Appointing Central Bankers The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A Formal Model of the Appointment Process
- 3 Estimating Monetary Policy Preferences
- 4 Empirically Testing the Model's Predictions
- 5 Appointments to the European Central Bank
- 6 The Origins of the Federal Reserve Appointment Process
- 7 Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
Titles in the series
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2009
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A Formal Model of the Appointment Process
- 3 Estimating Monetary Policy Preferences
- 4 Empirically Testing the Model's Predictions
- 5 Appointments to the European Central Bank
- 6 The Origins of the Federal Reserve Appointment Process
- 7 Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
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- Appointing Central BankersThe Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union, pp. 161Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003