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Cato, Caesar, and the Germani*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 November 2015

Kit Morrell
Kit Morrell*
Affiliation:
The University of Sydneykit.morrell@sydney.edu.au
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Abstract

In 55 BC, Caesar massacred reportedly 400,000 Usipetes and Tencteri. When a supplicatio was proposed in the senate, M. Cato moved instead that Caesar should be surrendered to the enemy. This paper offers a technical analysis of an episode which, while well known, has not always been well understood. What Cato proposed was deditio (surrender) on the grounds that Caesar had committed a breach of fides (breach of truce and/or mistreatment of ambassadors) and thus an offence against the gods. Deditio was a means of expiation, so that Caesar alone should suffer for his crime, as in the famous case of C. Hostilius Mancinus in 136. Cato’s motivations were obviously political, but the technical and religious nature of his allegations meant they could not be ignored. Caesar, I argue, felt obliged to respond, and does so in BG 4 within particular constraints imposed by the nature of fides and deditio.

Type
Research Article
Information
Antichthon , Volume 49 , November 2015 , pp. 73 - 93
Copyright
© The Australasian Society for Classical Studies 2015 

Cato’s proposal in 55 BC to surrender Caesar to the German tribes has been described as ‘too well-known to need recounting’Footnote 1 and often receives no more than a footnote in modern accounts.Footnote 2 As a result, it has not been given the attention it deserves or even fully understood,Footnote 3 despite the fact that most scholars – including Caesar’s admirer MommsenFootnote 4 – acknowledge the justice of Cato’s complaint. This paper re-examines the episode on a technical footing. It may have been political animosity and moral outrage at the massacre of so many Usipetes and Tencteri that prompted Cato’s action, but it was the technical and religious nature of his allegations that meant they could not be ignored. What Cato proposed was the deditio (surrender) of Caesar on the grounds that he had committed a breach of faith, whether breach of truce and/or mistreatment of ambassadors (or similar). To illuminate this, I explore the nature of deditio and its connection with fides publica; its function, I suggest, was both religious and ethical. Next, I argue that Caesar’s account of his dealings with the Usipetes and Tencteri (BG 4.7-15) responds directly to Cato’s allegations, and does so within particular constraints imposed by the nature of deditio. While Cato’s proposal was obviously political, the fact that Caesar felt compelled to respond suggests it should not be dismissed simply as Catonian histrionics.

I

The background to this episode is the ‘German war’ narrated in Book 4 of Caesar’s Gallic Wars, which ended (as Caesar frankly records) in a massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri after their leaders had been detained in Caesar’s camp. The fullest account of the aftermath in Rome is in Plutarch’s Cato Minor (51.1-2), although mistakenly placed after Cato’s consular campaign in 52:Footnote 5

. . . Γερμανοῖς δὲ καὶ σπονδῶν γενομένων δοκοῦντος ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ καταβαλεῖν τριάκοντα μυριάδας, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὸν δῆμον ἠξίουν εὐαγγέλια θύειν, ὁ δὲ Κάτων ἐκέλευεν ἐκδιδόναι τὸν Καίσαρα τοῖς παρανομηθεῖσι, καὶ μὴ τρέπειν εἰς αὑτοὺς μηδ' ἀναδέχεσθαι τὸ ἄγος εἰς τὴν πόλιν. (2) ‘οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς’ ἔφη ‘θύωμεν, ὅτι τῆς τοῦ στρατηγοῦ μανίας καὶ ἀπονοίας τὴν δίκην εἰς τοὺς στρατιώτας οὐ τρέπουσιν, ἀλλὰ φείδονται τῆς πόλεως.’

. . . when it was believed that [Caesar] had attacked the Germani while a truce was in place and killed 300,000, the rest thought it appropriate that the people should offer sacrifices for good tidings, but Cato urged them to surrender Caesar to those he had wronged, and not turn upon themselves or allow the city to suffer the pollution. ‘But indeed let us sacrifice to the gods,’ he said, ‘because they are not turning the penalty for the general’s frenzy and madness upon the soldiers, but are sparing the city.’

The corresponding account in the Life of Caesar (22.4), where it is correctly placed in 55, makes clear that this debate occurred in the senate. The story is found also in the comparatio of Nicias and Crassus (4.3) and in Appian’s Celtica (18). Suetonius’ notice confirms that what was proposed was deditio.Footnote 6 Suetonius does not name Cato, but nonnulli suggests that he had some support, if only from his own circle. The ultimate source for Plutarch’s and Appian’s accounts, and probably Suetonius’ as well, is Tanusius Geminus,Footnote 7 a contemporary of Cato and Caesar, and possibly an eye-witness to the debate in the senate.Footnote 8 He appears to have treated Cato’s proposal and its aftermath in some detail, and in a manner highly critical of Caesar,Footnote 9 but there is no reason to doubt the basic outline of what must have been a well-known episode.Footnote 10

Deditio, in this context, was the surrender of a Roman citizen to an enemy who had been wronged. It was a religious rather than a legal process, involving a vote by the senate and a decision by the fetial priests, who would then deliver the guilty party to the enemy bound in chains.Footnote 11 The wrong in question was a breach of fides. We hear of deditio carried out for violation of treaties, truces, and the rights of ambassadors, all of which were founded on good faith.Footnote 12 Two of five Roman stories in Valerius Maximus’ chapter De Fide Publica concern deditio (6.6.3, 5). The connection between deditio and fides is reflected also in the jurisdiction of the fetials: Varro calls them guardians of fides publica in international relations.Footnote 13

The basis of Cato’s proposal in 55 was that Caesar had committed a breach of fides against the Usipetes and Tencteri. The exact nature of the alleged breach is less clear.Footnote 14 Plutarch (Cat. Min. 51.1) says explicitly that Caesar was thought to have attacked while a truce was in place (σπονδῶν γενομένων); elsewhere he uses παρασπόνδημα,Footnote 15 which can mean either breach of truce or breach of faith more generally.Footnote 16 Appian refers to ‘an unholy deed against those who had sent ambassadors’.Footnote 17 In addition, Caesar’s account suggests that he was accused of violating the ius legatorum.Footnote 18 On balance, it seems likely that Cato made a variety of allegations against Caesar,Footnote 19 including mistreating ambassadors and attacking during a truce, or at any rate during negotiations, to which similar rules applied.Footnote 20 Any of the above amounted to a breach of fides and thus grounds for deditio.Footnote 21

The purpose of deditio was to spare the city from divine punishment for the wrong by surrendering the individual responsible.Footnote 22 Thus Livy’s fetial says to the Samnites, in the aftermath of the Caudine Forks disaster, ‘I surrender these men to you, that the Roman people may be freed from an impious crime,’Footnote 23 namely, repudiation of treaty arrangements which had been made without authorisation. Cicero states the same principle in the pro Caecina, delivered about fifteen years before Cato’s proposal: ut religione civitas solvatur, civis Romanus deditur.Footnote 24 In other words, deditio is fundamentally religious: the wrong in question, while committed against an enemy, was an offence against the gods, and it is the gods’ wrath that is to be averted. The process is expiatory or purgative rather than punitive.Footnote 25 Actions that were grounds for deditio might also be grounds for legal proceedings, but the two are conceptually distinct and – importantly, in Caesar’s case – the defences available in a criminal court did not apply within the religious framework of deditio.Footnote 26

Cato appears to have made much of the religious aspect.Footnote 27 According to Plutarch, Cato ‘declared his opinion that Caesar must be surrendered to the barbarians, thus purging the city of pollution for the breach of faith and turning the curse upon the guilty man.’Footnote 28 Indeed, Plutarch reports that Cato proposed an alternative supplicatio ‘because [the gods] are not turning the penalty for the general’s frenzy and madness upon the soldiers, but are sparing the city.’Footnote 29 The use of the present tense is significant: Romans were traditionally wary of ‘delayed’ punishment.Footnote 30 A breach of fides created the threat of future harm to Rome; deditio (like an ‘expiatory’ supplicatio) was a means of averting that harm. Thus, while Caesar might claim his victories as evidence of the gods’ approval,Footnote 31 at the same time it was no obstacle to Cato’s proposal that he had, so far, enjoyed only success. Indeed, Caesar used the same argument elsewhere, telling Divico in Book 1 of the Gallic War that ‘the immortal gods are accustomed to grant those they wish to punish for their wickedness a more favourable state of affairs in the meantime and a lengthy impunity, that they may suffer more gravely from their change of circumstances.’Footnote 32

A useful illustration of the nature of deditio is the famous case of C. Hostilius Mancinus (cos. 137) in 136. Mancinus was actually handed over to the Numantines after the senate refused to endorse an unfavourable treaty he had made. Although the treaty was not technically binding on Rome, as it had not been ratified, nonetheless Mancinus had created an obligation, the breach of which would be a breach of fides and an offence against the gods.Footnote 33 Therefore, to avoid both the treaty obligations and divine punishment, Mancinus was offered up essentially as a scapegoat for the Roman state.Footnote 34

Mancinus’ failure in Numantia was itself an example of delayed divine punishment for breach of fides. Its roots lay in the treaty made by Q. Pompeius (cos. 141) a few years earlier, which the senate had disregarded.Footnote 35 As Rosenstein shows, Mancinus argued that his defeat was the result of divine anger over the earlier neglect of Pompeius’ treaty.Footnote 36 Reports of adverse omens accompanying Mancinus’ departure for Spain were perhaps invented by Mancinus’ supporters after the fact to support their argument.Footnote 37 At any rate, the senate accepted this interpretation and in 136 bills were proposed for the deditio of Pompeius as well as Mancinus and his officers:Footnote 38 Pompeius to atone for the earlier wrong and Mancinus as a preventive measure.

II

Cases like Pompeius’ and Mancinus’ were solid precedents for Cato’s proposal.Footnote 39 Eighty years had passed since Mancinus was conducted to Numantia in chains, but the affair was well known – it is mentioned in Cicero’s de oratore, written the year that Cato made his proposal,Footnote 40 and Mancinus himself had commissioned a statue commemorating his surrender.Footnote 41 Other evidence shows general awareness in the late Republic of deditio as an appropriate remedy when Romans mistreated foreigners,Footnote 42 and it is possible there were more recent examples. The Digest records a responsum of Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 95) concerning the deditio of persons who had mistreated ambassadors.Footnote 43 Indeed, there is evidence that deditio had been discussed in the senate very shortly before Cato made his proposal. Gelzer adduces the important evidence of Cicero’s in Pisonem, delivered a few months earlier.Footnote 44 In the speech, Cicero charged Caesar’s father-in-law, L. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 58), with crimes similar to those Cato subsequently alleged against Caesar, including the mistreatment of foreigners and nefarium bellum.Footnote 45 In Piso’s case, Cicero could already point to the consequences: he describes the plague which had afflicted Piso’s army as divine retribution for the general’s actions.

This passage should be read with Cicero’s comments on Piso in de haruspicum responso, delivered in 56.Footnote 46 The haruspices had attributed an ominous rumbling noise to various misdeeds, including the murder of ambassadors.Footnote 47 This was likely an allusion to the murder of the Alexandrian ambassadors who had come to Rome to oppose the restoration of Ptolemy Auletes,Footnote 48 but Cicero asserts that Piso, too, ‘had polluted the name of the Roman people with so great an evil that it cannot be expiated other than by the sacrifice (supplicium) of the perpetrator’.Footnote 49 He is referring to the death of the Macedonian ambassador Plator, reportedly murdered on Piso’s orders. Supplicium here might suggest deditio, while the rumbling sound hinted at divine punishment if Rome failed to act. Cicero’s comments were politically motivated,Footnote 50 and he did not go so far as actually to propose deditio, but his line of attack shows that the ius legatorum (and its divine sanctions) had political cache around the time of Cato’s proposal.

I am not suggesting there was any real likelihood that the senate would have voted to surrender a victorious general to the enemy. Cicero attests Cato’s propensity for extreme but ultimately fruitless pronouncements,Footnote 51 and this one probably went no further than his own sententia.Footnote 52 Yet, closer consideration suggests that he had identified a weak spot and attacked it through an accepted and well-precedented avenue, the religious and technical nature of which made it potentially more dangerous to Caesar than conventional criminal or political allegations. Perhaps Cato thought it was worth a try, though more likely his strategy was to draw critical attention to Caesar’s activities – that is, his methods as well as his achievements – with a view to a future trial.Footnote 53 Cato repeatedly threatened to prosecute Caesar as soon as he laid down his imperium, probably for maiestas.Footnote 54 It is worth reiterating, however, that deditio was a completely separate institution, religious rather than legal and not dependent on the decision of a court (or vice versa). That the deditio proposal in itself was a blow to Caesar’s dignitas is suggested by his response: a letter to the senate, denouncing Cato in terms of the highest invective.Footnote 55 Moreover, Plutarch observes that Crassus’ Parthian war would have been judged very differently if he had enjoyed Caesar’s success.Footnote 56 Cato’s proposal, too, might have been received differently if Caesar had failed in Gaul.Footnote 57 Indeed, it is likely Caesar came under greater pressure to justify his actions following Ambiorix’s revolt in 54-3.Footnote 58

Cato might also have hoped to produce a reaction among Caesar’s subordinates.Footnote 59 Caesar himself reports the difficulty he experienced in 58 when his officers spread fear and disobedience among the soldiers.Footnote 60 According to Dio, the officers were motivated not only by fear of the enemy, but by their concern ‘that they were undertaking a war neither proper nor authorised on account of Caesar’s personal ambition’.Footnote 61 Caesar does not mention this aspect explicitly, but his speech to the centurions in Book 1 seems to confirm the existence of moral unease about the war they were fighting.Footnote 62 It is likely these misgivings were stirred up by Caesar’s opponents in Rome, Cato among them.Footnote 63 Indeed, a little further on, Caesar suggests that the ‘nobiles and principes of the Roman people’ were actually in league with Ariovistus.Footnote 64 Although on this occasion Caesar was able to reassure his soldiers (BG 1.41.1), presumably the potential for trouble remained if he were thought to have acted criminally.

Even viewed as a political stunt, however, Cato’s proposal tells us something about the standards of conduct to which Caesar had to be seen to measure up. Such an attack could only be made with reference to communally agreed principles – here, the ethics of war and the framework of state religion.Footnote 65 In cases like those of Mancinus and of Sp. Postumius in 321, deditio was employed as a means of avoiding treaty obligations;Footnote 66 however, the institution was supposed to uphold moral standards. Cicero says in de officiis that the ius fetiale and many other laws common to all nations regulate dealings with enemies. ‘Were this not so,’ he adds, ‘the senate would never have delivered up illustrious men in chains to the enemy.’Footnote 67 In other words, a ‘code of conduct’ governed Roman dealings with foreigners,Footnote 68 and deditio was the guarantee of that code. Cato’s proposal should be understood in this light. His religious argument was perhaps somewhat cynically adopted,Footnote 69 but the same need not apply to the principles behind it. Throughout his career, Cato championed the cause of ethical conduct towards enemies and allies.Footnote 70 By proposing in the senate that Caesar should be handed over to the enemy, he drew critical attention to the practice of Roman imperialism.Footnote 71 To this end, his proposal was probably more effective for its sensationalism.

III

The best indicator of the seriousness of Cato’s charges is Caesar’s own account of his dealings with the Usipetes and Tencteri in Book 4 of the Gallic War. The book ends with a notice of the twenty-day supplication decreed by the senate his rebus gestis.Footnote 72 If the commentaries were published in instalments, as seems most probable,Footnote 73 it will have been written and circulated not long afterwards. Moreover, Cicero attests frequent dispatches and messengers from Caesar publicising his achievements in Rome, so it is likely that Caesar’s version of events was disseminated promptly in one form or another.Footnote 74 Certainly his defensive tone in this part of Book 4 suggests a more-or-less immediate response to criticism of his actions. Even if written later, however, I argue that Caesar is (in part) responding specifically to Cato’s charges in 55.Footnote 75

Though often remarked upon for its frankness, scholars have noted apologetic tendencies in the Gallic War, and Book 4 has attracted considerable attention in this regard.Footnote 76 Here I focus specifically on what I take to be Caesar’s response to the deditio proposal, as opposed to the justification of the ‘German war’ more generally,Footnote 77 or his ‘defence in advance’ against any future legal challenge.Footnote 78Deditio required special treatment, since the sort of defence that was available against criminal charges – that he had acted out of necessity or rei publicae causa Footnote 79 – did not apply against the religious offence constituted by a breach of fides. One could hardly bring divine vengeance upon the state for the sake of the state! Thus Caesar’s statements about the unreliability of the Gauls and the need for swift action are not strictly relevant.Footnote 80 Instead, he was obliged to refute Cato’s allegations on the facts, and that, I think, accounts for the vagueness and literary sleight of hand detectable at points in Book 4.Footnote 81 Naturally Caesar could not hope to change Cato’s mind, but his response might well have persuaded senators not firmly committed either to himself or to Cato.Footnote 82

First, breach of truce:Footnote 83 since our evidence is essentially Caesar’s word against Cato’s, it is useful to compare Book 4 with Caesar’s earlier account of the conference with Ariovistus. In Book 1 Caesar describes in detail the exchange of ambassadors (legati), the negotiations for a conference (conloquium), the conditions agreed upon to ensure the leaders’ safety, and Ariovistus’ abuse of the conloquium to attack the Roman troops (1.34-5, 42-6). Caesar does not precisely say that Ariovistus had violated the agreement, but he draws a pointed contrast with his own good faith, explaining that he ordered his men not to retaliate, so the enemy could not claim that they had been entrapped per fidem in conloquio (1.46.3).

In Book 4, by contrast, Caesar seems deliberately vague about what was actually agreed.Footnote 84 At the initial meeting (4.9), the German envoys request a delay (mora) in hostilities.Footnote 85 Caesar replies that he cannot grant the request.Footnote 86 When the envoys return, they again ask Caesar not to proceed further and, when he refuses, they ask that he instruct his cavalry not to open hostilities (4.11.1-3). They also request an interval (spatium) of three days in which to send an embassy to the Ubii (4.11.3) – that is, a truce (indutiae), as Caesar makes clear in the following chapter.Footnote 87 Caesar states that the envoys’ real intention was to stall until their cavalry could return, but nonetheless ‘he said that he would proceed no further than four miles that day in search of water’Footnote 88 and sent messengers to instruct his cavalry not to provoke the enemy.Footnote 89 Finally, when the German leaders come to his camp after the cavalry engagement, Caesar says they proposed to excuse themselves for starting a battle ‘in contravention of what had been said and what they themselves had requested’ (contra atque esset dictum et ipsi petissent: 4.13.5).

Reading between the lines, these passages strongly suggest that Caesar had agreed to a truce. Plutarch thought so,Footnote 90 and the complacency of the Roman forces at the time of the cavalry engagement strengthens that conclusion.Footnote 91 Caesar, however, obscures both the existence and the nature of the agreement, despite the fact that he accuses the enemy of breaking it. Breach of truce was a serious allegation which we would expect Caesar to exploit in an account which consistently stresses the faithlessness of the enemy.Footnote 92 His failure to do so, eschewing the precision of Book 1 in favour of vague passive formulations like ‘what was said’ and ‘what had been sought’,Footnote 93 casts doubt on his own fides. After all, we have only Caesar’s word that it was the Germani who attacked first.Footnote 94 Cato, for one, thought otherwise, and probably with good reason: according to Caesar, the Germani attacked with just 800 cavalry against a Roman force of 5,000.Footnote 95 Moreover, if there had been a truce, which the enemy had broken, why not say so plainly – unless the latter point were in doubt?

The way Caesar handles the question of ambassadors is still more striking. Up until the cavalry battle, Caesar repeatedly refers to the German envoys as legati.Footnote 96 Subsequently, however, he denies them the status and even the name of ambassadors. Caesar signals this to the reader (but not to the enemyFootnote 97) when he writes that ‘he decided that neither should he now give audience to legati nor accept terms from those who, by deceit and snares, had sought peace, then made war unprovoked.’Footnote 98 This seems to mean that Caesar would not regard any Germani who subsequently came to him as legitimate ambassadors. Accordingly, the German leaders and elders who arrive next in Caesar’s camp are referred to not as legati but only as Germani frequentes, ‘a throng of Germani’.Footnote 99 Indeed, Caesar says that he had already decided to fight before they arrived.Footnote 100

The Germani were unarmed – Caesar would say so, if otherwiseFootnote 101 – and they surely would not have walked into Caesar’s camp unless they believed they were being received as ambassadors. Further, Caesar writes that they employed the same methods as before.Footnote 102 The natural conclusion is that these Germani, too, were ambassadors in everything but the name Caesar gives to them, and ought to have been inviolable, even if their motives were suspect. Again, it is useful to compare Book 1, where Ariovistus’ ambassadors remain legati, even after Ariovistus violated the conloquium.Footnote 103 Caesar refuses another conference on this basis, but he continues to refer to the messengers as legati and treats them as such. In Book 4, however, Caesar denies the Germani both the name and the rights of legati and detains them in his campFootnote 104 – which, according to Caesar himself, was a violation of the ius legatorum warranting the most serious punishment.Footnote 105

Another instructive comparison comes from Book 3, where Caesar turns his officers into ambassadors by an inverse manipulation of language.Footnote 106 The prefects and military tribunes of 3.7.3 appear, once detained by the Veneti, as inviolable legati.Footnote 107 The purpose, as Ando observes, is to justify Caesar’s treatment of the Veneti: he executed their senate and sold the rest into slavery as exemplary punishment, he says, for violation of the ius legatorum.Footnote 108 Caesar’s hypocrisy is not hard to spot; indeed, Powell suggests that Cato might have been turning Caesar’s own arguments against him in 55.Footnote 109

Not only does Caesar’s recasting of the German ambassadors in Book 4 strain credibility; in fact, the Germani frequentes came at his request. In chapter 11 Caesar instructs the Germani ‘to assemble the following day in full strength (frequentissimi), that he might learn what they were requesting’.Footnote 110 Some scholars have taken this to mean that Caesar was laying a trap.Footnote 111 At any rate, it was the following day (4.13.4) that the German leaders came to his camp, where he promptly had them detained. According to Dio, he did so by means of a further deceit.Footnote 112Neque iam sibi legatos audiendos (4.13.1), then, might refer not to any legati but specifically those legati whom Caesar had told to come to him.Footnote 113 Caesar claimed that the intervening cavalry attack justified his change of heart, but that was no excuse against a premeditated trap. If that is what it was, Caesar was guilty of bad faith at least as heinous as he alleges against the enemy.

What follows has the ring of a plan well executed: ‘Delighted they had come into his path (quos sibi Caesar oblatos gavisus), Caesar ordered them to be detained.’Footnote 114 Scholars have remarked on the extraordinary word gavisus.Footnote 115Offero is intriguing too: though not explicitly reflexive, it suggests that the Germani had, in a sense, offered themselves to Caesar.Footnote 116 In any case, he took full advantage of this ‘most convenient’ turn of events.Footnote 117 He massacred reportedly 400,000 or more of the enemy without losing one of this own men,Footnote 118 largely thanks to the absence of the leaders he had detained, as Caesar himself tells us (4.14.2). Yet he contrives that ‘[his] clementia has the last word’:Footnote 119 he freed those he had detained (his Caesar libertatem concessit: 4.15.5), but they chose to remain with him, out of fear of the Gauls.

IV

Caesar’s fides is doubtful at best. Perhaps for this reason, he emphasises the bad faith of the enemy, repeatedly and in powerful language: dolus, insidiae, perfidia, simulatio. He insists that they only requested a truce by way of a ploy (4.9, 11, 13) and were responsible for opening hostilities (4.12). Conveniently, we have only Caesar’s word for what the Germani thought or Caesar knew. But, even if we accept it, did bad faith on the part of the enemy excuse Caesar’s conduct?

Cicero’s de officiis indicates that there was some debate on this question.Footnote 120 The better view, however, was that a Roman acted in good faith irrespective of the fides of the enemy. That is the point of Valerius Maximus’ account of the deditio of L. Minucius and L. Manlius.Footnote 121 Similarly, Livy has Scipio declare that ‘although not only the fides of the truce but even the ius gentium with respect to ambassadors had been violated by the Carthaginians, he would take no steps against them unworthy of the institutions of the Roman people and his own mores.’Footnote 122 Appian makes the same point when he writes that Galba in Spain in 150 ‘was avenging bad faith with bad faith in a manner not worthy of Romans but imitating barbarians.’Footnote 123 In other words, traditional morality expected a Roman to show fides towards enemies, even if they acted in bad faith. That is what we would expect in view of the religious aspect of fides, and Cicero confirms that the principle held good in the late Republic.Footnote 124

Of course, that did not mean Caesar was obliged to observe a truce once it was broken,Footnote 125 but neither did (alleged) bad faith by the enemy entitle him to use the same sort of snares or to disregard the ius legatorum. In accounting for his treatment of the Usipetes and Tencteri, however, Caesar implies that a breach of faith by the enemy nullified the usual obligations of fides. He could not and does not claim that fides was unimportant – indeed, fides (or lack thereof) is central to Caesar’s presentation of the Germani – but rather that there was no duty of fides to the enemy in this case,Footnote 126 hence no breach and no grounds for deditio. In so doing, he is modifying the traditional moral code in favour of what Riggsby calls ‘the common moral logic of tit-for-tat’.Footnote 127 This technique stands in contrast to the overall programme of the work, where, as Riggsby argues, Caesar appeals to conventional standards of just war and the good general.Footnote 128 I submit that Caesar’s alternative logic in Book 4 should be seen as part of his response to Cato: as well as disputing Cato’s allegations on the facts, Caesar is actually rewriting the rules of fides.

Conclusion

Deditio, with its religious implications, was an acute choice of instrument. No one was really going to surrender Caesar to the enemy, yet he could not afford to ignore Cato’s challenge. Neither was invective an adequate response, nor military expediency, nor even the conventional rhetoric of just war; he had to answer Cato’s allegations on their own terms. In attempting to do so, Caesar is reduced to obfuscation and even to deformation of the accepted principles of fides publica. This layering of multiple strategies of justification reveals Caesar under pressure to explain his actions. Of course, the senate had voted not surrender but a supplication of unprecedented length, and probably most contemporaries were little interested in the justification of events that produced Roman victory.Footnote 129 Still, Cato’s protest was not without effect. He could not help the unfortunate Germani, but his actions in 55, as at other points in his career, served to keep the ethics of imperialism in the spotlight. Caesar’s careful response, even after the supplicatio had been voted, is a measure of Cato’s success.

Footnotes

*

This paper was originally presented at the conference of the Australasian Society for Classical Studies in Melbourne, 2012. I am grateful to Luca Grillo, Sarah Lawrence, Sascha Morrell, Martin Stone and Kathryn Welch for commenting on written versions, and to Antichthon’s anonymous readers for their useful suggestions. The text of Caesar used throughout is Seel’s 1961 Teubner edition. All translations are my own.

1 Lee (Reference Lee1969) 100. Cf. e.g. Brennan (2009) 180; Morstein-Marx (Reference Morstein-Marx2007) 161.

2 For instance, neither Collins (Reference Collins1972) nor Riggsby (Reference Riggsby2006) mentions Cato’s proposal, while CAH 2 does so only in a footnote (Wiseman [Reference Wiseman1992] 400 n. 118). Rambaud (Reference Rambaud1966) 118-22, Szidat (Reference Szidat1970) 61-5, and Kremer (Reference Kremer1994) 172-5 are primarily interested in Caesar’s self-justification, and Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 3.494 in Tanusius’ account. Among the few scholars to consider Cato’s proposal in any depth are Gelzer (Reference Gelzer1961) 46-53 and Fehrle (Reference Fehrle1983) 175-80, who rightly emphasise that it should not be dismissed as an empty ploy, though neither offers a corresponding analysis of Caesar’s response.

3 E.g. see n. 21 on the lack of consensus regarding the basis of Cato’s proposal.

4 Mommsen (Reference Mommsen1871) 310, 379.

5 Cf. Pelling (Reference Pelling1980) 127-8; Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 3.494.

6 Suet. Iul. 24.3: nonnulli dedendum eum hostibus censuerint (‘Some moved that he [Caesar] be surrendered to the enemy’). See below on the process.

7 Both Plutarch (Caes. 22.4) and Appian (Celt. 18) cite Tanusius, and Suetonius is known to have used him (Iul. 9.2). See Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 1.293-4, 3.494, with further references. Gelzer (Reference Gelzer1961) suggests that Plutarch incorporated additional material from Munatius Rufus. Cf. Ferhle (1983) app. 1.

8 Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 1.391-3. Münzer (Reference Münzer1932) 2231 suggested that Tanusius was a senator.

9 Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 1.391-4, 3.494.

10 Drummond (in Cornell [Reference Cornell2013] 1.394) pronounces Tanusius ‘a peculiarly uncritical historian’, but Cato’s proposal was made in the senate, before many witnesses, and presumably was recorded in other histories, if not the acta senatus (Cornell [Reference Cornell2013] 1.393; Gelzer [Reference Gelzer1961] 48). The variation in the later sources regarding the nature of Caesar’s breach of faith probably reflects the fact that Cato made a number of allegations (see below).

11 For the process, see Liv. 9.8-10; Cic. de or. 1.181; Broughton (Reference Broughton1987) 50-62; Rich (Reference Rich2011) 196-9; cf. e.g. Val. Max. 6.6.3, 6.6.5. As Rich notes, it is surely accidental that the fetials go unmentioned in some sources (e.g. Vell. 2.1.5; App. Hisp. 83). Both Varro (cited in Non. Marc. 850L) and Cic. leg. 2.21 refer explicitly to the jurisdiction of the fetials in such matters (cf. Dion. Hal. 2.75.2). Possibly, then, what Cato proposed, formally, was that the senate should refer the matter to the fetial priests. In Mancinus’ case (see below), a law was also passed, ex s.c. and supported by Mancinus himself (Cic. rep. 3.28, off. 3.109).

12 Cf. Gruen (Reference Gruen1982) 68.

13 Varro LL 5.86: fetiales, quod fidei publicae inter populos praeerant. Cf. Cic. off. 3.108. On the fetials, see, recently, Santangelo (Reference Santangelo2008) and Rich (Reference Rich2011), with bibliography.

14 Cf. Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 3.494; Szidat (Reference Szidat1970) 67.

15 Plut. comp. Nic. et Crass. 4.3; Caes. 22.4.

16 See Wheeler (Reference Wheeler1988) 46.

17 App. Celt. 18: ὡς ἐναγὲς ἔργον ἐς διαπρεσβευσαμένους ἐργασάμενον.

18 See below.

19 Cf. Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 3.494, suggesting comparison with Cicero’s attack on L. Calpurnius Piso (Pis. 84-5; prov. cons. 4-5).

20 Caesar himself attests that attacking during a conloquium, like attacking during a truce, amounted to a breach of the accepted rules of war (BC 1.85.3; cf. 1.46.5).

21 Most scholars identify Caesar’s alleged wrong as breach of truce, breach of fides, violation of the rights of ambassadors, or some combination of these. See e.g. Radin (Reference Radin1916) 25; Szidat (Reference Szidat1970) 67 n. 315; Collins (Reference Collins1972) 234; Brunt (Reference Brunt1978) 182; Fehrle (Reference Fehrle1983) 177-8; Broughton (Reference Broughton1987) 53; Lieberg (Reference Lieberg2006) 421; Ando (Reference Ando2008) 497 n. 16; Santangelo (Reference Santangelo2008) 80; Brennan (2009) 180; Ramsey (Reference Ramsey2009) 45; Pelling (Reference Pelling2011) 252; Rich (Reference Rich2011) 199; Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 3.494. Compare Michel (Reference Michel1980) 677-8, who thinks the basis of Cato’s proposal was that Caesar had made war without authorisation; Cato probably did make such an allegation (see below), which could have formed the basis of maiestas or repetundae charges (Cic. Pis. 50), but it was not grounds for deditio. Similarly, the mass killing of the Usipetes and Tencteri likely added pathos to Cato’s attack (cf. Rice Holmes [Reference Rice Holmes1911] 99) but was not in itself cause for religious or legal proceedings, or indeed a breach of ius gentium as the Romans understood it. Cf. Szidat (Reference Szidat1970) 67, who emphasises that Caesar was criticised not so much for his military proceedings as his treatment of the German ambassadors.

22 Cf. Rich (Reference Rich2011) 197.

23 Liv. 9.10.9: ob eam rem quo populus Romanus scelere impio sit solutus hosce homines uobis dedo. Cf. Broughton (Reference Broughton1987) 54 n. 10; Ando (Reference Ando2008) 498 n. 19. On the question of historicity (or otherwise), see e.g. Crawford (Reference Crawford1973); Rich (Reference Rich2011) 196-7.

24 Cic. Caec. 98 (‘to free the city from religious pollution, a citizen is surrendered’); see Lintott (Reference Lintott2008) 80 on the date. Religio is difficult to translate (see e.g. Muth [Reference Muth1978] esp. 349), but here means something like pollution or impediment of a supernatural nature (cf. OLD s.v. religio). The effect of religio was very strong. By way of illustration, the one point on which all parties agreed during the debate over Ptolemy Auletes in 56 was that, on account of the religio (the Sibylline prophecy), he could not be restored with an army – even though Cicero, and evidently others, considered the prophecy a sham: Cic. fam. 1.1.3 (SB 12), 1.2.1 (SB 13), 1.4.2 (SB 14); Q. fr. 2.2.3 (SB 6); cf Siani-Davies (Reference Siani-Davies2001) 24-5, 31-2, 121.

25 For this reason, translating deditio as ‘extradition’ (as e.g. Michel [Reference Michel1980]) confuses the point somewhat, since the modern function of extradition is to facilitate trial in a different jurisdiction.

26 See below.

27 The political use of religion was typical of Cato’s circle; note e.g. Bibulus’ sky-watching in 59 (Cic. dom. 39; har. resp. 48; Suet. Iul. 20.1, etc.) and Cato’s attempt to obstruct voting on the lex Trebonia by claiming to hear thunder (Plut. Cat. Min. 43.4). The fact that Caesar was Pontifex Maximus may have made the religious angle particularly appealing.

28 Plut. Caes. 22.4: ὡς ἐκδοτέον ἐστὶ τὸν Καίσαρα τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἀφοσιουμένους τὸ παρασπόνδημα ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν ἀρὰν εἰς τὸν αἴτιον τρέποντας. Note also τὸ ἄγος (religious pollution) at Cat. Min. 51.1.

29 Plut. Cat. Min. 51.2 (above). Note that ‘Cato’ uses θύω, the same verb used to describe the supplicatio for Caesar’s victory (εὐαγγέλια θύειν: 51.1). Supplicationes were employed not only as thanksgivings for victory but more generally for expiatory or propitiatory purposes (e.g. Liv. 27.23, 40.19); cf Halkin (Reference Halkin1953), though recent scholarship has rejected his rigid distinctions between the different functions (e.g. Barton [Reference Barton2001] 55-6; Pittenger [Reference Pittenger2008] 128). Note also that supplicationes were never voted to an individual but always dis immortalibus; only late Republican usage referred (imprecisely) to supplications ‘to’ the general himself (see e.g. Cic. prov. cons. 27; Hickson-Hahn [Reference Hickson-Hahn2000] 253).

30 See e.g. Liv. 29.18-19 and below on Mancinus. Flaws in religious procedure, too, often manifested themselves at a later date. Cf. Beard (Reference Beard2012) 33-4 on the ‘distinctive temporality of divinatory time’.

31 E.g. Caes. BG 1.40.13 (quoted below). Cf. e.g. Cic. leg. Man. 47-8; Feldherr (Reference Feldherr1998) 54-6; Riggsby (Reference Riggsby2006) 168.

32 Caes. BG 1.14.5: consuesse enim deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secundiores interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere. I am grateful to Anthichthon’s anonymous reader for drawing this passage to my attenion. Cf. 1.12.6 where Caesar suggests that his ambush of the Tigurini might be seen as divine punishment for their attack on L. Cassius Longinus’ army in 107.

33 Cic. off. 3.107-9 explains that an oath sworn to an enemy is binding, and that this is the reason for the deditio of generals who make treaties without authorisation. See above on the religious aspect.

34 So e.g. Liv. per. 56: ad exsolvendum foederis Numantini religione populum Mancinus, cum huius rei auctor fuisset, deditus Numantinis non est receptus (‘To release the people from the religio of the Numantine treaty, its author Mancinus was handed over to the Numantines, but not accepted’). Cf. Rosenstein (Reference Rosenstein1990) 148.

35 Cic. rep. 3.28; off. 3.109. This amounted to a breach of fides by the Roman state as a whole: Rosenstein (Reference Rosenstein1986) esp. 243.

36 App. Ib. 83; Rosenstein (Reference Rosenstein1986) esp. 239-41, 245. Mancinus’ campaign therefore had been doomed from the start and technically contra auspicia.

37 Rosenstein (Reference Rosenstein1986) 246, with references. Note that Ti. Gracchus (tr. pl. 133), Mancinus’ quaestor, was probably already an augur (239 n. 28).

38 Cic. rep. 3.28, off. 3.109; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 7.3; Rosenstein (Reference Rosenstein1986) 245-6. Only the bill regarding Mancinus was passed.

39 Cf. Wiedemann (Reference Wiedemann1986) 489.

40 Cic. de or. 1.181. The work was probably nearing completion in mid-November 55 (Cic. Att. 4.13.2 [SB 87]; Fantham [Reference Fantham2004] 9-15). Like the in Pisonem passage below, this raises the question: did Cicero or Cato make deditio topical in 55?

41 Plin. NH 34.18.

42 E.g. Cic. Verr. 2.5.49 assumes common knowledge of deditio and its function; cf. Broughton (Reference Broughton1987) 61.

43 Dig. 50.7.18.pr. Cf. Broughton (Reference Broughton1987) 54-9, citing Diod. 36.15, who suggests that Saturninus was threatened with deditio c. 101. Conceivably, this might have been the occasion for Scaevola’s responsum.

44 Gelzer (Reference Gelzer1961) 52-3. He dates Cicero’s attack on Piso to September and Cato’s proposal (which he associates with the altercationes of Cic. Att. 4.13.1 [SB 87]) to mid-November; cf. Gelzer (Reference Gelzer1968) 131. In fact the dramatic date of the in Pisonem appears to be early August: Marshall (Reference Marshall1975). Cato made his proposal in the context of the debate on Caesar’s supplicatio, which was voted after his return from Britain (Caes. BG 4.38.5), so perhaps in September or October (cf. Stein [Reference Stein1930] 46). On the other hand, Cicero’s speech was revised for publication and the reference to supplicationes (Pis. 59) might indicate a date after Cato’s proposal: Lintott (Reference Lintott2008) 211. On balance, it is likely Cicero’s accusations against Piso predate Cato’s proposal, especially as Cicero seems to have hinted at something similar in 56 (see below), but Cato went further in actually proposing deditio.

45 Cic. Pis. 85: tua scelera di immortales in nostros milites expiaverunt; qui cum novo genere morbi adfligerentur neque se recreare quisquam posset, qui semel incidisset, dubitabat nemo quin violati hospites, legati necati, pacati atque socii nefario bello lacessiti, fana vexata hanc tantam efficerent vastitatem. (‘For your wrongs the immortal gods took vengeance on our soldiers; they were struck down by a new kind of disease from which no-one, once affected, was able to recover. Nobody doubted that the mistreatment of foreigners, the murder of ambassadors, the provocation of peaceful peoples and allies in an impious war, and the violation of sacred places brought about such great destruction.’) Cf. Pis. 84, prov. cons. 5.

46 Cic. har. resp. 35. Gelzer does not consider this passage.

47 Cic. har. resp. 34: oratores contra ius fasque interfectos ‘ambassadors have been killed contrary to law and religion’ Cf. §36: fidem iusque iurandum neglectum ‘fides and oath have been neglected’.

48 Cic. har. resp. 34; cf. Dio 39.12-14.

49 Cic. har. resp. 35: nomen quidem populi Romani tanto scelere contaminavit ut id nulla re possit nisi ipsius supplicio expiari.

50 In fact, the political exploitation of the haruspices’ report, like the Sibylline oracle a few months earlier, underscores the importance of religious matters within Roman politics (cf. Beard [Reference Beard2012]). Gelzer ([Reference Gelzer1968] 131 n. 2), for one, thought Cato meant his warning earnestly.

51 Cic. Att. 4.18.4 (SB 92).

52 Probably delivered as part of the debate on Caesar’s supplicatio. There is no evidence that Cato’s proposal was put to the vote, though Suet. Iul. 24.3 indicates that others concurred with him (censeo typically introduces a sententia: Ryan [Reference Ryan1998] 92).

53 Cf. Ramsey (Reference Ramsey2009) 45.

54 Suet. Iul. 30.3: M. Cato identidem nec sine iure iurando denuntiaret delaturum se nomen eius, simul ac primum exercitum dimisisset (‘Cato habitually declared, and indeed swore an oath, that he would prosecute [Caesar] as soon as he dismissed his army’). Plut. Cat. Min. 49.1: ὥρμησεν ὁ Κάτων ὑπατείαν παραγγέλλειν, ὡς ἀφαιρησόμενος εὐθὺς τὰ ὅπλα τοῦ Καίσαρος ἢ τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν ἐξελέγξων (‘Cato hastened to stand for the consulship, so that he might immediately deprive Caesar of his arms or convict him of treachery’). Ἐπιβουλή here probably points to a maiestas charge: Bauman (Reference Bauman1967) 229 n. 99a; cf. chap. 6 and Gelzer (Reference Gelzer1968) 104 n. 3. Note also that maiestas could have a religious aspect (e.g. App. BC 2.24). The role of Cato’s threats in the outbreak of civil war cannot be considered here, but Caesar’s ‘fear of prosecution’ should not be dismissed lightly. Most recently, Ramsey (Reference Ramsey2009) 48 has argued that ‘the threat of prosecution was certainly to be reckoned with’; cf. e.g. Brunt (Reference Brunt1986) 18; Stanton (Reference Stanton2003). Contra: Shackleton Bailey (Reference Shackleton Bailey1965) 38-40; Ehrhardt (Reference Ehrhardt1995) 30-41; Morstein-Marx (Reference Morstein-Marx2007).

55 Plut. Cat. Min. 51.2-3. Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 3.494 would date the letter (and Cato’s response) not long after the deditio proposal.

56 Plut. comp. Nic. et Crass. 4.3-4.

57 Cf. Rosenstein (Reference Rosenstein1986) 249: Mancinus’ failure ‘showed that Pompeius’ accusers had been right all along’.

58 That is, Caesar’s struggles could be interpreted as divine vengeance for the earlier massacre, though Book 4 was probably composed prior to the revolt: Powell (Reference Powell1998) 123-4 with n. 36. Cf. e.g. App. Ib. 60-1, where Viriathus’ successes are portrayed as punishment for Rome’s breach of faith (ἀπιστία) towards the Lusitanians.

59 Certainly, at the outbreak of the civil war, the defection of just one of Caesar’s officers (T. Labienus) was considered a coup for his opponents: Cic. Att. 7.12.5 (SB 135), 7.13.1 (SB 136).

60 Caes. BG 1.39-40. Caesar specifies (1.39.2) that the trouble began with his prefects, military tribunes and those who had accompanied him amicitiae causa, presumably young aristocrats.

61 Dio 38.35.2: καὶ ἐθρύλουν ὅτι πόλεμον οὔτε προσήκοντα οὔτε ἐψηφισμένον διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν τοῦ Καίσαρος φιλοτιμίαν ἀναιροῖντο. They threatened to desert him if he did not change his ways (ἂν μὴ μεταβάληται). Cf. 38.37.1, 38.41.1.

62 Caes. BG 1.40.12-13: scire enim quibuscumque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse aut aliquo facinore comperto avaritiam esse convictam. suam innocentiam perpetua vita, felicitatem Helvetiorum bello esse perspectam. (‘. . . he [Caesar] knew well that, whenever an army had disobeyed its commander, either adverse events had shown fortuna lacking, or avaritia had been proved by the exposure of some crime. His own innocentia was evident from the whole course of his life, and his felicitas from the war against the Helvetii.’) Cf. Grillo (Reference Grillo2012) 41-3.

63 Cf. Bauman (Reference Bauman1967) 110-11 and Powell (Reference Powell1998) 128 with n. 46, who suggests comparison with attempts to subvert Crassus’ army on his departure for Parthia. Cato, who seems to have believed that Crassus had no just cause for war (Cic. fin. 3.75), may well have collaborated with the tribune C. Ateius Capito on this occasion, as he did in opposition to the lex Trebonia: Dio 39.34-5; cf. Fehrle (Reference Fehrle1983) 180. Suet. Iul. 24.3 suggests that Cato accused Caesar of iniustum bellum in 55 (cf. Cornell [Reference Cornell2013] 3.494).

64 Caes. BG 1.44.12: quodsi eum interfecerit, multis se nobilibus principibusque populi Romani gratum esse facturum – id se ab ipsis per eorum nuntios compertum habere – , quorum omnium gratiam atque amicitiam eius morte redimere posset (‘If he [Ariovistus] should kill him [Caesar], he would win favour with many nobles and leaders of the Roman people – this he knew for certain from the men themselves, through their messengers – by Caesar’s death he could gain the favour and friendship of them all’). This amounts to an allegation of treason against Caesar’s opponents.

65 Cf. Rosenstein (Reference Rosenstein1990) 87 n. 113; Gruen (Reference Gruen1982) 54 n. 18.

66 As Roman sources frankly acknowledge: e.g. Liv. 9.8; per. 56 (above); Cic. off. 3. 109. Indeed, it is possible Mancinus’ non-acceptance by the Numantines was arranged in advance: see Badian (Reference Badian1968) 10-11; Rosenstein (Reference Rosenstein1986) 251; Brennan (Reference Brennan2004) 54. On the other hand, the view attributed to the Numantines by Velleius (2.1) – ‘that a national breach of faith should not be atoned for by the blood of one man’ (publicam uiolationem fidei non debere unius lui sanguine) – might reflect Roman unease with too cynical an attitude to fides publica.

67 Cic. off. 3.108: cum iusto enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur, adversus quem et totum ius fetiale et multa sunt iura communia. quod ni ita esset, numquam claros viros senatus vinctos hostibus dedidisset. Cf. rep. 2.31 where Cicero states that any war fought contrary to the fetialis religio is iniustus and impius.

68 See Griffin (Reference Griffin2008) 86-8.

69 Especially if Cato subscribed to the common Stoic view that the gods do not punish humans (see e.g. Cic. off. 2.12, 3.102; Sen. ep. 95.49, de ira 2.27.1, though Chrysippus, for one, seems to have taken a different view: SVF 2.1175-6).

70 See esp. Cic. fam. 15.4 (SB 110) and Cato’s reply, fam. 15.5 (SB 111). Cato’s interest in provincial governance will be explored in detail in my monograph Pompey, Cato, and the Governance of the Roman Empire, to appear with Oxford University Press. Cf. e.g. Afzelius (Reference Afzelius1941) 122-8; Gelzer (Reference Gelzer1963) 265; Stem (Reference Stem1999) 23-59, esp. 31, on Cato’s public image as ‘the conscience of the empire’.

71 Cato’s proposal formed part of a broader debate on Roman imperialism in 55, a year which also witnessed controversy over the legitimacy of military intervention in Egypt and Parthia – controversy in which Cato and friends played a leading role. See Dio 39.59-60.1; Cic. fam. 1.9.20 (SB 20), Pis. 48-50 on criticism in 55 of Gabinius’ Egyptian expedition, and Cic. fam. 1.1.3 (SB 12); Dio 39.14.1; Plut. Cat. Min. 35.4 for the earlier involvement of Cato and friends in the ‘Egyptian question’. On Cato’s opposition to the lex Trebonia and Crassus’ Parthian campaign, see e.g. Dio 39.34-5, 39; Cic. fin. 3.75.

72 Caes. BG 4.38.5: his rebus gestis ex litteris Caesaris dierum viginti supplicatio ab senatu decreta est. Caesar does not mention Cato’s proposal; neither does he specify which achievements the supplicatio recognised. Normally, the decree of a supplicatio specified a single war (see e.g. Liv. 27.51.8; Cic. prov. cons. 27; Hickson-Hahn [Reference Hickson-Hahn2000] 252-3). Possibly Caesar’s supplicatio in 55 was voted for all his successes that year; however, Dio (39.53.1-2) refers it to the invasion of Britain, and Plutarch, less plausibly, to the destruction of the Usipetes and Tencteri (Cat. Min. 51.1, Caes. 22.1-4, comp. Nic. et Crass. 4.3). It is possible, therefore, that the terms of the decree passed over, or dealt very carefully with, the massacre. By reporting the supplication as he does, Caesar, however, implies senatorial approbation of his acts in toto. Further – and tellingly – of Caesar’s three notices of supplications, this is the only one to specify that the supplicatio was decreed ab senatu (cf. BG 2.35.4, 7.90.8).

73 Wiseman (Reference Wiseman1998) 1-9 argues strongly for serial publication (annual until 54-53). This is certainly the impression given by Caesar’s continuator Hirtius (BG 8.48.10). Kraus (Reference Kraus2009) 160 inclines to the view that the books were composed serially ‘but finished off as a unitary narrative’.

74 Cic. prov. cons. 22. Plut. Cat. Min. 51.4 records that Caesar’s letter responding to Cato’s proposal was read in the senate by his friends. It is probably best to think of multiple strategies of dissemination (and multiple audiences: see e.g. Wiseman [Reference Wiseman1998]; Hall [Reference Hall1998]; Riggsby [Reference Riggsby2006] 12-15, 211).

75 Cato probably maintained his charges. Note that Plut. Cat. Min. 51.1-2 places his proposal in 51, while in 52 Cato stood for the consulship with the avowed intention of recalling Caesar and bringing him to trial (Plut. Cat. Min. 49.1).

76 E.g. Taylor (Reference Taylor1949) 142; Gelzer (Reference Gelzer1968) 131-2; Lee (Reference Lee1969); Szidat (Reference Szidat1970) 66-7; Powell (Reference Powell1998); Kremer (Reference Kremer1994) 174-5; Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 3.494. It was not only Caesar’s treatment of the Usipetes and Tencteri that required justification: see e.g. Riggsby (Reference Riggsby2006) chap. 6 (esp. 176) and Gelzer (Reference Gelzer1968) 104 on Caesar’s treatment of his campaign against the Helvetii. Cf. James (Reference James2000) 63-4 on Caesar’s careful construction of an ‘impression of truthful openness’ that in fact conceals important details.

77 On this see e.g. Szidat (Reference Szidat1970) 61-7; Kremer (Reference Kremer1994) 174-5.

78 See Bauman (Reference Bauman1967) chap. 6; Gelzer (Reference Gelzer1968) 104 n. 3.

79 As Gabinius argued at his extortion trial: Cic. Rab. Post. 20.

80 Caes. BG 4.5-6, 13 (though he doubtless expected most readers to be persuaded by them). Cf. Szidat (Reference Szidat1970) 66-7, who rightly draws a distinction between the justification of the German war and the justification of the detention of the ambassadors, but does not explain why the latter required a different explanation or relate this to the nature of deditio.

81 He could not resort to flat denial or blatant fabrication: see Powell (Reference Powell1998) 111 on the potential for ‘authoritative contradiction’ of Caesar’s version of affairs in Gaul. Cf. Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 3.494; Pelling (Reference Pelling2011) 252: ‘Evidently unfavourable reports were reaching Rome, and C. did not have total control of the flow of information . . . The same impression is left by C.’s evasive language . . . : he could not pretend that the ‘truce’ issue had not arisen at all.’

82 Cf. Hall (Reference Hall2000); Riggsby (Reference Riggsby2006) 15.

83 For the background to these negotiations, see Caes. BG 4.1-8.

84 Cf. e.g. Rambaud (Reference Rambaud1966) 119, Pelling (Reference Pelling2011) 251, and Cornell (Reference Cornell2013) 3.494 on Caesar’s vagueness; Szidat (Reference Szidat1970) 63-4 on his use of selective omission; and Görler (Reference Görler1976) 118-19 on his adoption of a more limited perspective than in previous books.

85 This probably meant a truce; cf. Sall. Iug. 29.4 (mora indutiarum) and below on spatium.

86 Caes. BG 4.9.3: hos exspectari equites atque eius rei causa moram interponi arbitrabatur.

87 Caes. BG 4.12.1 (below).

88 Caes. BG 4.11.4-5: se non longius milibus passuum quattuor aquationis causa processurum eo die dixit.

89 Caes. BG 4.11.6. It is not clear whether the messengers arrived before the fighting broke out.

90 Plut. Caes. 22.2, citing Caesar’s commentaries, says the Germani were sending ambassadors to him under truce (διαπρεσβευόμενοι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν σπονδαῖς) when the cavalry battle occurred.

91 Caes. BG 4.12.1: nihil timentibus nostris, quod legati eorum paulo ante a Caesare discesserant atque is dies indutiis erat ab his petitus (‘. . . our men fearing nothing, since their legates had left Caesar shortly beforehand having sought that day for a truce’). Compare Pelling (Reference Pelling2011) 251, who argues that Caesar’s ‘evasive language’ is designed to create the impression of a truce, despite his earlier refusal, in order to accuse the Germani of breaking it.

92 See below; cf. Lee (Reference Lee1969); Szidat (Reference Szidat1970) 64-7.

93 On Caesar’s evasive use of the passive, see e.g. Grillo (Reference Grillo2012) 81.

94 Caes. BG 4.12.1, 4.13.5. Cf. Fehrle (Reference Fehrle1983) 177.

95 Caes. BG 4.12.1. Despite their superior numbers, Caesar reports 74 of his men killed in the battle (4.12.3); he does not specify the number of German casualties. His earlier explanation that German cavalry were prepared to attack much larger forces of saddle-using opponents (4.2) may be part of the apologia, both for the casualties and for the episode as a whole.

96 Caes. BG 4.7.2, 4.9.1, 4.11.1, 4.12.1.

97 There is no evidence Caesar ever communicated his decision to the Germani; indeed Dio’s account (39.48.1) suggests that he deliberately misled them into thinking they were being received as ambassadors (see below).

98 Caes. BG 4.13.1: hoc facto proelio Caesar neque iam sibi legatos audiendos neque condiciones accipiendas arbitrabatur ab iis, qui per dolum atque insidias petita pace ultro bellum intulissent.

99 Caes. BG 4.13.4. Cf. Powell (Reference Powell1998) 126.

100 Caes. BG 4.13.4: consilio cum legatis et quaestore communicato, ne quem diem pugnae praetermitteret (‘He had communicated to his legates and quaestor his decision that he would not let slip any day for battle’).

101 That is, as evidence of their treachery. In fact Caesar (BG 4.13.4-5) states that their intention in coming was merely to secure a truce – albeit, he says, through deceit and for ulterior motives – rather than (for example) espionage or a surprise attack.

102 Caes. BG 4.13.4: eadem et perfidia et simulatione.

103 Caes. BG 1.47.1; cf. Szidat (Reference Szidat1970) 65.

104 Caes. BG 4.13.6 (below).

105 Caes. BG 3.9.3 (see below). Note that the same verb (retineo) is used in this passage and in 4.13.6.

106 Ando (Reference Ando2008) 496-7.

107 Caes. BG 3.9.3: legatos, quod nomen apud omnes nationes sanctum inviolatumque semper fuisset, retentos ab se et in vincula coniectos (‘They [the Veneti] had detained legati, whose name among all nations has always been sacred and inviolable, and put them in chains’).

108 Caes. BG 3.9.3 (as above), 3.16.4: in quos eo gravius Caesar vindicandum statuit quo diligentius in reliquum tempus a barbaris ius legatorum conservaretur. itaque omni senatu necato reliquos sub corona vendidit.

109 Powell (Reference Powell1998) 126; cf. Rich (Reference Rich2011) 199. On the serial view of publication, Book 3 would have been circulated prior to Cato’s proposal, and in any case it is likely that report of Caesar’s actions against the Veneti had been disseminated in some form by this time.

110 Caes. BG 4.11.5: huc postero die quam frequentissimi convenirent, ut de eorum postulatis cognosceret. Possibly Caesar is describing a conloquium, but he avoids technical language.

111 Rice Holmes (Reference Rice Holmes1911) 97; Collins (Reference Collins1972) 934; cf. Murphy (Reference Murphy1977) 238; Riggsby (Reference Riggsby2006) 248 n. 95. Indeed, Collins, who argues that Caesar was not interested in self-justification, sees this as an admission of prior intent to capture the German leaders. I would argue, on the contrary, that Caesar here is particularly keen to explain his actions, but Collins may nonetheless be right about his intentions.

112 Dio 39.48.1: ὁ δὲ τούτους μὲν ὡς καὶ ἀπόκρισίν τινα αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐς μακρὰν δώσων κατέσχεν (‘He detained them on the ground that he would give them an answer before long’).

113 Cf. Pelling (Reference Pelling2011) 251.

114 Caes. BG 4.13.6: quos sibi Caesar oblatos gavisus, illos retineri iussit.

115 E.g. Powell (Reference Powell1998) 125; Collins (Reference Collins1972) 935.

116 Cf. OLD, s.v. offero 1b-c.

117 Caes. BG 4.13.4: opportunissime res accidit.

118 Caes. BG 4.15.3 states that 430,000 were in the camp; he does not specify the number of dead, though 4.15.1-2 implies that all the German fighting men either were killed or threw themselves into the river. These figures are likely exaggerated, but it is clear that a vast number of Germani perished. Plut. Caes. 22.5 and App. Celt. 18.1 give a figure of 400,000; 300,000 at Plut. Cat. Min. 51.1 and comp. Nic. et Crass. 4.3 is probably a slip: Pelling (Reference Pelling2011) 253. The lack of Roman casualties is an implicit claim to divine favour – though not a guarantee against delayed punishment (see above).

119 Lee (Reference Lee1969) 103.

120 Cic. off. 3.102-6, refuting a hypothetical argument that M. Atilius Regulus need not have honoured his oath to the Carthaginians.

121 Val. Max. 6.6.3, from de fide publica. Cf. Liv. 38.42.7 for the incident, in 188 BC.

122 Liv. 30.25.10: quibus Scipio etsi non indutiarum fides modo a Carthaginiensibus sed ius etiam gentium in legatis uiolatum esset tamen se nihil nec institutis populi Romani nec suis moribus indignum in iis facturum esse cum dixisset.

123 App. Ib. 60: ἀπιστίᾳ μὲν ἄρα ἀπιστίαν μετιών, οὐκ ἀξίως δὲ Ῥωμαίων μιμούμενος βαρβάρους. Cic. Brut. 89 confirms that the key issue was breach of fides.

124 Cic. off. 3.102-8 (if less strictly observed than in Regulus’ day: 3.111). Cicero’s argument is complicated by its Stoic framework, which maintained (in contrast to Roman state religion) that the gods do no harm (see n. 69); cf. Dyck (Reference Dyck1996) 627-8, who argues that this passage reflects both Stoic influence and ‘the attenuated religiosity of Cicero’s time’. In fact the proposition Cicero rejects – that fides must be observed on pain of divine punishment (§102) – was fundamental to the institution of deditio.

125 Naturally breach of truce or other agreement by one side released the other from its obligations (see e.g. the fetial prayer which called for Rome to be punished if Rome was first to break a treaty: Liv. 1.24.8) but other obligations of fides existed as a matter of course and (according to e.g. Livy’s Scipio, above) despite breach of truce.

126 When Caesar says that to delay battle would be utter madness (summae dementiae esse iudicabat: BG 4.13.1), he is effectively saying that to keep his word would be madness (cf. Plut. Caes. 22.3). Scholars have seen this as Caesar’s answer to Cato’s allegations (e.g. Collins [Reference Collins1972] 234; Powell [Reference Powell1998] 199 n. 64), and no doubt many readers would have been satisfied. (It is possible, indeed, that Caesar is turning Cato’s language to his own purposes: note ‘μανίας καὶ ἀπονοίας’ in ‘Cato’s’ speech at Plut. Cat. Min. 51.2.) In the eyes of the gods, however, it was no defence that a breach of faith was committed for the benefit of the state (here, the security of Roman control in Gaul). Therefore, Caesar denies that there was any duty of fides owed to the enemy on this occasion, in view of their prior bad faith. Cf. Cic. off. 3.107 for the view that no obligation of fides applies in dealings with pirates.

127 Riggsby (Reference Riggsby2006) 189.

128 Riggsby (Reference Riggsby2006) chaps 6-7, esp. 175-80 and 205-7; cf. Gelzer (Reference Gelzer1968) 104.

129 As Griffin (Reference Griffin2008) 99 puts it, ‘Caesar clearly counted on getting away with murder because of the glory and booty he secured for Rome.’ Cf. Brunt (Reference Brunt1978) 178-83; Hall (Reference Hall2000) 81; Riggsby (Reference Riggsby2006) 189 with n. 95; Bellemore (Reference Bellemore2012) 45. It is worth reiterating, however, that Cato had some supporters, and according to Suetonius the senate voted to send a commission of inquiry to Gaul (Suet. Iul. 24.3; cf Gelzer [Reference Gelzer1968] 131). Tanusius, too, seems to have taken up Cato’s cause enthusiastically.

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