¹ Shirley Zhao, “Sleepless nights' for Hong Kong finance chief over economic prospects for young generation', South China Morning Post, (24 December 2017)(accessed 15 January 2018).

² Hong Kong Standard, Carrie Lam ‘did not fully realize’ youth angst' (27 July 2017).

³ ‘Carrie Lam's speech in full: Hong Kong leader speaks to city on protests in TV address’, South China Morning Post, 5 Sept 2019.

⁴ Two reports were issued in 2010 regarding the situation of the younger generation. The first was written by a scholar from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology at the initiative of the Central Policy Unit of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Wu Xiaogang, ‘Hong Kong's Post-80s Generation: Profiles and Predicaments’, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology/The Central Policy Unit, The Government of the Hong Kong Administrative Region (2010) (accessed 13 January 2018). The second was issued by the Hong Kong Transition Project of the Baptist University: Hong Kong Transition Project, ‘Protest and Post-80s Youth. Sources of Social Instability in Hong Kong’, The Baptist University (2010) (accessed 12 July 2017).

⁵ In this article, Generation Y is roughly defined as individuals aged 18 to 30. We found the term “post-1980s generation”, which has been popularly used since the end of the 2000s, outdated, while “Generation Y” (or Millennials) seems more inclusive of those born in the 1990s and after.

⁶ Wong Ka-Ying and Wan Po-San, New Evidence in the Postmaterialist Shift: The Experience of Hong Kong', Social Indicators Research 92(3), (2009), p. 498.

⁷ Gordon Mathews, Eric Ma Kit-wai and Lui Tai-lok, Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008).

⁸ See, also, Gregory B. Lee, 'La question de l'identité à Hong Kong pendant la période du colonialisme tardif et la question de l“authenticité”, in Louis Augustin-Jean and Florence Padovani, eds, Hong Kong, Economie, culture et société (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007), pp. 313-332.

⁹ Mathews et al., Hong Kong, China, p. 29.

¹⁰ For a discussion on the relationship between development and entrepreneurship in Hong Kong, see Louis Augustin-Jean, ‘Entrepreneurship as a Contributor of Growth in Asia: an Analysis of Hong Kong's Case’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies 31(3-4), (2010), pp. 314-340.

¹¹ The authors gave many examples of it. One of the most telling, perhaps, is the fact that some students see the Chinese flag as “unfashionable” rather than (only) a symbol of the nation. Mathews et al., Hong Kong, China, pp. 127-128.

¹² Ma, N. (2011) ‘Value Changes and Legitimacy Crisis in Post-industrial Hong Kong’, Asian Survey, 51(4), p. 685.

¹³ This point is detailed in Louis Augustin-Jean and Anthea H.Y. Cheung The Economic Roots of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. Globalization and the Rise of China, Abingdon, UK, Routledge (2018), ‘Preface’, p. 10.

¹⁴ Cited in Gary Cheung and Alvin Lum, ‘Two months on and nearly 2,000 rounds of tear gas later, what do Hong Kong's extradition bill protesters really want?‘, South China Morning Post (9 August 2019). In fact, the links between economic factors, democratic aspirations and mass protests where more visible during the 2014 Umbrella Movement. See Louis Augustin-Jean and Anthea H.Y. Cheung, The Economic Roots of the Umbrella Movement.

¹⁵ Calculated from the Census and Statistics Department (C&SD), “2018 Gross Domestic Product.”

¹⁶ This is not trivial. Michelle Wong noted that “the top five tycoons earned HK$23.6 billion in dividends alone in 2016 and 2017” (Michelle Wong, ‘Why the Wealth Gap? Hong Kong's Disparity between Rich and Poor is Greatest in 45 Years, so What Can Be Done?‘, South China Morning Post (27 Sept. 2018).

¹⁷ Calculated from the Census and Statistics Department (C&SD), ‘Labour’, (Table 2.17: Employed persons by monthly employment earnings). See also Table 2.18 (Domestic households by monthly household income): from 2007 to 2017, the percentage of households with a monthly income of over HK$100,000, and from HK$80,000 to HK$99,000, have increased respectively from 2.8% to 6.5%, and from 1.7% to 3.9%.

¹⁸ Interestingly, the rise of the Gini coefficient based on household income slowed over the past five years: from 0.537 in 2011 to a record high of 0.539 in 2016 (it was 0.525 in 2001 and 0.533 in 2006). Despite this undeniable progress, the richest 10% of Hong Kong's households earned about 44 times more than the poorest 10%.

¹⁹ CS&D, Population By-Census 2016. Thematic Report. Household Distribution Income (Hong Kong: General Statistics Section Census and Statistics Department, 2017) (accessed 13 March 2019). See, also, CS&D ‘Census and Statistics Department announces results of study on household income distribution in Hong Kong’ (2017) (assessed 25 June 2019).

²⁰ See the convincing data provided by Oxfam on the issue: Oxfam, ‘Report on Hong Kong Living Wage Report’ (December 2018), p. 3. The SMW is adjusted every two years. Launched in 2011 at a rate of HK$28 per hour, it was last raised in May 2019 to HK$37.5 per hour.

²¹ See, for example, Richard Wong Yue-Chim, Diversity and Occasional Anarchy: On Deep Economic and Social Contradictions in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013). The different understanding of the premium has been presented in Louis Augustin-Jean and Anthea H.Y. Cheung, The Economic Roots of the Umbrella Movement: Globalization and the Rise of China (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).

²² “Persons with educational attainment at post-secondary level refer to those with all Certificate, Diploma, Higher Certificate, Higher Diploma, Professional Diploma, Associate Degree, Pre-Associate Degree, Endorsement Certificate, Associateship, First Degree, Taught Postgraduate, Research Postgraduate and other sub-degree education or equivalent level in local or non-local institutions” (C&SD, unpublished data).

²³ We thank Mrs. Luk Cheung Mee-ying, Senior Statistical Officer from the CS&D for providing us with this set of data.

²⁴ As seen in note 4, concerns for Generation Y were already displayed in 2010 in two reports, including one commissioned by the Central Unit Policy – the thinktank of the Hong Kong government. From that date onwards, more research on this topic has been produced, most noticeably by Stephen Chiu Wing Kai. These works mostly concentrated on the level of dissatisfaction of the ‘post-1980s generation’, as well as the living conditions of the youth (especially concerning housing). In addition to their own surveys, these scholars used published data such as the monthly income of people with a certain education level. However, as far as we know, none of this research has presented data on the income of fresh or young graduates. This is problematic since it does not allow one to fully understand the lifestyle and the problems of the youth. To cope with this, Augustin-Jean and Cheung have compiled data collected by several local universities regarding the job situation and salaries of young graduates. See Augustin-Jean and Cheung, The Economic Roots…, especially Chapter 3. For the two original reports, see Hong Kong Transition Project (2010) ‘Protest and Post-80s Youth. Sources of Social Instability…’ and Wu, X.G. ‘Hong Kong's Post-80s Generation: Profiles and Predicaments’. Among several articles (co)-written by Stephen Chiu, see Stephen Chiu Wing-kai and Kevin Tze-wai Wong, ‘Happiness of Hong Kong Youth from 2000 to 2014: empirical evidence on the differential impact of socioeconomic conditions on youth versus other age groups’, Journal of Youth Studies, 21:3 (2018), pp. 253-271,; Chiu Wing-kai and Lui Tai-lok, “General Education, Academic Achievements and Classes” 通識、學業成就與階級 (pp. 18-27); Yi Chung-yan and Chiu Wing-kai, “‘Socially Downward Mobile’ Youth? Objective Conditions and Subjective Feelings” 「下流 」青年？客觀狀況與主觀感受(pp. 54-77) in Chiu Wing-kai, Yi Chung-yan and Li Keng (eds.), Irritating Youth: An Observation over the Situation of Hong Kong's New Generation 躁動青春：香港新世代處境觀察 (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 2016). See also Yi Chung-yan, “The Expansion of University Degrees and the Inequality in Educational Opportunities” 大學學位 擴張與教育機會不平等 (pp. 4-17), in the same volume and note 25 below.

²⁵ The newly released report on youth (defined as people aged 15-24 years old) does not include data on fresh graduate income or even income per academic attainment. See C&SD, 2016 Population By-Census. Thematic Report: Youth Hong Kong: General Statistics Section Census and Statistics Department, 2018). (accessed 9 March 2018).

²⁶ There are many concepts of globalization. The (economic) definition adopted in this paper emphasizes the following: 1. A production system in multiple places, often located across borders; this is done either by a single group, or by subcontracting; 2. The financialization of the economy in a neoliberal environment; 3. Technical changes in particular, the development of information and communication technologies. While these three components are obviously related (e.g. the ‘decentralization’ of production would not be possible without financialization and technological progress), they comprise a global economic system which departs from previous internationalization (mainly based on international trade and the implementation of subsidiaries overseas). In this pattern, which started in the 1990s, ‘global cities’, like New York, London or Hong Kong, have strengthened their command position in the world economy and have attracted high-level services in banking, insurance, accounting, advertising, etc. For the specific case of Hong Kong (which, like the two others, has been ‘international’ for a long time), the change came hand in hand with the opening up of China, which boosted its traditional role of mediator between China and the rest of the world (in sourcing, trading, designing, subcontracting, etc. – not mentioning changes provoked by the reunification process with China).

²⁷ See, Saskia Sassen, Cities in the World Economies (2nd ed.), (Thousand Oaks, Tine Forge Press, 2000), Pascal Petit, ‘The Systemic Nature of the Rise in Inequality in Developed Economies’, International Review of Applied Economics 24(3), (2010), pp. 251-267, and Manuel Castells The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

²⁸ Commission on Strategic Committee on Social Development and Quality of Life, ‘Income Inequality and Social Mobility’, Central Policy Unit, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2006).

²⁹ C&SD, 2016 Population By-Census. Thematic Report: Persons from the Mainland Having Resided in Hong Kong for Less Than 7 Years (Hong Kong, General Statistics Section Census and Statistics Department, 2018), p. 15, available at: (accessed 9 March 2018). However, the income of immigrants from the Mainland has progressed more rapidly than that of the overall population during the past few years.

³⁰ Lee Kim-Ming, Wong Hung and Law Kam-Yee ‘Social Polarisation and Poverty in the Global City: the Case of Hong Kong’, China Report 43(1), (2010), pp. 5-6. See, also, Stephen Chiu Wing-kai and Lui Tai-lok, Hong Kong: Becoming a Chinese Global City (New York: Routledge, 2009).

³¹ Legislative Council Secretariat – Research Office, ‘Social Mobility in Hong Kong: Review and Outlook’, (Research Brief n° 2, 2014-2015). See also “Table 12.1. Distribution of population aged 15 and over by educational attainment and sex”, Hong Kong Digest of Statistics. Section 12: Education (2019), p. 341. A degree refers to a bachelor's degree or equivalent. Until recently, most bachelor's degree programmes comprised three years of university education, but have since been converted to four-year programmes. Sub-degrees are non-degree qualifications such as higher certificates, diplomas or higher diploma; and associate degrees consist of one to three years of post-secondary education.

³² For Hong Kong, see ‘Snapshot of the Hong Kong population 2016’. The OECD figure come from OECD data, ‘Population with tertiary education25-34 year-olds / 55-64 year-olds, % in same age group, 2018 or latest available’.

³³ Lui Hon-Kwong, Widening Income Distribution in Post-Handover Hong Kong (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 55.

³⁴ Legislative Council Secretariat – Research Office, ‘Challenges of manpower adjustment in Hong Kong’ (Research Brief n° 4, 2016), p. 8.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., p.9.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Lui Hon-Kwong and Suen Wing, ‘The Shrinking Earnings Premium for University Graduates in Hong Kong: the Effect of Quantity of Quality?‘, Contemporary Economic Policy 23(2), (2005), p. 253.

³⁹ LegCo Secretariat Research Office ‘Challenges of manpower adjustment in Hong Kong’, p. 11.

⁴⁰ Vere James, ‘Special topic enquiry on earnings mobility’, (2010) (accessed 6 September 2015).

⁴¹ LegCo Secretariat Research Office, ‘Social Mobility in Hong Kong: Review and Outlook’.

⁴² Ibid., p. 8.

⁴³ Mok Ka-Ho, ‘Enhancing Global Competitiveness and Human Capital Management: Does Education Help Reduce Inequality and Poverty in Hong Kong?‘, The China Review 15(2), (2015), p. 129.

⁴⁴ This was stated in the original ‘Brand Hong Kong’ programme launched by the Hong Kong Government in 2001: Hong Kong Government, ‘Brand Hong Kong’ (2001).

⁴⁵ See his significant heading: ‘Education as a Fundamental Solution for Inequality’; Richard Wong Yue-Chim, Diversity and Occasional Anarchy, p. 164.

⁴⁶ One could even argue that the situation in Hong Kong is far better than in many metropolises inasmuch as its unemployment rate is much lower than in many places. On the other hand, the crisis developed quicker than in most other cities – and inequality has reached an unbearable level.

⁴⁷ For an analysis of the role public housing played in the economic development of Hong Kong, see Louis Augustin-Jean, ‘Urban Planning in Hong Kong and Integration with the Pearl River Delta: An Historical Account of the Local Development?‘ GeoJournal 62(1-2), (2005), p. 1-13.

⁴⁸ See, among others, Wong Hung, ‘Changes in Social Policy in Hong Kong since 1997: Old Wines in New Bottles?‘, in Lam Wai-man, Percy Lui Luen-tim, Wilson Wong, eds., Contemporary Hong Kong Government and Politics (expanded 2nd edition), (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), pp. 277-296, and Ian Scott, The Public Sector in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010).

⁴⁹ Leo Goodstadt, Poverty in the Midst of Affluence: How Hong Kong Mismanaged its Prosperity (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013), p. 90. This article cannot detail the evolution of the government's housing policy since 1997. The withdrawal was also due to the failure of the first CE, Tung Chee-hwa, to fulfill his promises to increase housing supply by an average of 85,000 units a year, of which 50,000 would be for the public sector. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 and the deterioration of Hong Kong's housing market, prompted him – a former businessman – to halt this proactive policy and give more leverage to the market.

⁵⁰ Hong Kong Housing Authority ‘Number of Applications and Average Waiting Time for Public Rental Housing’ (2015) (accessed 4 January 2016).

⁵¹ Naomi Ng and Xu Xinqi, ‘Waiting time for a Hong Kong public housing flat longest in 18 years: five years, three months’, South China Morning Post, (10 August 2018).

⁵² Naomi Ng, ‘More young, single and highly educated Hongkongers on waiting list for public housing, official figures show’, South China Morning Post, (7 December 2018).

⁵³ Liu Edith and Victor Chan Chun-Ho, ‘Housing Dream out of Reach’, Varsity 114, (2010), pp. 24-25.

⁵⁴ Edward Yiu Chung-yim ‘Hong Kong Monetary Policy and Housing Affordability’, Alternative Social Projects in the Context of the European Crisis and the Hong Kong Transformation, International Seminar, 29 November 2013, Department of Applied Social Sciences/ China-Europa Centre, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University.

⁵⁵ Pearl Liu, ‘Hong Kong tops the table as world's most expensive housing market for 9th straight year’, South China Morning Post (21 January 2019).

⁵⁶ See for example, Richard Wong Yue-chim, Hong Kong Land for Hong Kong People (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015), pp. 216-217.

⁵⁷ Alice Poon, Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong (2nd ed.), (Hong Kong: Enrich Professional Publishing, 2011).

⁵⁸ Suzanne Pepper, Keeping Democracy at Bay: Hong Kong and the Challenge of Chinese Political Reforms (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), p. 31.

⁵⁹ The system has changed several times. After 1997, “New leases of land shall be granted for a term of 50 years from the date of grant (…) at premium, and subject to payment from the date of grant of an annual rent equivalent to 3% of the rateable value of the property at that date, adjusted in step with any changes in the rateable value thereafter”. Before 1997, the leases were commonly for 75 or 99 years in urban areas. For more information, see Lands Department, ‘General Information. Land Tenure System and Land Policy in Hong Kong’, The Hong Kong Government, (2005) (accessed 27 October 2016).

⁶⁰ Alice Poon, Land and the Ruling Class, pp. 60-62.

⁶¹ Louis Augustin-Jean, ‘Urban Planning in Hong Kong…‘

⁶² Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004) p. 173.

⁶³ See Leo Goodstadt, Poverty in the Midst of Affluence: How Hong Kong Mismanaged its Prosperity (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013), p. 90. See also p. 38: ‘Tung's building programme had increased the annual output of public housing by 137 per cent between 1997 and 2000. By 2011, however, the annual supply had shrunk to a mere 17 per cent of the 2000 total. The drop in the public supply allowed private sector property prices to rise by 55 per cent between 2000 and 2011 although monthly household incomes remained firmly below the 1997 level in every year until 2011‘.

⁶⁴ From 2015/2016 to 2018/2019, land premium increased from 13.5 per cent to 26.6 percent of the total Government revenue, to which the Stamp Duties (which include sale and property transfer, as well as lease of property), has to be added. This later tax varied from 10.8 per cent to 16.5 per cent over the same period. The Stamp Duties alone yield more than the salaries tax. LegCo Secretariat, ‘Major Sources of Government Revenue’ ISSF03/17-18 (2018).

⁶⁵ Duan Ting, ‘HK to draw more mainland buyers’, China Daily, (10 March 2017) (accessed 11 July 2017).

⁶⁶ Cited by Alice Poon, Land and the Ruling Class, p. 24. This share has diminished over the last two years due to investments from Mainland companies, as seen above. However, that does not change much the mechanism for transferring resources from the public to developers and the government.

⁶⁷ Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 245.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 16.

⁶⁹ Mark Williams, ‘The Lion City and the Fragrant Harbour: the political economy of competition in Singapore and Hong Kong compared’, Antitrust Bulletin 54(3), (2009), pp. 547-548. Carrefour withdrew from Hong Kong after just four years. It was blacklisted by suppliers for selling prices below the minimum agreed re-sales prices.

⁷⁰ Alice Poon, Land and the Ruling Class, p. 89.

⁷¹ Patrick Ho Chi-Ping, ‘Monopolies must go if HK's economy is to thrive’, China Daily (Hong Kong Edition), (18 April 2012).

⁷² Lee Eddie, ‘Hong Kong Business Groups do not appear to be worried over the competition law's impact on their dealing with members’, South China Morning Post, (14 December 2015).

⁷³ Lau Siu-kai, ‘Confidence in Hong Kong's Capitalist Society in the Aftermath of the Asian Financial Turmoil’, Journal of Contemporary China 12(35), (2003), p. 384.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 382.

⁷⁵ Leo Goodstadt, Poverty in the Midst of Affluence: p. 140. Goodstadt has been the first head of the Central Policy Unit from 1989 to 1997. (The CPU has been recently reshaped and renamed by Carrie Lam).

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 142.

⁷⁷ Michelle Wong, ‘Why the Wealth Gap?‘.

⁷⁸ Hong Kong Transition Project 2010, ‘Protest and Post-80s Youth’, p. 59, Table 76.

⁷⁹ Sebastian Veg, ‘Legalistic and Utopian. Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement,‘ New Left Review 92, (2015), pp. 68-69.

⁸⁰ Stephan Ortmann, ‘The Umbrella Movement and Hong Kong's Protracted Democratization Process’, Asian Affairs, 46(1), (2016), p. 35.

⁸¹ For an analysis on this point at the global level, see Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2014).

⁸² That mainly consisted of two initiatives. The first was the construction of an artificial island, which could accommodate up to one million people. The project was heavily criticized due to its costs (HK$500 million) and the time it would require before the first homes would be available. The second involved a private-public partnership to develop some of the land banks owned by the developers.

⁸³ See Greg Torode and Venus Wu, ‘Hong Kong's underused military land a potential goldmine: but a minefield for government’, Reuters (20 December 2017). The authors mentioned that this military land occupies 2,700 hectares, mostly under-occupied; they added that Reuters contacted the Hong Kong government, as well as the task force on land supply sat up by Carrie Lam, but they only received general answers. Concerning the involvement of James Tien, see Alex Lo, ‘PLA land offers range of sites for housing’, South China Morning Post (3 July 2018).

⁸⁴ Phila Siu, ‘Hong Kong protesters on meeting their housing dreams: yes, thank you, but we want genuine universal suffrage too’, South China Morning Post, (7 December 2018)

⁸⁵ Ibid.