On what kind of human action and omission is treated here. We find it grounded in experience that both some thoughts of the soul and some movements of the body stem from the will of the soul. Others, on the other hand, are not subject to the will (§325 Met.). For example: it is based on my [2] will that I now direct my thoughts to considering the good deeds of God, which he has shown me on previous occasions, but not that I see the person who encounters me or hear the shrieks of someone making noise (§219, 786 Met.), nor that I think of those things that occur to me in such circumstances (§238 Met.). No less does it stand under my will whether I now want to stand or sit, but not whether I digest the meal I have eaten or not (§519 Met.). What ranks among the actions of human beings. Since what stems from our will has its ground in the will (§29 Met.) and thus in us (§197 Met.), and similarly the movements of the body that are subject to the will have their ground in the state [Zustand]1 of the body (§878, 882 Met.), both the thoughts of the soul as well as the movements of the body that stem from the will rank among our actions (§104 Met.). Which are free. And since the will has a freedom to choose among possible things that which pleases us the most (§510 Met.), so are such human actions free, and therefore receive the name of free actions. To be precise, the movements of the body, by means of which the desires of the soul are fulfilled, are free with respect to the soul (§884, 885 Met.). On the other hand, since we encounter no freedom independently of the will (§492, 519 Met.), so is there also [3] no freedom in human action, whether it consists in thoughts of the soul or movements of the body, if it is not subjected to the will. Which are necessary. The action in such cases is necessary and therefore receives the name of a necessary action. Here we are only concerned with the free actions of human beings and in no way with those that are necessary.