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Missile Defense and the Security Dilemma: THAAD, Japan's “Proactive Peace,” and the Arms Race in Northeast Asia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

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Abstract

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The U.S. deployed a missile defense system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea in April 2017, citing North Korea's nuclear and missile “threats” as justification. Its deployment, however, needs to be seen in the wider strategic context. Not only does the measure raise the arms race with North Korea, it also facilitates Japan's “proactive contribution to peace” and exacerbates the security dilemma between the U.S. and its allies on one side and China and Russia on the other.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2017

References

Notes

1 I have written a detailed analysis of the security dilemma between the two Koreas and the U.S. elsewhere. See 서재정. "사드와 한반도 군비경쟁의 질적 전환:'위협의 균형'을 무너뜨리고 선 제공격으로?". 창작과비평 43, no. 2 (여름 2015): 414-40. [徐載晶, “サードミサイルと朝鮮半島軍費競争の質的転換: 「脅威の均衡」を壊して先制攻撃に ?“ 季刊『創作と批評』日本語版2015 年 夏号(通卷168号)]

2 Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition, (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1991), p. 27.

3 J.J. Suh, “The Imbalance of Power, the Balance of Asymmetric Terror: Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) in Korea” in Imbalance of Power: Transforming U.S.-Korean Relations, edited by John Feffer (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 64-80.

4 The Obama administration denied North Korea—which had left the NPT—the benefit of its negative security assurance by “declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations” (15). Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, (Washington, DC, 2010), p. 15.

5 Yi Yong-in, “Expert rebuts Defense Ministry's claims about THAAD missile interception,” Hankyoreh, February 17, 2016. [accessed on April 30, 2017]

6 An EMP attack involves detonation of a nuclear device at high altitude that produces an electromagnetic wave to cripple electronic communications and strike a blow at electricity and communications.

7 Amy Butler, “MDA Still Sees 2018 Deployment In Restructured SM-3 IIA Plan,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Aug 7, 2012. [accessed on January 8, 2017] The system was flight-tested in December 2015 and October 2016, and made a successful intercept test in February 2017.

8 The cabinet justifies its decision with a reference to the U.S. that “同盟国である米国及びそれ以外の諸国との安全保障 • 防衛分野における協力の強化に資するものである。 [Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan's ally, the United States as well as other countries.]” See here; and here [accessed on April 28, 2017] Its Implementation Guidelines opens the door to export weapons to Europe by including “米国を始め我が国との間で安全保障面での協力関係がある諸国 [countries cooperating with Japan in security including the U.S.]” See here and here [accessed on April 28, 2017]

9 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference,” July 8, 2016, [accessed on January 8, 2017]; PRC Ministry of National Defense, “Defense Ministry's Regular Press Conference,” September 29, 2016, [accessed on January 8, 2017]

10 홍창진, 심재훈, 최현석, 신호경, “中보복 한식당·항공업계로 확산…롯데마트99곳중 절반 문닫아, ” 연합뉴스, March 8, 2017. [accessed on March 10, 2017]

11 Korea Immigration Service, Ch'uripkuk.oikukinchongchak tonggyewolbo [Entrance/Exit and Foreigner Policy Monthly Statistics] (March 2017), April 21, 2017.

12 “Defense Ministry's Regular Press Conference on September 29.” China Military Online, September 29, 2016. [accessed on April 24, 2017]

13 진병태. “中국방부 “신형무기 장비로 韓사드 대응훈련 할 것” “(종합). “연합뉴스, April 27, 2017. See also “陸退將: 可外科手術定點清除THAAD,” CNA News, March 2, 2017. [accessed on April 23, 2017]

14 “Statement by Ambassador Wang Qun, Director-General of the Arms Control Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, at the General Debate of the First Committee of the 71st Session of the UNGA.” October13, 2016. [accessed on April 24, 2017]

15 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks at the Sixth Moscow Conference on International Security, Moscow, April 26, 2017. [accessed on April 29, 2017]

16 “China, Russia sign joint statement on strengthening global strategic stability,” Xinhua, June 26, 2016. [accessed on June 27, 2017]

17 The Tashkent Declaration of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, June 24, 2016.

18 See JJ Suh, “Half Full or Half Empty? North Korea after the 7th Party Congress,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 14 Issue 14 No. 9 (July 15, 201).

19 “조선정부 미국의 핵무기공개와 남조선부터의 핵철페 요구,” 조선통신, July 6, 2016. [accessed on April 29, 2017] [The official English translation on the site does not include this phrase.] See also Moon, Chung-in. “Basis for a Breakthrough in Pyongyang Statement?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July 14 2016).