Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface to the Second Edition
- 1 Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Asymmetric Information
- 2 Basic Models and Tools
- 3 Hidden Action
- 4 Corporate Governance
- 5 Hidden Characteristics
- 6 Auctions
- 7 Voting and Preference Revelation
- 8 Public Goods and Preference Revelation
- 9 Matching
- 10 General Competitive Equilibrium
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Preface to the Second Edition
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface to the Second Edition
- 1 Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Asymmetric Information
- 2 Basic Models and Tools
- 3 Hidden Action
- 4 Corporate Governance
- 5 Hidden Characteristics
- 6 Auctions
- 7 Voting and Preference Revelation
- 8 Public Goods and Preference Revelation
- 9 Matching
- 10 General Competitive Equilibrium
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Summary
I am pleased to have this opportunity to express my appreciation to the following students and colleagues who assisted me at various stages: My former students Hanley Chiang, Ryan Mutter, and Sita Slavov discovered some glitches in the first edition and brought them to my attention. My current students David Hansen, Jonathan Kuzma, and Emma Murray helped me fill in many of the boxes that connect the theory to contemporary events, and Matthew Draper did some preliminary spadework for Chapter 9. I am grateful for the superb diagrams produced by Carrie Clingan, a student in the Masters in Public Policy program at William and Mary. Jerry Kelly of the Syracuse University Economics Department made copious comments on early drafts of Chapter 7. I have benefited from the insightful comments of Ed Nelson of the Tulane Economics Department, John Weymark of the Vanderbilt Economics Department, and David Ellerman of the World Bank. My colleague and coauthor for two undergraduate texts, Alfredo Pereira, taught me how to write textbooks. I express my deep gratitude to these people. I assume responsibility for any errors in the book.
It is a pleasure to acknowledge the support and encouragement of Scott Parris, the economics and finance editor at Cambridge University Press, and the diligence of his assistant, Brianne Millett. My readers will benefit significantly from the finishing touches of my copy editor, Nancy Hulan. Renee Redding, of TechBooks, did a first-class job of guiding me through the production process.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- IncentivesMotivation and the Economics of Information, pp. xi - xiiPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006