Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Criminalizing the Corporate Control Process
- 2 Deterrence in Review
- 3 Assessing the Failure of Corporate Deterrence and Criminal Justice
- 4 Corporate Deterrence and Civil Justice
- 5 Corporate Deterrence and Regulatory Justice
- 6 Cooperative Models of Corporate Compliance: Alternatives to Criminalization
- 7 Criminalization versus Cooperation: An Empirical Test
- 8 Shaping the Contours of Control
- Appendix A Study One: Questionnaire Items and Responses
- Appendix B Study One: Sample Characteristics
- Appendix C Study Two: Questionnaire Items and Responses
- Appendix D Study Two: Sample Characteristics
- Name Index
- Subject Index
5 - Corporate Deterrence and Regulatory Justice
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Criminalizing the Corporate Control Process
- 2 Deterrence in Review
- 3 Assessing the Failure of Corporate Deterrence and Criminal Justice
- 4 Corporate Deterrence and Civil Justice
- 5 Corporate Deterrence and Regulatory Justice
- 6 Cooperative Models of Corporate Compliance: Alternatives to Criminalization
- 7 Criminalization versus Cooperation: An Empirical Test
- 8 Shaping the Contours of Control
- Appendix A Study One: Questionnaire Items and Responses
- Appendix B Study One: Sample Characteristics
- Appendix C Study Two: Questionnaire Items and Responses
- Appendix D Study Two: Sample Characteristics
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Summary
the primary responsibility for corporate crime control in the United States resides in regulatory agencies. These agencies are involved in all aspects of administrative justice from law making and administration to adjudication and sentencing. In examining the goals, strategies, and accomplishments of regulatory justice, I address similar issues and concerns raised in earlier chapters, such as whether legal processing of corporate criminals through administrative law and its remedies (e.g., investigation, processing, and sanctioning) promotes deterrence. In this vein, it is important to note that the goal of regulation is not punishment per se, but rather to produce business behavior that adheres to rules or standards. Although this may appear to be a fine distinction, it is not an inconsequential one from a deterrence perspective that assumes law-abiding behavior to stem from the fear of punishment. At issue, then, is whether nonpunitive compliance systems are capable of yielding deterrent effects.
As part of this overall review of regulatory justice, I highlight particular challenges to deterrence that coincide with three distinct periods of regulatory activity in the United States; assess current deterrence arguments, both theoretical and empirical; compare assumptions embedded in punitive (deterrence) versus compliance (persuasion) strategies; and consider whether these approaches to corporate crime control are oppositional or complimentary in nature.
Business regulation in the united states
Regulation is defined as “state-imposed limitation on the discretion that may be exercised by individuals or organizations, which is supported by the threat of sanction.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Corporate Crime, Law, and Social Control , pp. 79 - 97Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002