¹ Unless otherwise indicated, references in this paper to Chinese tourists, Chinese people, etc. refer to mainland Chinese.

² See Japan National Tourism Organization, “Hō-Nichi gaikyakusū (Number of Foreigners Visiting Japan),” (accessed June 24, 2021).

³ Since 2005, following a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations that took place in China, the Genron NPO has been conducting surveys of Japanese adults on mutual Sino-Japanese perceptions with the cooperation of the China Daily, an English-language daily newspaper published in the People's Republic of China (PRC) owned by the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC). See Genron NPO, “The Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey” (accessed February 15, 2021).

⁴ “Nihon no taichū kanjō futatabi akka, yoron chōsa (Opinion Poll: Japanese Feelings toward China Turn Negative Again),” Sankei News, September 23, 2016, (accessed July 19, 2018).

⁵ Genron NPO, “The Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey.”

⁶ The data available from surveys such as these allow us to gauge overall attitudes of Japanese respondents to China and the Chinese people (understood as referring primarily to citizens of the PRC).

⁷ Genron NPO, “The Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey.”

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Caroline Rose and Jan Sýkora, “The Trust Deficit in Sino-Japanese Relations,” Japan Forum, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2016), pp. 100-124.

¹⁰ Linus Hagström, “‘Power Shift’ in East Asia? A Critical Reappraisal of Narratives on the Senkaku Islands Incident in 2010,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 267-297.

¹¹ Sunakawa Hiroyoshi, “Nationalism, Japan's Media and the Abe Government,” in Ross Mouer, ed., Globalizing Japan: Striving to Engage the World (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2015), pp. 227-246.

¹² Griseldis Kirsch, “Relocating Japan? Japan, China and the West in Japanese Television Dramas,” in Griseldis Kirsch, Dolores Martinez and Merry White, eds., Assembling Japan: Modernity, Technology and Global Culture (Bern: Peter Lang, 2015), pp. 113-133.

¹³ Some may argue that Japan's perception of China as a “threat” started as early as when China ceased to be a “student” of Japan's growth or an “ODA recipient” from Japan. For example, in his last book China and Japan: Facing History, Vogel (2019) points out how both the Chinese and the Japanese reacted in an unprecedently strong way in 2010 toward the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute, largely because China had in that year for the first time surpassed Japan as the second largest economy in the world. See Ezra F. Vogel, “The Deterioration of Sino-Japanese Relations, 1992-2018,” in China and Japan: Facing History (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019), pp. 386-390.

¹⁴ Susan J. Pharr and Ellis S. Krauss, eds., Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996).

¹⁵ See Niekawa Shun and Itō Yoshitaka, “Chūgoku kōsen no Senkaku ryōkai shinnyū, futatabi kappatsuka sukeru Shu shi no omowaku (Trespassing of Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands by Official Chinese Vessels Again Picks up in Activity; Xi's Intentions Transparent),” Asahi shinbun, June 24, 2019, (accessed July 3, 2019).

¹⁶ Suzuki Shogo, “The Rise of the Chinese ‘Other’ in Japan's Construction of Identity: Is China a Focal Point of Japanese Nationalism?,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2015), pp. 95-116.

¹⁷ “Riju kuanghe Zhongguo youke nanzhu ceng canbai Jingguo Shenshe wangyou huyu dizhi (Japanese Drama Ridicules Chinese Tourists, Internet Users Appeal to Boycott the Male Leading Actor Who Had Visited Yasukuni Shrine),” Kknews, July 15, 2016, (accessed June 20, 2019).

¹⁸ According to Selden and Nozaki (2009), the reason that officially screened textbooks of the time typically said so little about Japanese expansionism and aggression was that the Ministry of Education was seeking to promote the “interests of international friendship and cooperation,” especially between Japan and its Asian neighbours, as one of its screening criteria. See Mark Selden and Nozaki Yoshiko, “Japanese Textbook Controversies, Nationalism, and Historical Memory: Intra- and Inter-national Conflicts,” Japan Focus, Vol. 7, Issue 24, No. 5, 2009.

¹⁹ Several other post-war prime ministers (including Yoshida Shigeru, Kishi Nobusuke, Ikeda Hayato, Satō Eisaku, Tanaka Kakuei, Miki Takeo, Fukuda Takeo, Ōhira Masayoshi, and Suzuki Zenkō) had visited Yasukuni while in office before Nakasone, but these visits had all been cast as visits by a private individual.

²⁰ It is said that the real target for such criticism was Hu Yaobang, who had been close to Nakasone and valued China's relations with Japan. Nakasone avoided visiting Yasukuni in 1986 so as to help Hu maintain his position, but this was in vain as Hu stepped down in January 1987. See “Chūgoku demo wadai ni natteinakatta ‘Nankin’ kenryoku tōsō no gu ni ‘riyō'sare (‘Nanking’ Used as Fodder in a Power Struggle without Even Having Been an Issue in China),” Sankei News, April 2, 2015 (accessed June 20, 2019).

²¹ Cabinet Office, “Gaikō ni kansuru yoron chōsa (Public Opinion Poll on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy),” (accessed August 2, 2018).

²² In an opinion poll about U.S.-Japan relations released in November 1989, the United States maintained its position as the “most trustworthy” country (54%) among Japanese respondents. On the other hand, in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident and the consequent deterioration in views of China among the Japanese public, China dropped from rank 3 (30%) in 1988 to rank 11 (9%) in 1989, failing to rank among the top 10 most trustworthy countries for the Japanese. See “Shinkokusa masu Nichibei masatsu kankei kaizen tagaini kitai Yomiuri Gyarappu kyōdō chōsa no naiyō (Progressive Worsening of U.S.-Japan Frictions: Joint Opinion Poll by Yomiuri and Gallup Shows Both United States and Japan Hope for Improved Relations),” Yomiuri shinbun, November 28, 1989.

²³ Anna Fifield, “A (Very) Short History of Japan's War Apologies,” The Washington Post, August 13, 2015, (accessed June 20, 2019).

²⁴ Public awareness of the issue increased in Japan after 1981, when China opened its doors to trade, prompting the mass media to focus on the problem. In 1992, NHK broadcasted a 25-episode drama Back to the Steppes to commemorate the 20th Anniversary of the Normalization of Japan-China Diplomacy. This co-production by NHK and CCTV (China Central Television, the most prominent state-sponsored TV station in mainland China) tells the story of a Japanese orphan left behind in Mongolia. In the same year, the Chinese movie Bell of Purity Temple (1992, Xie Jin) was released, starring Kurihara Komaki, an actress who became highly popular in China because of her performance in Sandakan No. 8 (1974, Kumai Kei). It tells the story of a Japanese orphan left behind in China who was raised by a poor but generous Chinese family and went to Japan to meet with his mother after he became a monk. In 1995, NHK broadcast another NHK-CCTV co-production, a 7-episode drama revolving around orphans left behind in China, A Son of the Good Earth, starring Nakadai Tatsuya, Kamikawa Takaya, Zhu Xu, and Jiang Wenli, to commemorate the 70th anniversary of its founding. The story was an adaptation of a 1991 novel by Yamazaki Toyoko based on interviews she had with 300 orphans in China beginning in 1984, with help and encouragement from Hu Yaobang. See Nakajima Megumi, “Mei dorama ‘Daichi no ko’ no yōfuyaku Zhu Xu san ni mita ‘furuki yoki Chūgoku no chichioyazō’ (‘The Good Traditional Chinese Image of the Father’ Seen in Zhu Xu, Actor Playing the Stepfather in the Famous Drama ‘A Son of the Good Earth’),” Newsweek, September 20, 2018 (accessed June 20, 2019). NHK described the theme of the drama as showing the “equal efforts made by Japanese and Chinese to survive through unfortunate times.” See NHK, “Tokushū dorama shirīzu ‘Daichi no ko’ (Feature Drama Series ‘A Son of the Good Earth’),” NHK Drama. (accessed June 20, 2019).

²⁵ Cabinet Office, “Public Opinion Poll on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy.”

²⁶ Macrotrend, “Nikkei 225 Index: 67 Year Historical Chart,” (accessed June 20, 2019).

²⁷ Steven Mufson, “China Holds Nuclear Test,” The Washington Post, May 16, 1995, (accessed June 24, 2021).

²⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama ‘On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War's End’,” August 15, 1995 (accessed June 20, 2019).

²⁹ Takamine Tsukasa, Japan's Development Aid to China: The Long-running Foreign Policy of Engagement (New York: Routledge. 2006), p. 123.

³⁰ Chang's book has been subject to critiques from western sources as well (see the review by Joshua A. Fogel in The Journal of Asian Studies 57:3, 818-820), but attacks from the Japanese right have gone beyond these to paint the book as simple fabrication designed to denigrate Japan. The Japanese rightist manga artist Kobayashi Yoshinori claims in his 1998 manga On War that Chang's work was given attention just because of her pretty face. See Kobayashi Yoshinori, On War (Tokyo: Gentōsha, 1998), p. 164.

³¹ Joelherrick, “Tokyo Governor Shintarō Ishihara: There Was No Nanking Massacre,” Shanghaiist, May 5, 2018 (accessed May 21, 2019).

³² The balance of tourist trade (revenue brought in by tourists to Japan versus amount spent by Japanese tourists abroad) dropped in 1999 compared with the previous year. Due to new arrangements on Chinese group tours set in place in 2000, however, the figures again increased significantly from less than 50 billion yen in 2000 to more than 150 billion yen in 2004. See Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, “Keizai rebyū (Economic Review),” June 18, 2010 (accessed July 3, 2019).

³³ Cabinet Office, “Public Opinion Poll on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy.”

³⁴ Genron NPO, “The Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey.”

³⁵ The amount of Japan-China trade volume in 1978 was US$5.07 billion. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Nitchū bōekigaku no sūii (Trends in Japan-China Trade Figures),” (accessed May 22, 2019). The amount of Japan-China trade volume in 2008 was US$294.33 billion. See JETRO, “2016 nen no Nitchū bōeki (Japan-China Trade, 2016),” March 13, 2017 (accessed May 22, 2019).

³⁶ Cai Hong, “Hot Economics Doused by Cold Politics,” China Daily, October 4, 2013, (accessed May 21, 2019).

³⁷ In February 2012, Kawamura Takashi, Mayor of Nagoya, on the occasion of a visit by a Chinese delegation, made a statement expressing his denial of the Nanjing Massacre. See “Nanjing Delays ‘Japanese Culture Week’,” China Daily, March 2, 2012, (accessed May 23, 2019). In May 2014, the Chinese government announced that every year there would be two “anti-Japanese memorial days,” namely “Victory over Japan Day” on September 3 and “National Memorial Day for the Nanking Massacre” on December 13. See Darren Wee, “Nanking Massacre Memorial Day Should Be International Event, Says NPC Delegate,” South China Morning Post, February 26, 2014, (accessed May 23, 2019). In October 2015, UNESCO accepted China's application to add the Nanjing Massacre historical documents to its Memory of the World Register, sparking strong opposition from Japan. See “‘Rape of Nanjing’ Listed on Memory of World Register,” China.org.cn, October 10, 2019, (accessed May 23, 2019).

³⁸ A vacillation can be seen in portrayals of the Japanese in Chinese films about WWII between war memory with an appeal to universal values on one hand and particularistic expressions of national pride having entertainment value on the other. For example, most of the Nanjing films produced in China include Japanese characters sympathetically portrayed, stressing the destructive impact of militarism on the Japanese as well as the Chinese, but at the same time Chinese TV has frequently aired dramas showing heroic Chinese characters mowing down faceless Japanese soldiers.

³⁹ “China's Defense Budget to Rise 17.8% in 2007,” China Daily, March 14, 2007, (accessed June 24, 2021).

⁴⁰ This idea has taken shape in the West due to the rapid economic and military growth of China since the early 1990s. Together with a huge population, China was considered to pose a threat to other nations as a potential superpower. See Denny Roy, “The ‘China Threat’ Issue: Major Arguments,” Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8 (1996), pp. 758-771; and Andrew D. Marble, “The PRC at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: Why the ‘China Threat’ Debate?,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2000), pp. 1-18.

⁴¹ Cabinet Office, “Public Opinion Poll on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy.”

⁴² Genron NPO, “The Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey.”

⁴³ In response to a request from Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsumoto Takeaki that China increase its military transparency, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi countered that the military transparency of China was high. See “Gaikō teitai hōchū ni kage Chūgoku kaiyō katsudō kensei kikazu heikōsen (Diplomacy Stagnates, Cloud over China Visit, Restraints on China's Sea Moves Ineffective, No Agreement in Sight),” Yomiuri shinbun, July 5, 2011. Japan's Defense White Paper of the same year expressed serious concern regarding China's military development and in particular movements of Chinese naval forces. See Luo Yuan, “China Entitled to Demand More Transparency in Japan's Military,” People.cn, August 8, 2011, (accessed May 22, 2019).

⁴⁴ On April 27, 2015, the United States and Japan released new guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation focusing mainly on how the United States and Japan would cooperate in addressing security concerns affecting Japan, such as China's growing military assertiveness. Parallel to this has been an escalation in military activities of both Japanese and Chinese air and maritime forces over islands in the East China Sea (Donghai). According to Japan's Defense Ministry, the Japan Air-Self Defense Force (JASDF) was scrambled to intercept Chinese aircraft approaching Japan's airspace a record-high 571 times in 2015. See Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan's Fighter Jets Intercepted Chinese Aircraft 571 Times in 2015,” The Diplomat, April 26, 2016 (accessed May 23, 2019).

⁴⁵ This nationwide survey was conducted between September 27 and October 7, 2012, targeting 3,000 people aged 20 or above. See Cabinet Office, “Public Opinion Poll on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy.”

⁴⁶ “‘Nitchū kankei warui’ Nihon 9 wari, Chūgoku 8 wari ryōkoku de yoron chōsa (Opinion Poll in Both Countries: 90% of Japanese and 80% of Chinese Consider Sino-Japanese Relations Bad),” Asahi shinbun, September 23, 2012, (accessed June 28, 2019).

⁴⁷ Genron NPO, “The Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey.”

⁴⁸ As early as in 2006, Abe had already spoken in defense of Class-A war criminals, claiming that charges directed against Japan by the victors in WWII for crimes such as those against peace and humanity, were for crimes that had not existed during the war. He further claimed that according to Japanese laws of that time, defendants of such crimes could therefore not be held accountable as war criminals. See Yoshida Reiji, “To Fathom Abe, Just Look at His Grandfather,” The Japan Times, December 28, 2006, (accessed June 28, 2019). In 2007, Abe again asserted that there was no evidence to prove that women across Asia were forced into sex slavery by the Japanese Army. See “No Government Coercion in War's Sex Slavery: Abe” The Japan Times, March 2, 2007 (accessed May 23, 2019).

⁴⁹ Giulio Pugliese, “The China Challenge, Abe Shinzo's Realism, and the Limits of Japanese Nationalism,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2015), pp. 45-55.

⁵⁰ In March 2016, despite territorial disputes between Japan and other Asian countries, Abe set an ambitious target of attracting 40 million annual foreign visitors to Japan and of doubling spending by foreign visitors in Japan by 2020. See Stanley White, “Japan's PM Abe Aims to Double Tourist Visits by 2020 to Boost Economy,” Reuters, March 30, 2016, (accessed July 19, 2018). In order to achieve a higher number of repeated visits, Japan has been easing visa requirements for foreign visitors, including Chinese tourists. For instance, multiple-entry visas can be easily obtained by businessmen, intellectuals, cultural figures, and those who have “sufficient financial capability” from China. See “Japan to Relax Visa Rules for Chinese Visitors from October 17,” South China Morning Post, September 27, 2016 (accessed July 19, 2018).

⁵¹ Yoshida Reiji, Mie Ayako and Eric Johnston, “Momii's Rise Tests NHK's Reputation: Staff, Experts Cite Ominous Changes at Broadcaster,” The Japan Times, February 2, 2014 (accessed June 20, 2019).

⁵² Ellis S. Krauss, Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 50-51.

⁵³ “NHK Chief Defends Broadcaster Amid ‘Abe Channel’ Claims,” The Japan Times, October 2, 2015, .XQxXr_ZuKUl (accessed June 20, 2019).

⁵⁴ “Is Japan's Public Broadcaster under Threat?” BBC News, March 20, 2014, (accessed June 28, 2019).

⁵⁵ Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association, “Circulation and Households (Set Paper Counted as One Copy),” Facts and Figures about Japanese Newspapers, (accessed May 23, 2019).

⁵⁶ “Senkaku kokuyūka go Chūgoku kōsen, ryōkai shinnyū 62 nichi nobe 208 seki (208 Chinese Vessels Trespass Territorial Waters since Nationalization of Senkaku Islands),” Asahi shinbun, September 11, 2013 (accessed July 3, 2019); and “Senkaku fuhō jōriku, ōgoe age ‘Chūgoku ryōdo,’ kageki katsudō, kako ni shisha mo ([Activists] Land Illegally on Senkaku Islands, Shouting ‘[This is] Chinese Territory’ Radical Activities, [Resulting] Even in Deaths in the Past),” Yomiuri shinbun, August 16, 2012 (accessed July 3, 2019).

⁵⁷ See Hagström, “‘Power Shift’ in East Asia?;” pp. 267-297; and Suzuki, “Japan's Construction of Identity,” pp. 95-116.

⁵⁸ Hagström, “‘Power Shift’ in East Asia?,” p. 268.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Suzuki, “Japan's Construction of Identity,” p. 96.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 97.

⁶² Kirsch, “Relocating Japan,” pp. 116-120.

⁶³ The construction of a Japanese identity in this way not only portrays China as “Other” but normalizes a particular historical vision wherein the Cold War status quo (when Japan was an economic dynamo and China economically backward) was in some sense natural and that shifts in both the Chinese economy and its geopolitical orientation after 1990 are in some sense “unnatural,” a violation of norms. Japan was easily able to fit China as a supplicant in a paternalistic imaginary during the 1970s and 1980s, but China's new economic and military power has thrown this “comfortable” othering into disarray and catalyzed a crisis of self-identity.

⁶⁴ Suzuki, “Japan's Construction of Identity,” p. 96.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 103.

⁶⁶ See “Chūgoku, fukuramu daikoku ishiki zenjindai kaimaku, kokubō yosan 12.2% zō (China's Growing Consciousness as a Great Power; Opening of the National People's Congress; National Defense Budget up 12.2%),” Asahi shinbun, March 6, 2014, (accessed July 3, 2019); “Chūgoku, gasuden kaihatsu chakuchaku Nihon wa chūshi motomeru (China's Continuing Development of Gas Fields; Japan Requests a Stop),” Nikkei, September 17, 2015 (accessed July 3, 2019); “Chūgoku kōsen, aitsugu ryōkai shinryū gunmin dōin, atsuryoku kyōka Senkaku oki (Repeated Trespassing of Territorial Waters off the Senkaku Islands by Official Chinese Vessels; Military Personnel Mobilized and Pressure Increasingly Exerted [on Japan]),” Asahi shinbun, August 8, 2016, (accessed July 3, 2019); “Chūgoku chūsai hanketsu hitei ni yakki gunji kainan enshū ‘jikoku no umi’ kyōchō (China Desperate to Deny Mediated Judicial Decision; Sea Disaster Exercises by Military; Claims that ‘This Sea is Ours’),” Yomiuri shinbun, July 20, 2016; “Jinkōtō migattena kaihatsu Chūgoku Minami Shinakai ‘shihai’ kyōka (Development of Man-made Islands in Selfish Disregard [of Claims by Others]: China's Strengthening of Control over South China Sea),” Yomiuri shinbun, July 28, 2016; and “Senkaku oki, Chūgoku no kaiyō kanshizen 8 seki ga ryōkai shinnyū (8 Chinese Ocean Surveillance Vessels Invade Territorial Waters off Senkaku Islands),” Yomiuri shinbun, April 23, 2013, (accessed July 3, 2019).

⁶⁷ Genron NPO, “The Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey.”

⁶⁸ See Japan National Tourism Organization, “Number of Foreigners Visiting Japan” (accessed June 24, 2021).

⁶⁹ “Explosive shopping” is normally what Japanese business leaders and the general public alike associate with “national revival.” When engaged in by the Chinese, however, it triggers a form of moral panic.

⁷⁰ See Nippon TV, “Meiwaku kōi aitsugu: Hokkaido no mujin'eki ni Chūgokujin kankōkyaku (Nuisances Continue: Chinese Tourists at Unmanned Rail Station in Hokkaido),” February 3, 2017; Fuji TV, “Sekai de no akuhyō…Chūgokujin no gyōten manā jittai (In Ill Repute across the World… Actual Examples of the Astonishing Behavior of the Chinese),” February 14, 2016, (accessed July 3, 2019); TV Asahi, “Beat Takeshi no TV takkuru Chūgokujin no koko ga wakaranai! (Beat Takeshi's TV Tackle: This Is What I Don't Understand about the Chinese!),” May 12, 2014, (accessed July 3, 2019); and “Shinkokuka: akushitsu manā no jittai (A Worsening [Situation]: The Reality of the Malicious Manners [of the Chinese]),” September 24, 2015.

⁷¹ According to a recent opinion poll conducted by Genron NPO regarding the reasons why Chinese hold a favorable impression of Japan, 49.2% of Chinese respondents mentioned the politeness and good manners of the Japanese. 44.0% of them mentioned the high quality of Japanese products. See “Nihon no inshō ‘yoi’ Chūgokujin, hatsu no 4 wari nose (Favorable Impression of Japanese among the Chinese Exceeds 40% for the First Time),” nippon.com, October 26, 2018, (accessed May 23, 2019).

⁷² See TV Asahi, “Beat Takeshi's TV Tackle”; Nippon TV, “Chūgokujin wa naze Nihon de bakugai wo suru no ka? Nihon sei tai Chūgoku sei (Why Do the Chinese Engage in Explosive Shopping in Japan?; Made in Japan vs. Made in China),” July 7, 2015, (accessed July 3, 2019); and Fuji TV, “Ikegami Akira kinkyū SP! yoku wakaranai Chūgoku no nazo (Ikegami Akira's ”Emergency Special!: Puzzles about the Chinese that I Don't Understand),“ November 29, 2014, (accessed July 3, 2019); and ”Chūgokujin kōkyū kanyō shokubutsu dorobō ga kyūzō (A Surge in Chinese Thieves Targeting Expensive Decorative Plants!),“ May 11, 2016, (accessed July 3, 2019).

⁷³ Iwabuchi Kōichi, Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), p. 14.

⁷⁴ Mark Schilling, Contemporary Japanese Film (Trumbull: Weatherhill, 1999), p. 50.

⁷⁵ One manifestation of this perceived illegal behavior is seen in data from the Japan Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry, according to which 5,803 foreign trainees in Japan went missing in 2015, half of them Chinese. See Ōtake Tomoko, “Record 5,803 Foreign Trainees Went Missing in Japan Last Year,” The Japan Times, October 31, 2016, (accessed July 2, 2018).

⁷⁶ According to Teng (2018), “‘Dama’ is a loaded word these days. Although originally nothing more than a benign descriptor for a kindly, hardworking, middle-aged woman, the term has somehow morphed into a globally recognized byword for a grasping, domineering, nouveau riche matron. In popular media, for example, damas are typically portrayed as uncultured, easily swayed by gossip, and utterly unwilling to listen to reason.” See Teng Wei, “‘Dama’: A History of China's Ageist, Sexist Slur,” Sixth Tone, October 26, 2018, (accessed June 28, 2019).

⁷⁷ Lily, “Takahada Atsuko wa Chūgokujin? Naomi to Kanako no engi ga daizessan de musuko mo musume mo haiyū (Is Takahada Atsuko Chinese? Acting in Naomi and Kanako Receives Rave Accolades, Son and Daughter Are Also Actors),” Lily-news, (accessed June 28, 2019).

⁷⁸ Lo Kin-ling, “China to Send Wang Qishan to Japanese Emperor Naruhito's Enthronement,” South China Morning Post, October 15, 2019, (accessed October 23, 2019).

⁷⁹ “China's Xi Jinping Postpones State Visit to Japan Due to Coronavirus,” The Japan Times, March 5, 2020, (accessed February 15, 2021).

⁸⁰ Genron NPO, “The Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey.”

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² This was a 1-hour documentary program broadcasted on October 7, 2018 about a Japanese man married to a Chinese woman in Nanjing. In order to understand the historical and territorial disputes between Japan and China, the couple tries to talk about them and even visits the Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders together. The program was nominated for the Best FNS (Fuji Network System) Documentary Award in 2018. See Fuji TV, “Nankin no Nihonjin (Japanese in Nanking)” FNS Documentary Award, October 4, 2018 (accessed May 28, 2019).

⁸³ FNN, “‘Bakugai’ kara ‘bakusuberi’ e Chūgokujin kankōkyaku ga sukījō ni sattō (From ‘Explosive Shopping’ to ‘Explosive Skiing,‘ Chinese Tourists Flood the Ski Resorts),” February 11, 2019 (accessed May 28, 2019).

⁸⁴ A crew from Nippon TV conducted an undercover investigation so as to reveal the “dirty” business of Chinese travel agencies in Japan. See Nippon TV, “Uso bakari no akushitsu jittai gyōten no Chūgokujin tsuā (A Malicious Reality Full of Lies: The Unbelievable Truth of the Chinese Tours)” (accessed May 28, 2019).

⁸⁵ As of late June 2021, more than 795,000 people in Japan had been diagnosed with COVID-19. See Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, “Situation Report (as of 00:00 26 June 2021),” June 26, 2021 (accessed June 28, 2021). Due to the coronavirus pandemic, the Tokyo Olympic Games scheduled for 2020 had to be postponed for a year. Amid calls for its cancellation, officials had decided to go ahead with the Games, but overseas spectators were banned and up to 10,000 domestic fans were allowed in the venues. See “Tokyo 2020: Olympics ‘100%‘ Going Ahead - Games President Seiko Hashimoto,” BBC Sport, June 3, 2021 (accessed June 28, 2021); and “Tokyo 2020: Up to 10,000 Japanese Fans Will Be Permitted at Olympic Venues” BBC Sport, June 21, 2021, (accessed June 28, 2021).

⁸⁶ TV Asahi, “Beat Takeshi no TV takkuru shunsetsu de meiwaku kankōkyaku ga gekizō!? (Beat Takeshi's TV Tackle: An Explosion of Annoying Tourists during Lunar New Year!?),” February 2, 2020, (accessed February 18, 2020).

⁸⁷ Palash Ghosh, “Coronavirus Update: Fear of Spreading Virus Stoking Worldwide Anti-Chinese Xenophobia,” International Business Times, January 31, 2020, (accessed February 18, 2020).

⁸⁸ From 2017 to 2019, there was an increase in both Japanese and Chinese who considered China-Japan relations to be good or relatively good. The situation witnessed a turning point in 2020, as Japanese people who considered the relations as bad or relatively bad rose by 9.3% to over 50%. Among the Chinese interviewed, in contrast, more than half considered the situation as neither good nor bad, with the percentage of those judging the situation as either good or bad both declining. See Genron NPO, “The Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey” (accessed February 15, 2021).