The Court and the World (Knopf, 2015) Chapters 3 and 4. It was not until 2011 that the Executive Branch acknowledged that documents such as the Ringle Report on Japanese Internment (Naval History and Heritage Command), which had concluded that Japanese American citizens on the West Coast posed no danger in the event of war with Japan, had not been made available to the Supreme Court when it was deciding the internment cases. Los Angeles Times, 5/24/11, U.S. official cites misconduct in Japanese American internment cases. For current examples see, Adam Liptak, “Campaign Pledges Haunt Trump in Court,” New York Times 3/16/17; Vivian Yee, “Judge Blocks Trump Effort to Withhold Money From Sanctuary Cities,” New York Times 4/25/17.

¹⁵ Mainichi, 4/30/16, Most municipalities hit by 2011 disasters see no need for an emergency clause in Constitution.

¹⁶ See, e.g., Lawrence Repeta, “Limiting fundamental rights protection in Japan: the role of the Supreme Court,” in Jeff Kingston, Ed. Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan (Routledge, 2014) and Shigenori Matsui, “Why is the Japanese Supreme Court so conservative?” 88 Washington University Law Review 1375 (2011).

¹⁷ Lawrence Repeta, Prime Minister Abe Subverts Japan's Public Records Act, 10/9/15; The Mainichi, 9/21/15, Cabinet Legislation Bureau has no record of Constitution reinterpretation deliberations; The Mainichi, 2/15/16, Cabinet Legislation Bureau head left no record of meetings about constitutional reinterpretation.

¹⁸ Mark Fenwick, Emergency Powers and the Limits of Constitutionalism in Japan in Emergency Powers in Asia, Exploring the Limits of Legality (Victor V. Ramraj and Arun K. Thiruvengadam Ed., Cambridge University Press, 2010).