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Grappling with Clientelism: The Japanese State and Okinawa under Abe Shinzo
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
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This is a slightly expanded version of the talk delivered by the author upon the occasion of the launch of his The State of the Japanese State at Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan (FCCJ), Tokyo, on 17 October 2018. It traces the evolution of Japan, especially under Abe Shinzo, as a “client state” (defined by Wikipedia as “a state that is economically, politically, or militarily subordinate to another, more powerful state”) of the United States. It considers what I now refer to as Mark One and Mark Two versions of that “client state” in the post-Cold War era, and discusses the persistent challenge to the clientelist frame arising from the Okinawan refusal to submit to it. It raises finally the possibility of either a Mark Three or of Japan's future sloughing off client state status altogether. Taking off from the book, it goes beyond it.
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References
Notes
1 The State of the Japanese State: Contested Identity, Direction and Role Folkestone, Kent: Renaissance Books, 2018.
2 Client State: Japan in the American Embrace, New York, Verso, 2007 (in Japanese from Gaifusha, Korean from Changbi, and Chinese from Social Science Academic Press of China, all 2008). See especially the discussion in the Japanese edition.
3 For my analysis of the British and Australian cases, and brief reference to Korea, Israel, and Latin America, see my “Zokkokuron,” in Kimura Akira and Magosaki Ukeru, Owaranai ‘Senryo‘ (The Unending Occupation), Kyoto, Horitsu Bunkasha, 2013, pp. 18-38. (English version at “Japan's Client State (Zokkoku) Problem,” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, June 24, 2013).
4 See our Tenkanki no nihon e – Pakkusu Amerikana ka, Pakkusu Ajia ka, Tokyo, NHK Shuppan shinsho No 423, Tokyo, January 2014.
5 Uchida Tatsuru and Shirai Satoshi, Zokkoku minshushugi, Tokyo, Toyo keizai, 2016.
6 Shirai Satoshi, Kokutai-ron – Kiku to seijoki, Tokyo, Shueisha shinsho, 2018. And for a short statement of his thesis, “Okinawa to kokutai,” Days Japan, vol. 15, No. 10, October 2018, pp. 4-11.
7 For further discussion, see my The State of the Japanese State, pp. 9 ff.
8 Ibid, p. 15.
9 OECD, The Long View: Scenarios for the World Economy to 2060
10 Terashima Jitsuro, “Noryoku no ressun,” No 192, “Chugoku no kyodaika kyokenka wo seishi suru, Nihon no kakugo,” Sekai, April 2018, pp. 42-47 at p. 42. See also IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2018.
11 Abe Shinzo, Utsukushii kuni e, Tokyo, Bungei shunju, 2006.
12 Boei mondai kondankai, “Nihon no anzen hosho to boeiryoku no arikata – 21 seiki e mukete no tenbo (The Modality of the Security and Defence Capability of Japan - The Outlook for the 21st Century), Higuchi ripoto, 12 August 1994.
13 Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, Resistant Islands – Okinawa versus Japan and the United States [Rowman and Littlefield, 2012, second, expanded edition, 2018], p. 64.
14 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, eds, “More Important than Ever: Renewing the US-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” Washington, CSIS, October 2018.
15 MacArthur told a US Senate Committee on 5 May 1951, “If the Anglo-Saxon was say 45 years of age in his development, in the sciences, the arts, divinity, culture, the Germans were quite as mature. The Japanese, however, in spite of their antiquity measured by time, were in a very tuitionary condition. Measured by the standards of modern civilization, they would be like a boy of twelve as compared with our development of 45 years.” (John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War ll, New York, W.W. Norton, 1999, p. 550). MacArthur's view matched that of Hirohito, who referred disparagingly to the Japanese people as “lacking in education,” marked by “a willingness to be led,” and prone to “sway from one extreme to the other.” (most likely between April and July 1946, see Dower, “A message from the Showa emperor,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 31, 4, 1999, pp. 19-24.)
16 “Memorandum of conversation,” 9 July 1971, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. 17, China, 1969-1972.
17 Fred Hiatt, “Major General, US troops must stay in Japan” Washington Post, 27 March 1990.
18 For details, see The State of the Japanese State, especially chapter 3.
19 Richard Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “The US-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia,” CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies), August 2012. This report, published months before the 2012 presidential election, laid out the position expected to be the kernel of East Asian policy for the incoming administration.
20 Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, Resistant Islands: Okinawa confronts Japan and the United States, pp. 193-6.
21 “Japan is back,” Abe Shinzo speech to CSIS, 22 February 2013.
22 While abandoning Yasukuni, he compensated by performing comparable, emperor-centred rituals at Ise Shrine.
23 The State of the Japanese State, p. 40.
24 See discussion in Kaji Yasuo, “”Abe ‘kaiken’ an no meiso ga shisa suru mono,“ Sekai, April 2018, pp. 178-190.
25 Retaining Article 9's two current paragraphs but adding a third, declaring the legitimacy of the Self-Defence Forces as a National Defence Army (kokubogun). The adoption of such a third clause implied that the SDF until the moment of revision had not been constitutionally legitimate. (At time of writing the formal constitutional revision package was yet to be announced, but this author assumes it will be minimalist and in line with the pattern suggested here, designed to establish the principle of revision while postponing the “real” agenda to a more propitious time.
26 “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in Joint Press Conference,” Tokyo, Japan,“ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 06, 2017.
27 “Boeihi ‘tai-GDP 2%‘ meiki, jimin boei taiko teigen no zenyo hanmei,” Sankei shimbun, 25 May 2018.
28 For details, see McCormack and Norimatsu, op. cit.
29 The State of the Japanese State, pp. 246-7
30 For details see my “The Abe state and Okinawan protest – High Noon 2018,” The Asia-Pacific Journal-Japan Focus, 7 August 2018.
31 “The Japanese government suing to allow land filling is a reckless trampling of democracy,” editorial, Ryukyu shimpo, 18 October 2018 (in English).
32 “Henoko shin kichi, gyoseiho kenkyusha 110 nin no seimeibun zenbun,” Okinawa taimusu, 31 October 2018.
33 Kyodo, “Okinawa governor meets top gov't official over US base transfer,” The Mainichi, 6 November 2018,
34 See, for example, the letter from Governor Onaga to Nakashima Koichiro, head of the ODB, “Futenma hikojo daitai shisetsu kensetsu jigyo ni kansuru sokuji koji teishi yokyu nado ni tsuite, ” Prefectural press release, 17 July, 2018
35 The State of the Japanese State, pp. 246-7.
36 The Editorial Board, “Toward a smaller American footprint on Okinawa,” New York Times, 1 October 2018.
37 “Naha Port,” Global Security.org (accessed 10 November 2018)
38 “Tamaki Deni-shi, Jieitai to Beigun no kichi kyodo shiyo kyogi mo, intabyu de hyomei, okinawa ken chijisen,” Sankei shimbun, 2 October 2018.
39 See the CSIS reports of 2012 and 2018 cited in footnotes 15 and 20 above.
40 To the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan on 9 November and to New York University on 11 November. See discussion in Kihara Satoru, “Okinawa, Bei sentoki FA18 no suiraku wa nani o shimesu ka,” Ari no hitokoto, 15 November 2018.
41 “Japan is worried about its alliance with America,” The Economist, 6 September 2018.
42 The following discussion of the Vladivostok meetings follows that in my The State of the Japanese State, pp. 145-149.
43 “Moon daitoryo,” op. cit.; James O'Neill, “North Korea and the UN sanctions merry go round,” New Eastern Outlook, 18 September 2017.
44 At 43 kilometres long and up to 70 meters deep, the Soya Strait would be an expensive project but probably no more technically difficult than the existing Japanese Seikan tunnel under the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido (53 kilometres long and 140 meters deep). Kiriyama Yuichi, “Shiberia tetsudo no Hokkaido enshin, Roshia ga keizai kyoryoku de yobo,” Shukan ekonomisuto, 15 November 2016, p. 22.
45 Yohei Muramatsu, “Sino-US trade war casts shadow over economic forum in Beijing,” Nikkei Asian Review, October 27, 2018. Steven Lee Myers and Motoko Rich, “Shinzo Abe says Japan is Chna's ‘partner’ and no longer its aid donor,” New York Times, 26 October 2018. See also David Hurst, “Abe wants ‘new era’ in China-Japan relations,” The Diplomat, 26 October 2018.
46 Hudson Institute, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy toward China,” Foreign Policy, 4 October 2018.
47 It seems likely that Japan will soon be put to the test on this if the US insists, as expected, on inclusion in the bilateral US-Japan trade deal about to be negotiated of a clause such as in the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) adopted on 1 October 2018 blocking any agreement with China not endorsed by the US. (Lee Jeong-ho, Keegan Elmer, and Zhou Xin, “China ‘threatened with isolation’ by veto written into US-Mexico-Canada trade deal,” South China Morning Post, 3 September 2018.)
48 Tyler Duirden, “USDJPY tumbles after Trump hints at Japan trade war next,” Zerohedge, 6 September 2018.
49 Danielle Demetriou, “Japan and North Korea held secret meeting as Shinzo Abe ‘loses trust’ in Donald Trump,” Telegraph News Online, 29 August 2018.
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