1 Translator/collaborator’s note: The basis of this article is a translation of the essay (with the current title) by Tanaka Kimiko, that appeared in 序局 108 (Sept, 2018). While interviews, research, and fieldwork (from August through December, 2018) allowed me to augment this article with further data, pictures, description, and historical contextualization, I sought to retain the first-person voice and main argument of Tanaka in the main text. All footnote citations are mine, as is the annotated bibliography For Further Research, and the Appendix. Inasmuch as this is co-authored, the members of the Ushiku no Kai as a whole should be credited, in particular Oh Tae-sung, who graciously provided data and pointed me to most of my cited sources. Appreciation also is due to Ellen Hammond, Tom Blackwood, Kirk Wattles and especially to Mark Selden for editorial suggestions. FYK and all the other anonymous Ushiku detainees who shared their stories, and more, have my deepest gratitude.

2 Ushiku no Kai (Ushiku Group) is short for the official name, Ushiku Nyūkan Shūyōjo Mondai wo Kangaeru kai (牛久入管収容所問題を考える会) that translates to Association Concerned with Issues at Ushiku Migrant Detention Center. See Appendix for more contact information.

3 See Appendix for a list of the organizations and churches that provide support to Ushiku Detention Center.

4 See also Japan Times, Mar 28, 2018.

5 This is the total held on any one day. The total number of different persons who were detained in a center at some point in 2017 was 13,400. Unless otherwise noted, the data was provided to Ushiku no Kai by the Ministry of Justice. The data in included within Ushiku no Kai’s annual reports for 2017 and 2018 (資料集: 年間活動報告会＆交流の集い)

6 See Asahi shinbun, “Jiyū seiyaku sare shōrai wo hikan” Sep 23, 2018 for a full account. The briefing that Tanaka gave to the press conference can be found on the Ushiku no Kai website.

7 See Oh Tae-sung (2017) 収容と仮放免が映し出す入管政策問題ー牛久収容所を事例に for statistics and comments on this. See also the APFS report on “Special Permission for Residence” which points out how many fewer permissions were given out after the 2003 policy of halving the number of illegal foreigners.

8 This type of clemency fluctuates over the years. See Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan, 176, and chapter 7, on this from the perspective of a decade ago, when it had gotten easier to attain.

9 Ohashi Takeshi, of the JLNR at his keynote address to the Annual Meeting of Ushiku no Kai on Dec. 16, 2018, made the point that in 20 years, he had not seen it so dire.

10 「檻なしの刑務所」 Quoted in Oh Tae-sang (2017). Garnered from a survey, this article includes many other salient quotes about the way provisional release can destroy lives. More international comparisons of parole systems are warranted.

11 See Chung (2010) for a discussion of the difficulties of naturalization in Japan, especially the multi-generational conundrum.

12 Wilsher (2012) sees a shift since the 1980s towards increased detention while Hamlin (2014) sees a turn from the end of the Cold War in 1989 towards increased forced deportations. It is beyond the scope of this article to go into questions of where Japan stands relative to other nations. In the hopes of forthcoming work of this nature, “For Further Research,” annotates studies discussing immigration control and detention outside of Japan.

13 Ministry of Justice, Immigration Control 2017, can be read against the grain for its doubletiered emphasis on ease of entry for high-level professionals, on the one hand, and constrictions on entry for guest workers, on the other.

14 There is no easy distinction between refugees and migrants See, for example, The Guardian, “Five Myths About the Refugee Crisis” (June 5, 2018) Morris-Suzuki also makes this fundamental point in Borderline Japan, 150-51.

15 The 1994 Prying Open the Door: Foreign Workers in Japan, Carnegie Endowment Publication, Contemporary Issues Paper no. 2, 52 and passim, is an excellent overview of the “vexatious” problems as they existed about 25 years ago.

16 Foreigners with any visa status, even those with family visa status or permanent residence, can have their status revoked. This is related to the dramatic slow-down in giving out the “special permit of residence” (see above).

17 My translation from the Japanese pamphlet.

18 On Oct. 31, 2018: Fukuoka (7) and Hiroshima (1) Takamatsu (1) while six other facilities had none.

19 Statistics from Ministry of Justice for October 31, 2018. Comparable numbers from October 23, 2017: Nagoya (208), Yokohama (87) Osaka (110), Omura (87) Tokyo (549) and Ushiku (324)

20 See Morris-Suzuki, (2008) “Migrants, Subjects, Citizens: Comparative Perspectives on Nationality in the Prewar Japanese Empire” APJ 6:8, Aug. 1.

21 See Morris-Suzuki, (2015) “Beyond Racism: Semi-Citizenship and Marginality in Modern Japan,” Japanese Studies, 35:1, 67-84

22 These numbers are necessarily rough and contested. Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan, 53, notes that 1.3 million of the 2 million Koreans in Japan left for Korea between the surrender and the end of 1945.

23 For an analysis that incorporates the effect of The Imperial Ordinance of Alien Registration, see Sarah Park (2016) “’Who are you?’ The Making of Korean ‘Illegal Migrants’ in Occupied Japan 1945-52” International Journal of Japanese Sociology no 25, 150-163.

24 Tanaka, in her original article upon which this is based, made an argument about the participation of Zainichi in the thwarted Feb 1, 1947 General Strike and the following May 1, 1952 strike, which I elide here.

25 See, for example, Hicks and Lie. See also Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan, 111-115, on the significance of the crucial separation between immigration and naturalization policies in Japan.

26 To augment Tanaka’s original argument, I relied on Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan, and, in Japanese Hyun Mooam 玄武岩(2013) コレアンネットワークメディア・移動の歴史と空間 Hokkaido University Press. Both cite helpful primary sources.

27 Sometimes referred to as “Hario Concentration Camp” in SCAP documents. See Morris-Suzuki, Borderline, 78, and passim.

28 Morris-Suzuki, Borderline, 154.

29 Morris-Suzuki, Borderline, 100-111, discusses the American Cold War influence on this reorganization and stresses how at this time it was first centralized into one agency. I note thats “Japanese Schlindler,” Sugihara Chiune, could only save 6,000 Jews with exit visas for transit through Japan from Lithuania because he was in the Foreign Ministry.

30 Tanaka, in her original article, emphasized the massacre of thousands on the island of Jeju, survivors of which made up a majority of those who returned to Japan.

31 This crackdown was a continuation of earlier operations run by the occupying forces. See Chapter 3 in Morris-Suzuki, Borderline.

32 Morris-Suzuki, Borderline, 154, states the number at 7,000 (including fire brigade members) citing Hōmusho Nyūkosha Shūyojo, Ōmura Nyūkosha Shūyojo.

33 The story is complicated, but the two groups were known as Mindan and Chōren then Sōren (the former associated with South Korea and the latter with North Korea). See Morris-Suzuki, Borderline, 100-101, 160-161, and passim.

34 There was even a song written of Omura. Morris-Suzuki, Borderline, 160.

35 See Morris-Suzuki, Borderline, 156-161, chapter 8.

36 The Hamamatsu riot is described in detail in Morris-Suzuki, Borderline, 195-197.

37 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017, p 45.

38 See, for example, USA for UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency: Refugee Facts (accessed 2/14/19). The number of displaced people at the end of 2017 was 68.5 million and it has continued to rise. This is the highest recorded level. The estimated displaced of people in 1945 was 40 million, with a smaller world population.

39 This is known as 難民申請中の特定ビザ.

40 According the Japan Times March 14, 2018, “JLNR and UNHCR data shows that just 36 out of 6025 resident Kurds have been granted “special residency status.”

41 Dec. 3 visitation.

42 Given that there is no dearth of examples of other nations with harsh immigration controls (in the media as in scholarship), further consideration of Japan within the current global state of affairs is merited.

43 This “Mandate Refugee” system is cited, for example, in the documentary. (Thanks to Tom Blackwood for this reference.)

44 Lawyers receive a minimal fee from their associations to work pro bono for detainees.

45 Bosworth (2014) reveals how much easier detainee communication to the outside world is in British deportation centers. I am also struck by how the cartoonist who goes by the pseudonym Eaten Fish and the writer Behrouz Boochani garnered international attention and acclaim by means of web and cell phone while detained by Australia, something impossible to achieve in Japan.

46 See here.

47 The phrase 使い捨て労働力 was repeated in the Asahi newspaper. Quoted in The Washington Post, Nov 21, 2018 “Japan wakes up to the exploitation of foreign workers as an immigration debate rages.”

48 This paragraph is taken from Tanaka’s forthcoming article in 労働運動.