“In all candor, I just don't think much about Europe except in connection with a cut in our troop strength there.” So a “Senate leader” confessed to the New York Times in September 1969. His admission comes as no surprise to the student of Congress's role in shaping America's European policy from 1969 to 1990. In those years congressional opinion on Europe was marked by division and uncertainty; the unity of purpose that led Congress to play a decisive role in extricating America from Vietnam was nowhere to be seen. Many legislators did agree that a substantial reduction of American forces in Europe would benefit the American economy, and perhaps the NATO alliance as well. Yet even when strong sentiment prevailed, as on this issue, Congress was not able to unite on a statement expressing the body's will, let alone on legislation to see that will carried out. Legislators tended, in addition, to give very little attention to specifically German issues, and then only in the broader context of Western Europe and NATO. This disinterest stemmed largely from Congress's inability, from the late 1960s on, to discern what precisely the issues that affected Germany were. After Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik relieved the atmosphere of crisis that had surrounded the German question, American legislators devoted less attention to Germany.