Book contents
- On the Shoulders of Giants
- Econometric Society Monographs
- On the Shoulders of Giants
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Part I Threads in the Tapestry
- Part II Innovation Theory (I): Cumulative Innovation
- Part III Innovation Theory (II): Law and Economics
- Part IV Club Theory
- Part V Evolutionary Game Theory
- Part VI Public Policy
- Part VII Living Legacy
- Part VIII Epilog
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Document
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 October 2017
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Book contents
- On the Shoulders of Giants
- Econometric Society Monographs
- On the Shoulders of Giants
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Part I Threads in the Tapestry
- Part II Innovation Theory (I): Cumulative Innovation
- Part III Innovation Theory (II): Law and Economics
- Part IV Club Theory
- Part V Evolutionary Game Theory
- Part VI Public Policy
- Part VII Living Legacy
- Part VIII Epilog
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
In active investment climates where firms sequentially improve each other’s products, a patent can terminate either because it expires or because a noninfringing innovation displaces its product in the market. We define the length of time until one of these happens as the effective patent life, and show how it depends on patent breadth. We distinguish lagging breadth, which protects against imitation, from leading breadth, which protects against new improved products. We compare two types of patent policy with leading breadth: (1) patents are finite but very broad, so that the effective life of a patent coincides with its statutory life, and (2) patents are long but narrow, so that the effective life of a patent ends when a better product replaces it. The former policy improves the diffusion of new products, but the latter has lower R&D costs.
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- On the Shoulders of GiantsColleagues Remember Suzanne Scotchmer's Contributions to Economics, pp. 121 - 156Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
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