The book is an impressive contribution to the history of the Nuremberg Trials by a young historian who has a unique knowledge not only of the main trial by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) but also of the following trials by U.S., British, and French courts. The notes show that the author has not only studied the transcripts of the trials but also a vast amount of private and official correspondence of those participating, namely prosecutors, defense counsel, defendants, and judges. The author is mainly interested in the historic dimension of the trials and only to a limited extent in the legal issues. Already in the preface the author outlines his historical perspective. He stresses that according to him, no innocent person of the 206 defendants was convicted but limits his statement to historical responsibility not to legal guilt, a distinction not easy to follow for a lawyer (p. vi).
The book is organized in ten chapters. In the first chapter the author explains his intention to write a chronicle of a contest of ideas molded in the idiom of law and the case of applied humanities if ever there was one. But the book is written, according to him, “in the vernacular of the historian” (p. 15). He also explains the sources he has used (pp. 20–22). The second chapter, “Mapping the West,” deals with the background of Nazism in German history. The war of 1870–71 and, in particular, World War I are dealt with in this context and the critical attitude of western observers toward the development in Germany is outlined. The importance of émigré scholars who had left Germany and published critical reports is discussed. This leads to the view that Germany had left its western tradition when it turned to Nazism (p. 59). The third chapter, “Constructing Nuremberg,” explains the discussions during the war and the preparations for a war crimes trial. The drafting of the Charter of the Tribunal and the different views on crimes against peace, with the French delegation disagreeing in that respect, is explained (p. 79). The selection of the defendants for the trial before the IMT is recorded. Also, the composition of the Court and of the prosecution is explained.
The international trial is given the heading: “The Lunatic Fringe Mostly.” Some problems concerning the presentation of evidence under time pressure are shown (p. 104). The prosecution's case is outlined in some detail showing the differences in the presentations of the four chief prosecutors (pp. 106–11). While the Holocaust played an important role, Jewish organizations were not given a direct role in Court. The part showing the arguments of the defense starts with a picture of the “mediocrity” of the accused (pp. 121–23). The arguments of the prosecution and defense are discussed in some detail and the judgment is presented rather briefly and not always in a convincing manner (pp. 142–50). It is stated that as to the issue of retroactivity, judges largely refrained from taking up the matter (p. 142). This does not represent the full story since several pages of the IMT judgment deal extensively with the retroactivity argument. One may disagree with the findings but one must recognize that the IMT judges explained in detail why according to their view an aggressive war was outlawed by 1939 and was considered a crime. The differences in the judgment concerning the defendants, including the acquittals, are mentioned but not discussed in any detail as a lawyer would hope for.
Chapter 5 bears the heading “Paving the Sonderweg” and is the first of four to deal with trials after the judgment of the International Military Tribunal (“Sonderweg,” meaning special way, is a notion used by historians to show the special German developments, including the aberrations). The setup of the U.S. Military Tribunals is explained in detail. The twelve trials before U.S. tribunals are discussed. The trial of Alfred Krupp showed that the judges were not prepared to convict on general “Sonderweg” charges but insisted on special crimes such as slave labor and spoliation in occupied territories (pp. 183–85). When Prussian militarism was seen to be on trial, the judges acquitted all defendants on the aggressive war charge showing that they were not willing to accept general theories regarding direct responsibility of all high officers for the aggressive war (p. 192). The heading “Saving Capitalism” may show a certain bias by interpreting the acquittal of half of the economic defendants on all counts and the sentences in other cases (p. 237). The author seems to imply that the judge's position regarding the defense of normal business behavior should have been different in Nazi Germany, which as to the individual guilt is not easy to accept (p. 239). Under the heading “Trying Modernity or la Trahison des Clercs” the decision not to prosecute Karl Haushofer for his geopolitical theory is mentioned (pp. 242–45).
After that, the convictions for medical experiments and so-called euthanasia are discussed. Here the judges convicted after a “painstaking differentiation of what guilt was apportioned to whom and a strong emphasis on the benefit of the doubt.” (p. 259). The author does not mention that German courts at the same time convicted medical personnel for euthanasia, sometimes even sentencing individuals to the death penalty. Under the heading “Un Etat d'Anti-Droit: Nazi Law,” the discussion of the guilt of Carl Schmitt and Ernst Rudolf Huber is mentioned (pp. 260–64). And the indictments of lawyers are presented, which resulted in penalties but also in acquittals, with the court emphasizing the principle of due process of law in these cases (p. 272). The Weizsäcker case is discussed in some detail along with other cases against defendants in the Ministries, where of twenty-one defendants only two were acquitted and the others convicted to prison sentences up to twenty-five years (p. 288). The S.S. trials are discussed in that context. Under the next heading, the military cases are addressed (p. 310). In particular, the hostage issue where one of the courts held that reprisals taking and executing hostages if not in unproportional numbers was not unlawful in World War II, contrary to the later Geneva Conventions of 1949, which led to strong dissents among experts and some of the judges. In this context, the judgment by the British court in Hamburg convicting Feldmarschall von Manstein is also discussed. At the time of these trials, one of the U.S. judges in 1949 considered the Soviets rather than the Germans the real major war criminals (pp. 338, 351).
Chapter 9, “Reintegrating the Other,” deals with the Cold War developments that led to the Landsberg Report by McCloy of January 1951, which overturned most of the convictions of the U.S. trials (p. 366). In 1957–58, the last prisoners were released. The integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the western treaties is mentioned in that context. In his conclusion, the author states that the tribunals differed in their willingness to engage historical reasoning generally (p. 407). This again shows the interest of the historian in the historical discussions rather than in the legal arguments. The author has gained an admirable expertise of the different files as shown by his explanations. The book is not always easy to read for a lawyer because the presentation of the prosecution and the defense seems to get more attention at times than the judgment. That is certainly due to the historical rather than the legal emphasis put on the trials by the author. But it is a very impressive contribution to the first examples of trials of state crimes. What is very important in that context is the detailed history, not only of the judgment by the International Military Tribunal but also of the cases decided in particular by U.S. tribunals following this judgment.
