¹ I'd like to thank Mark Selden, Gavan McCormack, Martin Hart-Landsberg and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments and suggestions.

² “Geopolitics Watch: Forecasting the Korean Peninsula Peace and Denuclearization Process,” SinoInsider, April 29, 2018.

³ Mark Landler, “As Two Koreas Talk Peace, Trump's Bargaining Chips Slip Away,” The New York Times, April 28, 2018.

⁴ Pyongyang's departure from the previous demand for the troop withdrawal was also confirmed by President Moon. He announced in a statement on April 19 that North Korea expressed its desire for “complete denuclearization” of the Korean Peninsula and would not be seeking the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula as a condition for denuclearization. Instead the North would accept security guarantees and an end to what it called the “hostile policy” of the U.S.

⁵ Pyongyang had previously indicated its willingness to freeze only its nuclear testing in return for the suspension of the U.S.-ROK military exercise whereas Beijing called on it to freeze its nuclear and missile tests in its “freeze-for-freeze” proposal.

⁶ Suh, JJ. “Half Full or Half Empty? North Korea after the 7th Party Congress.” The Asia Pacific Journal Japan Focus 14, no. 14 (July 2016).

⁷ Kim Jong Un called it his “firm resolution” in his first public address in April 2012 to “have the people never tighten their belt again but heartily enjoy socialism's prosperity.”

⁸ 정성장, “북한의 경제-핵 병진노선 폐기 배경과 비핵화에 대한 입장 평가,” 세종논평, No 2018-22 (2018.4.23).

⁹ 이종석, “김정은의 비핵화 의지와 ‘강남경제개발구’,” 한겨레, 2018.3.25.

¹⁰ Kim Jong Un also put significant efforts - including a 2014 order to scrap the old plan and redesign the terminal - to renovate the Pyongyang International Airport. The second terminal that opened in 2015 is 5 times as large as the previous one, complete with restaurants and duty-free shops. In March, a month before the inter-Korea summit, Pyongyang requested the International Civil Aviation Organization that it be allowed to open several “trans-regional routes.” This, together with the opening of the Wonsan ski resort among other things, seems to indicate Kim's interest in bringing in more foreign visitors. “북한, '옛청사의 6배' 평양국제공 항 신청사 준공식(사진),” 연합뉴스, 2015.7.2; 변종국, and 천호성. "[단독]北 “해외항로 늘리고 영공 열겠다” 하늘길 제재풀기 나서." 동아일보, 05.02 2018.

¹¹ These zones seem part of a national development strategy, not a piecemeal response to the needs of the time. See footnote 13 for more.

¹² Park, Kyung-Ae and Mark Bennett. “Engaging North Korea with High-Culture Soft Power: Knowledge Sharing with Pyongyang.” Pacific Affairs 87, no. 1 (03, 2014): 29-41. For other educational exchanges between the U.S. and North Korea, see U.S.-DPRK Educational Exchanges: Assessment and Future Strategy, edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Karin J. Lee, The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, 2011.

¹³ This of course raises the question of who will benefit most from these changes and how these benefits will be distributed within the society if the North extensively engages world capitalism. It remains to be seen how the North will address such “externalities” as social inequalities and environmental degradation that most post-socialist economies have experienced.

¹⁴ Kim has organized a series of meetings designed to strengthen his support at the grassroots, including a Party Cell Secretaries Conference (2013 and 2017), “enthusiasts” conferences in various sectors, youth and women conferences of various age groups, and conferences of foot soldiers like “patrols” and unit leaders.

¹⁵ 찐저·쉬원지·위즈쌴 (金 哲·徐文吉·于治賢), 중·북경제협력과 북한의 경제발전 전망 (中朝经济与合作朝鲜变革发展展望), 중장기통상전략연구 15-05 (대외경제정책연구원: 2015.12.30), 22.

¹⁶ A bunjo is made up of 10~25 farmers whereas a pojeon is comprised only of 3~5. The management committee is responsible for the overall operation of a collective farm, but a pojeon is the smallest unit that carries out farming and allocates income based on its output. Pyongyang organized a national conference of agricultural bunjo chiefs in 2014 for the first time in its history in an effort to accelerate the change nationwide. 정창현, “농업 분조장대회와포전담당제,” 통일뉴스, 2014.2.3.

¹⁷ 김헌주. "[단독] 김정은, 집권 초부터 경제法 정비… 경제강국 실현 치밀하게 준비했다." 서울신문, 05.02 2018.

¹⁸ “김정은동지의 노작《김정일애국주의를 구현하여 부강조국건설을 다그치자》 전문,” 조선중앙통신,, 2012.8.3. This is the speech that Kim reportedly delivered on July 26^th, 2012.

¹⁹ ROK government sources, Statistical Office and Bank of Korea, show a 12% growth of the DPRK's GNI from 2011 to 2016. 2017 북한의 주요통계지표 [Major Statistics Indicators of North Korea], 통계청 [Statistics Korea] (2017.12); and 한국은행 경제통계시스템 [Economic Statistics System], Accessed May 12, 2018.

²⁰ Showing that Kim has published more writings - so-called Kim Jong Un's Works - on economic policies than any other policy areas, Chin Heegwan argues that Kim prioritizes the economy. 진희관, “북한의 「로작」 용어 등장과정과 김정은 로작 분석,” 북한연구학회보, 21 권 2호 (2017), 25-53.

²¹ Choe, Sang-Hun, “Kim says He'd End North Korea Nuclear Pursuit for U.S. Truce,” The New York Times, April 29, 2018.

²² The DPRK's Foreign Ministry followed up with an announcement on May 12, 2018 that the nuclear test sites would be dismantled under foreign journalists' observation between 23^rd and 25^th of May.

²³ The DPRK decided to set UTC+08:30 as its standard time, calling it Pyongyang Time, on August 5, 2015. The decision, which went into effect on the seventieth anniversary of Korea's liberation, was presented as a break from one of the legacies of Japanese colonialism because it was the Governor General of Korea who set in 1912 Korea's time zone to UTC+9:00 to align with Japan Standard Time. Kim's directive to nullify the 2015 decision seems well in line with his emphasis on cooperation with the South and outsiders.