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Prime Minster Abe's Constitutional Campaign and the Assault on Individual Rights
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Abstract
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While calls for constitutional amendment have frequently recurred since the end of the Allied Occupation of Japan in 1952, the current Abe government's proposals for constitutional change involve something fundamentally new. Rather than calling for amendment of specific clauses, most notably Article 9, the Abe government's approach is an attack on the very core of constitutionalism. Central to this attack is a process of undermining of individualism in favour of efforts to enforce morality, tradition, culture and military expansion: a process which is deeply connected to Abe's historical revisionism. This article explores how Abe's approach undermines constitutionalism itself, and assesses the political and social implications of this assault on Japan's constitution.
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Notes
1 The term, “constitutional coup” is often used by constitutional scholars to emphasize that Abe's attempt to amend the current constitution is not amendment but rather rejection of constitutionalism. For example, Ishikawa Kenji, a scholar of constitutional law, argued in an interview with the Mainichi Shinbun that “from a perspective of legal studies, it is a coup d'etat.” [Accessed on 15th July, 2017].
2 According to scholar of political theory Sugita Atsushi, the most significant achievement of the movement against security-related laws is that “a general understanding of constitutionalism has spread among ordinary citizens for the first time.” Sugita Atsushi, “Rikken Minshushugi o Torimodosu tame ni” [“To Take Back Constitutional Democracy”], Sanka Sisutemu, no. 104, 2016.
3 See the website by a scholar of constitutional law, Mizushima Asaho. Mizushima, a scholar of constitutional law was also a founding member of the Association for Article 96. [Accessed on 22th July, 2017] (emphasis added).
4 I was one of the panelists at the symposium. For my speech, see here [Accessed on 22th July, 2017]
5 For example, the Tokyo Shinbun covered the press conference marking the inauguration of Association for Article 96 on its front page. [May 24th, 2013].
6 See Toyoshita Narahiko, Shūdanteki Jieiken to wa nani ka [What is Collective Self-Defense?] Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2007, pp. 13-15. Those who support Abe's approach emphasize that collective self-defense is defined as an “inherent right” in Article 51 of Charter of the United Nations. However, Article 51 reads “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense […] until the Security Council has taken measures.” This means that each sovereign state is left to decide whether the right will be exercised or not. [Emphasis mine].
7 Abe Shinzō, Atarashii Kuni e—Utsukushii Kuni e [Towards a New Country: Towards a Beautiful Country] Enlarged ver., Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2013, pp. 135-136.
8 Under the Constitution, despite the fact that Article 9 prescribes the renunciation of war, and prohibits the possession of war potential and the right of belligerency by the state, since Japan is an independent nation, the Japanese government consistently takes the view that these provisions do not contradict Japan's inherent right of self-defense, and that “the Constitution allows Japan to possess the minimum level of armed force needed to exercise that right”. (See also the article by Lummis in this issue). Previous governments took the view that any exercises of collective self-defense whose purpose is to defend other nations from attack should not be allowed under the Constitution, but this has now changed. See for example, Ministry of Defense “Fundamental Concepts of National Defence.” [Accessed on 8th December, 2017].
9 For example, the Asahi Shinbun sent out questionnaires to 209 scholars of constitutional law and got 122 answers in July 2015. Out of 122, there were only two scholars who did not respond that the exercise of collective self-defense was unconstitutional. See here [Accessed on 23rd July, 2017].
10 Abe, Atarashii Kuni e, p. 125.
11 Abe, Atarashii Kuni e, p. 126.
12 Abe, Atarashii Kuni e, p. 127.
13 Nakano Kōichi, Ukeikasuru Nihon Seiji [Japanese Politics Leans to the Right], Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2015, p. 107.
14 See, for example, Norma Field, “The Courts, Japan's ‘Military Comfort Women’, and the Conscience of Humanity: The Ruling in VAWW-net Japan v. NHK',” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, vol. 5, issue 2, February 2, 2007
15 As I discuss below, “morality” [道徳] in Japanese tends to be used to imply not a universal principle but rather the hierarchal rules of family and community, which are usually are handed down from the previous generations.
16 See “the LDP's mission” [Accessed on 24th July, 2017].
17 See for example, Zenkoku Kenpō Kenkyūkai, Hōritsu Jihō Zōkan— Kenpō Kaisei Mondai [Legal Times, Expanded Edition: Problems of the Revision of the Constitution], Tokyo: Nihon Hyōron-sha, 2005.
18 Masuzoe Yōichi, Kenpō Kaisei no Omote to Ura [The Visible and Concealed Faces of Constitutional Revision], Tokyo: Kōdansha Gendai Shinsho, 2014.
19 Translation was based on Voices of Overseas Youth for Civic Engagement (VOYCE) but with some words revised. See here [Accessed on 27th July, 2017].
20 Higuchi Yōichi and Kobayashi Setsu, Kenpō Kaisei no Shinjitsu [The Truth about Constitutional Amendment], Tokyo: Shūeisha Shinsho, 2016, p. 51.
21 Higuchi and Kobayashi, Kenpō Kaisei no Shinjitsu, pp. 21-22.
22 Nishi Osamu, Kenpō Kaisei no Ronten [Controversies on Constitutional Amendment], Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2013, p. 134.
23 Nishi, Kenpō Kaisei no Ronten.
24 Nishi Kenpō Kaisei no Ronten, pp. 143-4.
25 Higuchi and Kobayashi, Kenpō Kaisei no Shinjitsu, pp. 68-69.
26 For example, Momochi asserts that “there can be no doubt that the Constitution of Japan lacks the idea of a state and that of a family. In a word, it is no exaggeration to say that it places absolute trust in individuals and ignores or makes light of the state and the family. That is why the state of Japan is confused and families are collapsing.” See here [Accessed on 25th July, 2017].
27 Higuchi and Kobayashi, Kenpō Kaisei no Shinjitsu, pp. 69-70.
28 See Momochi's argument. [Accessed on 25th July, 2017].
29 See also Higuchi Yōichi, Ichigo no Jiten: Jinken [One-Word Dictionary: Human Rights, Tokyo: Sanseido, 1996, pp. 37-39.
30 Higuchi and Kobayashi, Kenpō Kaisei no Shinjitsu, pp. 70 and 136.
31 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham and London: Duke University Press. 2004.
32 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, p. 23.
33 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, p. 4.
34 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, p. 20.
35 Ikuhosha, Shinpen Atarashii Minna no Kōmin [New Civics for All, revised version], Tokyo: Ikuhosha, 2016, p. 13.
36 Mizubayashi Akira, “Nihonteki ”Kō-shi“ Kannen no Genkei to Tenkai” [The Origin and Development of Japanese Idea of “the public-private], in Takeshi Sasaki and Kim Tae-Chang, Kōkyō Tetsugaku 3: Nihon ni okeru Kō to Shi [Public Philosophy III: The Pubic and the Private in Japan], Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2002, pp. 12-13.
37 Mizoguchi Yūzō, “Chugoku Shisōshi ni okeru Kō to Shi” [“The Public and the Private in the History of Chinese Thought”] in Takeshi Sasaki and Kim Tae-Chang eds., Kōkyō Tetsugaku 1: Kō to Shi no Shisōshi [Public Philosophy I: The Pubic and the Private in Japan], Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2001, 36-42. In Japanese, although there is a term of Tenka [天下], it means a whole state.
38 Mizoguchi, “Chugoku Shisōshi ni okeru Kō to Shi”.
39 Abe, Atarashii Kuni e, chap.7. The title of chap.7 of Toward a New Country is “Reform of Education.” Abe emphasizes the importance of moral education and of teaching school students the idea that “the family is great”.
40 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, p. 17.
41 The phrases, “what does democracy look like?” and “this is what democracy is,” were used during street demonstrations organized by SEALDs. Even after SEALDs was dissolved, people have continued to use these phrases during demonstrations.
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