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State Transformation and Social Forces Under the Shadow of Economic Security: The Case of Japan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

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Abstract

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At a cursory glance, much of Japan's new economic security policy resonates with US-Biden policy language of building resilient supply chains and strengthening strategic partnerships. Mainstream scholarship has been quick to interpret this as a new form of economic statecraft and the strengthening of the US-Japan partnership. However, little has been discussed about how the adoption of economic security policy has entailed state restructuring and reconnected different social forces. There has been a shift in the functions of state institutions which are, to some extent, becoming fused. Security institutions are drawn into economic domains while economic institutions increasingly adapt to discourses on military issues. This fusion has been facilitating the reconnection of industrial capital, military capital, and state elites who attempt to leverage the interlocking components of US-led policies and economic security, that in turn reproduces the developmental form of the Japanese state. This paper offers a theoretically-informed way of understanding new geopolitical lines underpinning state transformation in Japan and sheds light on the constitutive elements we currently see as ‘networked security architecture’ such as the Quad or ‘friendshoring’ industrial policy.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2023

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