Keynes's World War II involvement in the areas of relief and commodity policy, in addition to its links with the Article VII discussions and other proposals for post-war Europe, had its origins in British concerns about export surpluses.

These surpluses arose for two main reasons: the disruption of pre-war channels of trade by the war and ensuing blockade of enemy countries and the desire, for economic warfare reasons, to deny the enemy access to supplies of strategic materials. As a result of early attempts to buoy up primary exporters' positions and to deny the enemy supplies, Britain acquired titles to large stocks of primary commodities, Australian wool and Egyptian cotton to name only two, and faced the need to evolve a longer-term policy. On 19 July 1940 the Economic Policy Committee of the War Cabinet set up a Ministerial Sub-Committee on Export Surpluses ‘to report what steps, such as restriction of production, purchase and storage, destruction, etc., should be taken to deal with surpluses in producing countries of commodities which should be denied to the enemy by our blockade’ The Sub-Committee's brief was further influenced by a statement by the Prime Minister in the Commons on 20 August which reiterated the arguments for continuing the blockade and committed Britain to a policy of building up stocks of food and raw materials for post-war relief purposes.

On 9 September the Ministerial Sub-Committee set up an official sub-committee to carry out its task. This sub-committee after surveying the situation recommended that Britain should purchase, with or without American help, £200 million in surplus commodities, linking the purchases with the goal of restricting or regulating future production.