Challenging Conventional Wisdom

There are many ways in which African experiences challenge commonly held assumptions about migration, not just within the region but more broadly. Conventional wisdom holds, for example, that migrants face more hostility if they are culturally different from their hosts in terms of religion, language, or other traits. There is some evidence from Europe for this (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay Reference Brader, Valentino and Suhay2008; Ford Reference Ford2011; Hainmueller & Hangartner Reference Hainmueller and Hangartner2013), but experiences in Africa suggest otherwise. Adida (Reference Adida2014) finds that cultural similarities between migrants and hosts make relations worse, not better, as leaders of both communities are motivated to highlight differences in order to maintain their authority. Moreover, culturally diverse countries are not necessarily more welcoming to additional diversity in the form of immigrants. Survey data show that opposition to immigration is in fact significantly higher in more ethnically diverse African countries (Whitaker & Giersch Reference Whitaker and Giersch2015), perhaps because these countries already face contentious debates about the rights of citizenship among different groups.

African experiences also challenge the simplistic distinction between “migrant” and “refugee.” International law defines a refugee as someone who flees his or her home country due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a social group. Being a refugee is thus inherently political. A migrant, in contrast, seeks better economic opportunities. But people migrate for multiple reasons, including a combination of economic hardship and a lack of political voice. Poor economic conditions often are the result of ineffective governance by repressive authoritarian governments. The collapse of Zimbabwe’s economy in the early 2000s, for example, was driven in part by politically motivated land grab policies implemented by Robert Mugabe’s government. Even as domestic critics of these policies were being punished for their dissent, other governments in the region, including those of Botswana and South Africa, denied admission to thousands of Zimbabweans arriving at their borders on the basis that they were migrants and not refugees. Similarly, as Dan Connell argued recently in this journal, Eritrea “masks the political origins” of the recent out-migration of as much as 15 percent of its population by “insisting they are ‘migrants,’ not refugees”; this “is a fiction that’s convenient for destination countries . . . [that are] eager for a rationale for turning the Eritreans (and others) away” (2016:219). With politics and economics clearly interconnected, one cannot determine which is to blame for outmigration. As long as governments continue to identify these people as migrants, however, producing states can avoid political embarrassment and receiving states can avoid giving them the refuge they seek.

Driven by this belief that African migrants are simply seeking better economic opportunities, a common solution to the migration “crisis” lies in generating higher levels of economic development within Africa. The European Union especially has struck a series of high-profile deals to provide billions of dollars to migrant-producing and host countries within the region in an effort to prevent migrants from finding their way north (Macdonald Reference Macdonald2015; Bybee Reference Bybee2017). An underlying assumption is that migrants will stay home if there are more economic opportunities there. Besides downplaying obvious political motivations for migration, this assumption belies reality. Evidence suggests that economic growth actually leads to higher levels of outmigration (de Haas Reference de Haas2007, Reference de Haas2008), in part because people have more resources to pay for the costly journey. People who migrate to Europe especially are often well-educated and better off than their peers (de Haas Reference de Haas2008). The uptick in African migration to Europe over the past decade has coincided with a period of sustained growth in many African countries; instead of preventing outmigration, development has increased the ability of Africans to move. Moreover, economic development does not ensure that host or transit countries in Africa will treat migrants from neighboring countries any better. Survey data show that people in wealthier African countries are more likely to oppose immigration (Whitaker & Giersch Reference Whitaker and Giersch2015), perhaps because they want to protect economic prosperity for themselves (Campbell Reference Campbell2003).

These findings from Africa raise doubts about the existing system by which wealthy countries essentially pay poorer countries to keep migrants within their respective regions. This is how the international refugee regime has operated for decades, with donor governments paying for the upkeep of tens of millions of refugees in Africa and Asia while agreeing to resettle only a tiny fraction (less than 0.5%) in Europe and North America. The system does little to address the root causes of migration or to prevent movement to other regions, but the focus on economic challenges is a convenient way for African governments to solicit money from donors. Host countries like Tanzania and Kenya, for example, have threatened periodically to close refugee camps due to funding shortages, often prompting renewed support (Whitaker Reference Whitaker2008, Reference Whitaker2016). Similarly, migrant-generating countries have highlighted their economic woes, both to attract international aid and to shirk responsibility for the political factors causing people to flee. Seeking to avoid further migration to their shores, the United States and European Union regularly provide the lion’s share of funding for global refugee operations.

Like counterparts elsewhere, African leaders also portray migrants as a security threat. Although there are legitimate concerns in some contexts, the threat often is exaggerated. Many times, refugees themselves are less a source of insecurity than other actors in the conflict. In justifying its decision to close Somali refugee camps, for example, the Kenyan government emphasized the security threat posed by al-Shabaab (Whitaker Reference Whitaker2016). Officials have produced no evidence to support claims that recent terrorist attacks in Kenya were planned by refugees in the Dadaab camp, but the climate of insecurity has been used to justify suspicion and harassment of all ethnic Somalis in the country (Balakian Reference Balakian2016). ^{Footnote 7} In Tanzania, the simple presence of Rwandan refugees was perceived as a threat. The government’s 1996 forced repatriation operation was prompted by fear that the Hutu-dominated camps would be attacked by Rwanda’s Tutsi-led government, as happened in neighboring Congo (then Zaire) (Whitaker Reference Whitaker1999, Reference Whitaker, Steiner, Gibney and Loescher2003a).

Empirical research does show that the risk of both domestic and international conflict increases with the presence of large numbers of refugees from neighboring states, but the overall chance of conflict is still very low (Salehyan Reference Salehyan2007, Reference Salehyan2008; Salehyan & Gleditsch Reference Salehyan and Gleditsch2006). The likelihood of conflict in such situations depends on several variables, including the political cohesion of the refugees (Lischer Reference Lischer2006) and the existing political context into which they enter (Whitaker Reference Whitaker2003b). Furthermore, the slightly increased risk of conflict does not mean that refugees themselves are the perpetrators. A recent study shows that refugee-hosting regions are more likely to be victims of attacks on civilians by governments and armed groups, especially when refugees are self-settled (Fisk Reference Fisk2016). These studies say nothing about any security risks associated with African refugees who resettle in other regions, but those are exceedingly low because of relatively small numbers and the rigorous vetting procedures they undergo.

Whether real or exaggerated, African leaders’ claims about the security threat posed by migrants find a receptive domestic and international audience. In the context of multiparty competition, as discussed below, elected officials want to be seen as doing everything they can to address security concerns. Plans to close refugee camps in Kenya were announced just over a year before the 2017 general election, at a time when opposition politicians were staging frequent protests against corruption and other scandals. Shifting the rhetoric toward external security threats conveniently took the focus off domestic shortcomings. On the international stage, the language of security resonates well with donors, especially when migrants can be linked (however remotely) to terrorism. Since 2001 African governments have received millions of dollars from the United States and other Western donors for counterterrorism cooperation. Seeking to capitalize further on a common threat, leaders in countries such as Uganda and Nigeria have labeled opposition politicians as terrorists (Whitaker Reference Whitaker2007). Given the new U.S. president’s recent statements about the security threat posed by migrants, African leaders are likely to increase their own use of such language as they seek to garner favor and support from his administration.

The Politics of African Migration

With policymakers strategically highlighting economic and security concerns, political dynamics often are overlooked in journalistic and academic accounts of African migration. As we have seen, politics can be an important push factor causing people to leave their homes. Authoritarian governments stifle alternative viewpoints, foment fear, and thwart innovation, driving people to pursue opportunities elsewhere. A country like Rwanda has been free of widespread violence and experiencing rapid economic growth for two decades, but many of its citizens continue to reside in Kenya, Belgium, and beyond because of the repressive political climate at home. Despite this common pattern, donors like the United States have reduced funding in recent years for good governance and democracy programs, which are arguably just as important as those aimed at economic development (and possibly even more so).

Political dynamics also shape responses to African migration. Since the 1990s, increasing hostility toward migrants in many African countries has coincided with the spread of multiparty competition. The Kenyan plan to close refugee camps in the heat of an election season is not unique. In 1995, six months before its first multiparty general election, Tanzania closed its western border to prevent a further influx of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. In postapartheid South Africa, politicians frequently have used anti-immigrant rhetoric to garner support (Landau Reference Landau2010; Mosselson Reference Mosselson2010; Neocosmos Reference Neocosmos2010). The long-time ruling party in Cameroon has used the language of autochthony to undermine opposition candidates (Geschiere Reference Geschiere2009). In Côte d’Ivoire, politicians facing multiparty competition developed the ultranationalist concept of Ivoirité to attract votes from key constituencies (Crook Reference Crook1997; Mitchell Reference Mitchell2011; Whitaker Reference Whitaker2005), ultimately contributing to a violent conflict with citizens who were excluded from this identity and treated as foreigners. Even in Botswana, which has been held up (rightly or wrongly) as an example of multiparty democracy in Africa, hostility toward migrants has increased during a period when elections have become increasingly competitive (Poteete Reference Poteete2012).

Political liberalization in Africa thus has a dark underbelly. In the absence of strong ideological differences among parties, politicians often mobilize support by engaging in identity politics. In such situations, migrants and refugees can be a convenient scapegoat for complex problems such as crime, unemployment, and insecurity. In a recent analysis of survey data from eleven African countries (Whitaker & Giersch Reference Whitaker and Giersch2015), my co-author and I found that opposition to immigration is significantly higher in more democratic countries and when the survey is conducted closer to a national election. These findings suggest that the use of anti-immigrant rhetoric by politicians around election time legitimizes underlying hostility and fuels broader xenophobia. Democracy thus becomes a vehicle for the spread of illiberal ideas. This pattern does not hold true everywhere, though. In Ghana, for example, longstanding immigrant groups have taken advantage of citizenship laws and a competitive two-party system to constitute themselves as an important voting bloc (Kobo Reference Kobo2010), prompting politicians from both sides to actively compete for their support during election campaigns (Whitaker Reference Whitaker2015).

The politicization of immigration and immigrants is not new, of course, and is not limited to emerging democracies in Africa. Anti-immigrant rhetoric has been part of the political landscape for decades in established democracies in Europe and North America. The rise of radical right parties in Europe has attracted considerable scholarly attention (Art Reference Art2011; Dahlström & Esaiasson Reference Dahlström and Esaiasson2013; Mudde Reference Mudde2014; Rydgren Reference Rydgren2004, Reference Rydgren2005), and immigration has long been used as a wedge issue in American politics (Jeong et al. Reference Jeong2011). The use of anti-immigrant rhetoric was on full display again in 2016 and 2017, during the “Brexit” campaign in the United Kingdom and the presidential elections in the United States and France. Building on research from outside the region, Africanists should continue to examine the ways in which democracy can generate illiberal outcomes, not just for migrants and refugees but for other marginalized groups as well. ^{Footnote 8}

Finally, but often forgotten, politics play a role in how home countries interact with their citizens abroad. Global patterns of migration have created large African diaspora populations around the world. Millions of Nigerians, South Africans, and Kenyans live outside Africa, but emigration is especially important for smaller countries such as Cape Verde, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Seychelles, which have more than 10 percent of their populations living abroad (Gonzalez-Garcia et al. Reference Gonzalez-Garcia2016). These diaspora populations stay involved in their home countries, not just by providing billions of dollars in remittances, but also by participating in politics. About half of African governments now permit dual citizenship for their nationals living in other countries (Manby Reference Manby2009), though the process of obtaining such rights often has been politicized (Whitaker Reference Whitaker2011). African diasporas have been lobbying for the ability to participate in home country elections through overseas voting (Jaulin & Smith Reference Jaulin and Smith2016), but partisan rivalries and debates surrounding the circumstances of migration have stalled their efforts in some cases (Wellman Reference Wellman2016; Whitaker & Inyanji Reference Whitaker and Inyanji2016). As the number of migrants continues to increase, within Africa and beyond, more research is needed about prevailing political discourses on migration, the lived experiences of migrants and hosts, the perceived and real security implications of migration, and the political influence of diaspora populations.